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I. INTRODUCTION 
The headline-grabbing business failures of late have brought 
increased attention to the relatively unresolved area of multinational 
bankruptcies. Parmalat, Global Crossing, and United Airlines are among 
the few international juggernauts that have foundered. In the financial 
meltdowns of these cross-border institutions, assets and creditors are 
dispersed throughout commercial environments that rarely end neatly at 
national borders. There has been heated debate, both in scholarly 
literature and the practical battlefield, over how best to resolve these 
transnational insolvencies, and there is nothing yet approaching a 
consensus. Reform efforts of various stripes have almost uniformly 
failed to gain meaningful international support.1 
At the hub of this inability to generate international consensus is a 
theoretical rift. The essence of disagreement revolves around the 
competing theories of “territorialism” and “universalism” as the 
 
1. Treaties proved unavailing. See Jay L. Westbrook, Theory and Pragmatism in Global 
Insolvencies: Choice of Law and Choice of Forum, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 457, 487 (1991) 
(discussing the Strasbourg Convention and the failed Brussels Convention). So did other 
attempts. See Todd Kraft & Allison Aranson, Transnational Bankruptcies: Section 304 and 
Beyond, 1993 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 329 (1993) (discussing the challenges facing adoption of the 
International Bar Association’s largely ignored Model International Insolvency Cooperation Act). 
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preferred normative models for resolving multinational failures.2 While 
territorialism counsels following strict sovereign borders in allocating 
regulatory jurisdiction among nations over globally dispersed assets,3 
universalism embraces a one-law approach: the application of one 
“exporting” country’s law extraterritorially to other “receiving” 
jurisdictions.4 
Given that this theoretical debate between territorialism and 
universalism remains ongoing and unresolved, we should be 
unsurprised at the historic inability to craft an international agreement 
among nations, by treaty or other means. Indeed, we should remain 
pessimistic in our prognosis. Nevertheless, an important and fresh 
development in international bankruptcy has recently defied our bearish 
expectations. After decades of disagreement, one recent attempt at 
reform has bucked the trend of failure and actually won widespread 
international support: the United Nations Commission on International 
Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency 
(Model Law).5 Since the Model Law, there has been an explosion of 
international bankruptcy reform.6 These efforts include UNCITRAL’s 
best practices Draft Legislative Guide, designed for countries seeking to 
revise their insolvency laws;7 the American Law Institute’s (ALI’s) 
Transnational Insolvency Project (TIP), a series of proposals for cross-
border insolvencies in the three NAFTA countries;8 and the European 
 
2. See Ian F. Fletcher, The European Convention on Insolvency Proceedings: Choice-of-Law 
Provisions, 33 TEX. INT’L. L.J. 119, 124 (1998) (characterizing universalism and territorialism as 
“essentially rival schools of thought about the ‘correct’ way to govern transnational insolvency”). 
See generally Robert K. Rasmussen, Colloquy, International Bankruptcy: Resolving 
Transnational Insolvencies Through Private Ordering, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2252 (2000) 
[hereinafter Colloquy] (discussing difficulties with both theories). 
3. See, e.g., Lynn M. LoPucki, Cooperation in International Bankruptcy: A Post-Universalist 
Approach, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 696 (1999). 
4. See, e.g., Westbrook, supra note 1, at 461. 
5. U.N. COMM. ON INT’L TRADE LAW, MODEL LAW ON CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY WITH 
GUIDE TO ENACTMENT, U.N. Sales No. E.99.V.3 (1999) [hereinafter MODEL LAW]. 
6. See, e.g., Bob Wessels, The European Union Insolvency Regulation: An Overview with 
Trans-Atlantic Elaborations, in ANNUAL SURVEY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 494 (William L. 
Norton, Jr. ed., 2003) (describing the provisions and limitations of the recently adopted EU 
Insolvency Regulation). 
7. UNCITRAL Draft Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law, 24th Sess., U.N. Doc. 
A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.54 (2001) [hereinafter UNCITRAL Draft Legislative Guide]. 
8. AM. L. INST., TRANSNATIONAL INSOLVENCY: COOPERATION AMONG NAFTA 
COUNTRIES. INTERNATIONAL STATEMENT OF UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY LAW, GENERAL 
PRINCIPLES VOLUME (2003) [hereinafter ALI TIP], cited in Jay L. Westbrook, Multinational 
Enterprises in General Default: Chapter 15, The ALI Principles, and The EU Insolvency 
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Union’s Insolvency Regulation, a legal enactment covering intra–
European Union multinational bankruptcies.9 Accordingly, these recent 
developments present something of a puzzle: why, in the face of so 
many false starts, and especially in the face of ongoing disagreement 
over the theoretical benefits of universalism compared to territorialism, 
did international bankruptcy reform finally take off? Was it simply a 
matter of fortuitous historical timing? Was there something specific 
about the mechanism of the UNCITRAL Model Law (perhaps its status 
as a model law, as opposed to a treaty, or perhaps its substantive 
content) that accounted for its ability to break the loggerhead? What 
makes a mechanism such as a model law effective at galvanizing reform 
in international bankruptcy law? 
This Article examines how international bankruptcy law changes. At 
one level, its scope is thus restricted to the peculiarities of insolvency 
law and its international challenges in particular. On another level, 
however, the model builds upon insights from conflicts literature and 
other theoretical tools of general applicability. What I am specifically 
trying to do in this study of how bankruptcy law changes is explore and 
explain what I call a “mechanism” of reform in international 
bankruptcy. By this I mean looking at a specific product of international 
bankruptcy reform—here the UNCITRAL Model Law—as a case study 
of sorts. The goal is to see if it has distinguishing characteristics that can 
explain its successful reception by the international community in an 
environment, such as bankruptcy, where international consensus 
remains elusive and mired in theoretical disagreement. Accordingly, I 
situate this project on a middle ground between a substantive critique of 
the universalism versus territorialism theories of international 
insolvency law more generally on the one hand,10 and a process analysis 
of international commercial law on the other.11 In focusing on a 
mechanism of reform, such as the UNCITRAL Model Law (which has 
just been enacted in the United States), I am thus trying to explain what 
made one project work where other putative reform mechanisms 
faltered. In doing so, I scrutinize both the substantive provisions of that 
 
Regulation, 76 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 41 n.109 (2002). 
9. Council Regulation 1346/2000, On Insolvency Proceedings, 2000 O.J. (L 160) 0001-
00013, available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/pri/en/oj/dat/2000/l_160/l_16020000630en00010 
018.pdf (last visited Nov. 6, 2005). 
10. See, e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk & Andrew T. Guzman, An Economic Analysis of 
Transnational Bankruptcies, 42 J. LAW & ECON. 775 (1999). 
11. See, e.g., Paul B. Stephan, The Futility of Unification and Harmonization in International 
Commercial Law, 39 VA. J. INT’L L. 743 (1999) (applying public choice analysis). 
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mechanism and the process by which it was created. My result is a 
theory of how international bankruptcy law can change most readily. 
The principal contention of this Article is that international 
bankruptcy reform mechanisms such as UNCITRAL’s Model Law 
succeed due to a synergistic combination of specific attributes, the most 
important of which are a modesty of scope and a procedural focus. By 
adopting an incrementalist and procedurally animated approach (what I 
call “procedural incrementalism” as a shorthand), the Model Law 
created an opportunity to bridge the theoretical gap between 
universalists and territorialists. This was accomplished obliquely: on the 
surface, the Model Law bridged it by appearing to be a hybrid of 
universalism and territorialism, with something seemingly for everyone. 
Beneath the surface, however, the Model Law actually advanced 
universalism, and in a way that caused minimal affront to territorialist 
jurisdictions. The Model Law’s design thus allowed hesitant states to 
“acclimate” to a regime of universalism. This is the genius of the Model 
Law and makes it unprecedented in its effectiveness as a mechanism of 
international reform. Following years of failure in an environment 
where the comparative merits of territorialism and universalism remain 
hotly contested, the Model Law actually won support. 
To make this claim, I must first lay several foundations, which 
naturally divides the Article into five sections. Section II sets the 
theoretical stage and outlines the continuing debate between 
universalism and territorialism. This is important in order to articulate 
the principles of universalism that are likely to be the sticking points for 
territorialists. Sections III and IV then explore UNCITRAL’s Model 
Law. Rather than conduct a clause-by-clause exegesis,12 Section III (the 
“surface” analysis) sketches a broad outline of how the Model Law 
seemingly operates vis-à-vis the theoretical debate presented in Section 
I. Section IV (the “subsurface” analysis) then explores several specific 
provisions of the Model Law in detail that operate more toward its 
periphery and belie its true location along the universalism axis. 
Building upon this scrutiny, Section V proposes a model for how the 
Model Law achieved its important advancements, namely, widespread 
international support and the partial acceptance of universalism, 
notwithstanding the ongoing disagreement presented in Section II. It 
 
12. This task has been conducted commendably elsewhere. See, e.g., Andre J. Berends, The 
UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency: A Comprehensive Overview, 6 TUL. J. 
INT’L & COMP. L. 309 (1998). 
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uses some insights of modern conflicts literature and contends that the 
Model Law’s success lies not simply in its status as a model law, but 
from its attention to “low stakes,” modest matters and concomitant 
focus on procedural issues. This procedural incrementalism holds the 
key to its effectiveness as a mechanism of reform. Finally, Section VI 
tentatively tests the model’s consistency with subsequent reform efforts 
that have followed upon the Model Law in bankruptcy. 
II. THE TRANSNATIONAL INSOLVENCY DEBATE 
In this Section, I sketch in broad strokes the outline of the theoretical 
debate regarding transnational insolvencies. I begin with the unique 
theoretical elements of domestic insolvency laws that only intensify in 
complexity at the international level. 
A. Insolvency Law Generally 
There are at least four key features of a domestic insolvency system. 
First, a domestic insolvency system generally strives to be “market 
symmetric,” i.e., co-extensive with an entire domestic economy’s 
scope.13 Thus, in a federal system such as the United States, one 
bankruptcy law operates at the federal level, superseding and hence 
unifying the laws of the several states. Accordingly, although property 
liens and contractual rights might be defined locally, the reordering of 
those rights to deal with general financial default occurs federally.14 
Second, and relatedly, bankruptcy has been characterized as “meta-
law” that swoops in and trumps pre-existing legal entitlements in a 
specifically defined context: when an entity experiences general 
financial default.15 Accordingly, bankruptcy laws run “deep” and have 
the tendency to get in the way of and displace other laws and policies in 
the domestic system. The list of the activities exempted from the scope 
of the bankruptcy stay under American law is narrow.16 
Third, when a debtor enters the bankruptcy system, the nature of the 
legal proceeding is in rem. In other words, if one of the principal 
 
13. See Jay L. Westbrook, A Global Solution to Multinational Default, 98 MICH L. REV. 
2276, 2283–84 (2000). 
14. See G. Marcus Cole, The Federalist Cost of Bankruptcy Exemption Reform, 74 AM. 
BANKR. L.J. 227, 236–41 (2000). 
15. See Frederick Tung, Fear of Commitment in International Bankruptcy, 33 GEO. WASH. 
INT’L L. REV. 555, 566–68 (2001) (attributing the term “meta-law” to Manfred Balz, The 
European Union Convention on Insolvency Proceedings, 70 AM. BANKR. L.J. 485, 486 (1996)). 
16. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(b) (2000). 
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functions of an insolvency system is to distribute or reorganize the 
assets of a debtor, then all the stakeholders must be bound by the 
proceeding’s outcome.17 Consequently, it is difficult to consider the 
bankruptcy of an enterprise without also considering the jurisdiction of 
the bankruptcy system’s legal institutions to bind all the participants in 
property-based actions.18 This “breadth” of bankruptcy law is 
theoretically derived, in part, from its need to protect creditors from 
their potentially value-destructive impulses. Bankruptcy marshals 
creditors together in a compulsory dispute resolution process; no one 
gets to opt out.19 
Fourth, the key substantive elements of an insolvency regime can be 
summarized as rules of priority and distribution,20 and, to a lesser extent, 
the related rules of avoidance.21 These rules are “prickly” because they 
are highly normative and driven by domestic policy.22 As one country’s 
top court summarized, “[n]ational bankruptcy laws express the policies 
and priorities of their enacting countries.”23 Therefore, although at a 
general level all bankruptcy regimes might find themselves aligned in 
overarching goals, such as “protection and maximization of the value of 
 
17. The in rem nature of bankruptcy law and its need to bind all participants is underscored in 
the federalist system of the United States by bankruptcy’s in rem abrogation of the sovereign 
immunity of states. See 11 U.S.C. § 106 (2000); Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood (In re 
Hood), 541 U.S. 440 (2004). 
18. See Westbrook, supra note 1. 
19. THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 12–13 (1986). 
20. Barry E. Adler, Bankruptcy Primitives, 12 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 219, 234 (2004). 
This characterization implicitly assumes that bankruptcy law—at least part of it—may be called 
“substantive.” Others may disagree, but I am willing to classify both the distributive decision of 
who gets what when a debtor cannot satisfy all of its creditors and the extinguishment of legal 
debts “substantive” by whatever criterion one might use. To the extent that bankruptcy law 
contains both substantive elements and procedural elements, I contend that priority rules lie at the 
substantive end of the spectrum. I therefore refer to these elements throughout this paper as 
“substantive” bankruptcy law. 
21. See Jay Lawrence Westbrook, Choice of Avoidance Law in Global Insolvencies, 17 
BROOK. J. INT’L L. 499, 500 (1991) (noting that avoidance laws “have as their function the 
protection and vindication of the priorities set by each national distribution scheme”). The 
different policies of avoidance law clashed in one of the seminal transnational insolvency cases, 
In re Maxwell Communication Corp., 170 B.R. 800 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994), aff’d, 186 B.R. 807 
(S.D.N.Y. 1995), aff’d, 93 F.3d 1036, 1042 (2d Cir. 1996). 
22. Some scholars argue that these normative matters of distributive justice are ill-situated in 
bankruptcy law. See Douglas G. Baird, Bankruptcy’s Uncontested Axioms, 108 YALE L.J. 573, 
580–88 (1998) (discussing academic debate). Even those tolerant of such provisions urge caution. 
See Westbrook, supra note 21, at 510 (observing that each country’s priority and avoidance laws 
must balance statutory entitlements against the costs and risks of unsettling otherwise normal 
commercial transactions). 
23. Antwerp Bulkcarriers, N.V. v. Holt Cargo Sys., [2001] 3 S.C.R. 951, 964 (Can.). 
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[a] debtor’s assets,”24 consensus dissolves soon after that. The more 
specific provisions of domestic insolvency laws reflect an array of 
normative value judgments, such as which creditors should be accorded 
priority and how strongly secured credit requires protection.25 Some 
consider these distributive provisions important vindications of social 
policy;26 others deem them the spoils of “domestic rent seeking 
contests.”27 Whatever the view, these laws are “public and regulatory.”28 
Accordingly, perhaps the most challenging substantive consequence of 
domestic bankruptcy laws are their varying distributive policy 
determinations of who should bear the most pain in a situation in which, 
by definition, a debtor has insufficient funds to satisfy all creditors 
fully.29 
In sum, bankruptcy laws are broad, deep, and prickly. They are 
expansive, both in terms of encompassing all of a debtor’s assets and in 
terms of displacing other domestic substantive laws in the event of 
financial crisis.30 They are also policy-laden and distributive, 
determining which creditors warrant special treatment in distribution. 
To be maximally effective, bankruptcy laws must bind as many 
stakeholders in the debtor’s assets as possible, commensurate with the 
debtor’s commercial market. Given this invasive character of a law that 
tends to contain deep normative content and that varies substantially 
jurisdiction by jurisdiction, a greater recipe for an international conflict 
of laws in the cross-border setting might be difficult to imagine. 
 
24. MODEL LAW, supra note 5, pmbl. 
25. Professor Guzman examines employee priorities and finds that the seeming divergence 
across jurisdictions may actually be overstated. Andrew T. Guzman, International Bankruptcy: In 
Defense of Universalism, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2177, 2197–98 (2000) (canvassing different 
countries’ employee priority laws). Professor Tung, however, notes that labor seems to have 
heightened lobbying power (and thus heightened bankruptcy priority) in Germany, France, 
Mexico, and South Korea. See Frederick Tung, Passports, Private Choice, and Private Interests: 
Regulatory Competition and Cooperation in Corporate, Securities, and Bankruptcy Law, 3 CHI. 
J. INT’L. L. 369, 375–76 (2002). 
26. See WORLD BANK, PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES FOR EFFECTIVE INSOLVENCY AND 
CREDITOR RIGHTS SYSTEMS ¶ 148 (2001) [hereinafter WORLD BANK PRINCIPLES] (“Legislators 
should…create…priority classes based on…widely embraced social policies.”). 
27. Frederick Tung, Is International Bankruptcy Possible?, 23 MICH. J. INT’L L. 31, 55 
(2001). 
28. Fletcher, supra note 2, at 123. 
29. See Bob Wessels, Current Developments Towards International Insolvencies in Europe, 
13 INT. INSOLV. REV. 43, 46 (2004) (“Even the more recent European insolvency laws continue 
to show substantial differences in underlying policy considerations, both in structure and in 
content.”). 
30. This is especially so in the reorganization context. See Stonington Partners, Inc. v. 
Lernout & Hauspie Speech Prods. N.V., 310 F.3d 118 (3d Cir. 2002). 
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B. The International Perspective 
An increasing number of businesses have begun to transcend national 
boundaries in recent decades.31 When a transnational firm encounters 
financial crisis, it thus presumptively engages the regulatory scope of 
more than one country’s bankruptcy regime. This presents a classic 
conflict of laws situation, replete with the traditional choice-of-law 
concerns. Of particular interest are the legitimacy of the extraterritorial 
reach of one country’s laws to govern the distribution of assets located 
in another jurisdiction, the actual or constructive expectations of 
stakeholders regarding the applicable laws, and the balance between 
comity and the assertion of sovereign entitlement.32 
Conflicts in bankruptcy situations are inevitable due to the expansive 
reach of the laws. They are also prickly, due to the policy-rich norms 
implicated. The theoretical possibilities for resolution are therefore 
numerous. For example, one might argue that because a debtor firm is 
more closely tied to Country A, Country A’s bankruptcy laws should 
govern, even with regard to assets located in Country B.33 On the other 
hand, one might well say that as co-equal sovereigns, neither Country A 
nor Country B has a greater claim to govern the assets in the other’s 
jurisdiction.34 Or one might take an entirely different approach and 
argue that both countries’ assets should be governed by an external, 
 
31. There remains empirical disagreement over whether the exemplar multinational is a 
mega-conglomerate or a smaller firm located near a border. See Kent Anderson, The Cross-
Border Insolvency Paradigm: A Defense of the Modified Universal Approach Considering the 
Japanese Experience, 21 U. PA. J. INT’L ECON. L. 679, 771 (2000) (describing Japanese 
pachinko parlors owned by Koreans). Professor Westbrook laments these smaller firms as 
“invisible to scholarship.” Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Lessons of Maxwell Communication, 64 
FORDHAM L. REV. 2531, 2532 n.5 (1996). 
32. See generally Westbrook, supra note 21. The Supreme Court has recently chastised 
overstepping regulatory bounds when dealing with solely domestic antitrust matters. See F. 
Hoffmann-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 124 S.Ct. 2359, 2367 (2004) (“Why should 
American law supplant, for example, Canada’s, or Great Britain’s or Japan’s own determination 
about how best to protect Canadian or British or Japanese customers from anticompetitive 
conduct engaged in significant part by Canadian or British or Japanese or other foreign 
companies?”). 
33. See, e.g., MODEL LAW, supra note 5, art. 2 (proposing “centre of…main interests” test). 
34. Larry Kramer, Return of the Renvoi, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 979, 1019 (1991) (“The whole 
problem in a true conflict is that different states have made different judgments about what is just, 
and it is axiomatic that…states are coequal sovereigns entitled to make their own value 
judgments.”). 
9
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substantive law created by some form of international agreement.35 A 
rich theoretical literature explores the possibilities. 
In a critical respect, the “problem” of transnational insolvencies, at 
least at one level, might be nothing more than an admittedly challenging 
choice-of-law issue: whose (policy-rich) laws of distribution, priority, 
and avoidance should govern the insolvency of the multi-jurisdiction 
debtor? One response, accordingly, might be to craft a uniform 
jurisdiction-selecting protocol based on contacts.36 Another approach, 
following more modern conflicts literature, might seek to find which of 
a competing set of rules better forwards more abstracted values, such as 
an efficient international commercial system.37 I refer to both of these 
types of solutions as “pluralist,” because they countenance the validity 
of myriad bankruptcy regimes around the world, each of which could 
legitimately govern a given cross-border insolvency. Therefore 
substantive harmonization of these various regimes, at least initially, 
appears unnecessary. 
To be sure, pluralism is not the only theoretical paradigm available to 
address cross-border insolvency, but it remains dominant. In so doing, 
pluralism has splintered into two primary theoretical models: 
territorialism and universalism.38 
C. The Tradition: Territorialism  
Finding its roots in the choice-of-law situs rule,39 the traditional 
approach to transnational bankruptcy has been one of “territorialism.” 
Country A insolvency proceedings may only reach assets located in 
 
35. Cf. Robert K. Rasmussen, A New Approach to Transnational Insolvencies, 19 MICH. J. 
INT’L L. 1, 22–27 (1997) (proposing opt-out rights from default legislative rules for privately 
contracting commercial actors). 
36. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 cmt. c (1971) (articulating the 
principle that the law of the jurisdiction with the “most significant relationship” to a dispute 
should govern). 
37. See Larry Kramer, Rethinking Choice of Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 277 (1990); see also 
Hannah L. Buxbaum, Rethinking International Insolvency: The Neglected Role of Choice-of-Law 
Rules and Theory, 36 STAN. J. INT’L L. 23, 30 (2000) (speculating on the potential for 
transnational bankruptcy to move from jurisdictional fixation to content-based rules). 
38. Professor Rasmussen’s alternative of maximal private ordering (“contractualism”) is an 
important contribution to this robust academic discussion but beyond the scope of this Article’s 
focus. See generally Colloquy, supra note 2 (discussing efficacy of contractual solutions to 
transnational insolvencies). 
39. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 223, 226, 228, 234–36, 
239, 241 (1971). That the situs rule is well followed does not, of course, mean that it is well 
received. See, e.g., Russell J. Weintraub, An Inquiry Into the Utility of “Situs” as a Concept in 
Conflicts Analysis, 52 CORNELL L.Q. 1, 11 (1966). 
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Country A. To the extent a debtor has assets in Country B, only Country 
B’s courts—applying Country B’s bankruptcy laws—may govern them. 
Good jurisdictional borders make for good neighbors in international 
regulatory relations, and there is always the backdrop of comity. 
This system, while arguably clear, proves cumbersome when 
implemented. Bankruptcy proceedings can be opened in multiple 
countries covering various assets with the only hope of coordination 
coming from principles of comity.40 Complicating matters further, some 
countries, such as the United States, assert broad jurisdiction over a 
debtor’s worldwide assets,41 in essence inviting a conflict of laws 
regarding the assets located abroad. At the other end of the spectrum, 
countries like South Korea42 and the Netherlands43 sharply constrain the 
scope of their own bankruptcy proceedings to domestic assets. In the 
latter group of countries, foreign orders seeking to affect domestic 
assets—such as might be generated in an American bankruptcy 
proceeding—are rendered void if challenged domestically. An 
international debtor with assets in multiple jurisdictions is thus exposed 
to an array of potentially conflicting bankruptcy laws, such as Dutch 
and French law applying to Dutch-situated assets of a French-domiciled 
debtor in bankruptcy in one or both countries.44 
 
40. See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113 (1895). 
41. See 11 U.S.C. § 541(a) (2000). 
42. See Anderson, supra note 31, at 729–34. See Samuel L. Bufford & Kasuhiro Yanagida, 
Japan’s New Laws on Business Reorganization: An Analysis, 39 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 1, 59 n.353 
(2005) (discussing Daewoo Motor Bankruptcy proceedings in Korea and Japan). I have been 
advised by e-mail from Benjamin Wagner, research assistant to Professor Soogeum Oh of Ewha 
Womans University in Seoul, Korea, that as of March 2005, South Korea has amended its 
insolvency laws (to take effect March 2006), which will add a cross-border insolvency section 
“modeled largely after the UNCITRAL Model Law.” 
43. See Berends, supra note 12, at 315. Japan has recently amended its laws to drop its 
territorialist approach. See Bufford & Yanagida, supra note 42; see also Bob Wessels, The 
Comity Principle in Amice, LIBER AMICORUM ROB RUTGERS, KLUWER, DEVENTER, 347–59 
(2005) (arguing that the principle of territoriality is being diminished under Dutch private 
international law, but acknowledging a difference of scholarly opinion within the Netherlands); 
Sumant Batra, Indian Insolvency Reforms: An Update, Forum on Asian Insolvency Reform, 6 
(2004), available at http://www.insol.org (lamenting the failure of Indian legislative reforms to 
depart from territorialism as proposed by the Eradi Committee). 
44. See C./De Vleeschmeesters B.V., HR 31 mei 1996, NJ 108 (ann. ThMdB) (refusing to 
recognize French discharge of the debtor and allowing Dutch proceedings to be opened because, 
under Dutch law, French discharge could not affect Dutch claims or assets). For an English 
description of the case, see Discharging a Bankruptcy in France and the Recovery of an 
Undischarged Claim Against a Debtor in the Netherlands, 43 N.I.L.R. 390, 390–92 (1996). 
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Even with crisp respect for jurisdictional boundaries, territorialism 
has problems. Such a system encourages creditors to race to file local 
bankruptcy proceedings at the first signs of distress—“grabbing” local 
assets—and to distribute them quickly under local law before they can 
leave the jurisdiction. The internationally dispersed assets of the 
multinational debtor are thus divided and conquered under multiple 
proceedings without any semblance of coherent, enterprise-wide 
adjudication.45 This undermines the very market-symmetric and orderly 
disposition of a debtor’s assets that is one of the theoretical foundations 
of domestic insolvency regimes. In fact, it maximizes the chances of a 
fractious resolution. Accordingly, as lamented by some scholars, a 
lender trying to measure financial risk and to price credit to 
multinational debtors faces an unenviable (and costly) task of predicting 
how many of its debtor’s assets will be located in different jurisdictions 
around the world—and for how long—and what the substantive 
insolvency rules of each such jurisdiction will be in the event a debtor 
defaults.46 
Who then supports territorialism? Presumably not rationally acting 
multinational businesses, who want to avoid the above-postulated 
uncertainty cost and its concomitant increase in ex ante capital pricing. 
Nor would we expect support from international lenders (other than 
those who can price adjust perfectly). But territorialism does have 
proponents. Supporters are drawn from two main camps. First, there 
may be debtors or lenders who simply doubt that territorialism wreaks 
havoc for multijurisdictional insolvencies. These skeptics may believe 
that the unfailing clarity of territorialism’s allocation of regulatory 
jurisdiction outweighs any increased costs of monitoring imposed by the 
potential application of multiple bankruptcy laws.47 Second, the model 
 
45. In corporate regulation, Philip Blumberg has contrasted an “enterprise” approach with an 
“entity” approach in addressing multinational business entities. See Philip I. Blumberg, THE 
MULTINATIONAL CHALLENGE TO CORPORATION LAW, 63, 89 (1993). The “enterprise” approach 
corresponds in the bankruptcy context with universalism and accords with bankruptcy law’s 
preference for market-symmetric administration. 
46. See, e.g., Rasmussen, supra note 35, at 17–18. A further possible cost of territorialism is 
that it skews investment toward suboptimal decisions by inclining a debtor to seek credit based 
not only on expected financial return, but also on comparatively favorable priority treatment for 
subsequent creditors under bankruptcy law (thus sharing the rent with the subsequent creditors 
and transferring the costs onto subsidizing preexisting creditors). See Bebchuk & Guzman, supra 
note 10, at 779. This argument has been challenged by others. See, e.g., Westbrook, supra note 8, 
at 16; see also LoPucki, supra note 3, at 708 n.56 (citing the example of Nestlé’s international 
financing discussed in Alan C. Shapiro, MULTINATIONAL FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 767–69 (5th 
ed. 1996)). 
47. See LoPucki, supra note 3. 
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finds support among sovereigntists, especially nations concerned that 
they may have to subordinate their own bankruptcy laws and policies 
under a one-law approach.48 These jurisdictions enjoy the certainty of 
knowing their own laws will apply to at least the local assets within 
their territorial borders. To be sure, there are other related issues, 
including worries of hegemony,49 creditor endowments,50 and “vested” 
property rights.51 The chief concern, however, seems to be a deep-seated 
sense of sovereign entitlement animated by a reluctance to apply foreign 
bankruptcy law to domestic assets and claimants.52 
D. The Promised Land: Universalism  
Many bankruptcy theorists disfavor the potential chaos of multiple 
bankruptcy laws governing a cross-border proceeding. Accordingly, the 
dominant theory of an ideal international insolvency regime, 
“universalism,” advocates one law to control a bankrupt’s worldwide 
assets, regardless of their location. Universalists contend that such 
uniformity will reduce the confusion associated with territorialism’s 
competing domestic priority rules,53 reduce monitoring costs incurred by 
lenders otherwise forced to police asset location constantly,54 enhance 
overall asset value, and minimize administrative difficulties.55 Professor 
Westbrook aggregates these predicted benefits under the label of 
“Transactional Gain.”56 He posits that Transactional Gain creates a 
much bigger pie to be distributed for all creditors. To entice creditors 
 
48. See Lynn M. LoPucki, The Case for Cooperative Territoriality in International 
Bankruptcy, 98 MICH. L. REV. 2216 (2000); Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Insolvency Law as Credit 
Enhancement: Insolvency-Related Provisions of the Cape Town Convention and the Aircraft 
Equipment Protocol, 13 INT. INSOLV. REV. 27 n.106 (2004); see also Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, 
National Regulation of Multinational Enterprises: An Essay on Comity, Extraterritoriality, and 
Harmonization, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 5, 8–9 & 12 n.22 (2003) (“Countries may object to 
having the law of another country apply within their territory as a matter of sovereignty, even if 
they agree with the policy of the law in question.”). 
49. See Tung, supra note 15, at 576–77. 
50. See infra Westbrook, note 72. 
51. See Holt Cargo Systems Inc. v. ABC Containerline N.V. (Trustees of), [2001] S.C.R. 907, 
¶ 33. 
52. Professor Fletcher summarizes this well when he candidly discusses the need for 
international bankruptcy reform efforts to “appease” the powerfully held “base, national instincts” 
of policy-defensive sovereign states. Ian F. Fletcher, The European Union Convention on 
Insolvency Proceedings: Choice-of-Law Provisions, 33 TEXAS INT’L L.J. 119, 124 (1998). 
53. See Westbrook, supra note 1, at 462. 
54. See Guzman, supra note 25, at 2179–81.  
55. See Westbrook, supra note 13, at 2292–93. 
56. See Westbrook, supra note 1, at 466. 
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who might enjoy a higher ratio of domestic assets covering domestic 
claims than the worldwide average (and who would thus rationally 
prefer to grab those assets under a territorialist system rather than share 
them on a global level under one law), Westbrook anticipates a “Rough 
Wash,” whereby such creditors are cautioned ex ante that they are 
equally likely to find themselves in a “deficit” bankruptcy, where the 
local assets to local claims ratio is lower than the global average and 
hence there is less to grab, as they are to be in a “surplus” situation.57 
Universalism tells these creditors that while its regime might change the 
size of their pieces from bankruptcy to bankruptcy, the overall pie is 
enhanced by Transactional Gain and the potentially differing size of 
those pieces is likely to be a Rough Wash.58 
In its purest conceptual form, universalism aspires to the 
harmonization of one worldwide, substantive law of bankruptcy.59 The 
most common model of universalism, however, follows a pluralist 
route. Sidestepping the issue of which substantive provisions the ideal 
bankruptcy law would possess, it simply selects from one of the pre-
existing bankruptcy regimes ex post.60 To the extent that other courts are 
needed (to give legal force to the orders of the courts of the governing 
jurisdiction), such courts could convene ancillary proceedings designed 
to effectuate the controlling court’s orders.61 The current universalist 
paradigm thus concedes the divergence of present domestic bankruptcy 
laws and advocates only a pluralist system of choice-of-law; its theory 
does not envision (or rely upon) substantive harmonization of those 
bankruptcy laws.62 
 
57. Id. at 471. 
58. See ALI TIP, supra note 8, at 40 (“Thus the loss in today’s case will be an investment in 
larger returns in future cases, on top of the general transactional gain that will arise from 
multinational cooperation.”) (footnote omitted). A more aggressively utilitarian version of this 
argument might be that even if some subgroup of local creditors is routinely and systematically 
disadvantaged under universalism, the majority of local creditors enjoy sufficient rough wash to 
make the transactional gain of universalism worthwhile: a “Kaldor-Hicks wash” so to speak. 
59. See Colloquy, supra note 2 (referring to “substantive universalism”). Others have used the 
term “unity” to refer to one forum governing an entire insolvency proceeding (which presumably, 
but not necessarily, would be applying one substantive bankruptcy law). See Berends, supra note 
12, at 315–16. 
60. I refer to this model as “pluralist universalism.” In a recent article, Professor Westbrook 
summarizes at least four templates for universalism, including single or multiple fora, applying 
single or multiple laws. See Westbrook, supra note 13, at 2315–19. 
61. See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 304 (1978), discussed infra at 18. Local proceedings in cross-border 
insolvencies may either be “ancillary” (assisting a primary jurisdiction) or “plenary” (rivaling one 
and insisting on parallel jurisdiction). 
62. Professor Avi-Yonah offers an elegant model of when transnational legal regimes should 
aspire toward a pluralist, extraterritorialist path (as advocated by the universalists) and when 
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The choice-of-law rule most commonly proposed to operationalize 
universalism involves a content-neutral designation of “home court” 
based on contacts with the debtor.63 Thus each country, at least in 
theory, is equally entitled to be the controlling jurisdiction in a 
transnational dispute. For example, if the choice-of-law rule for 
determining the controlling jurisdiction is the place of the debtor’s 
incorporation, then universalism implicitly assumes that for each 
Country A-incorporated firm holding assets in Countries A and B, there 
is probably an equal and opposite Country B-incorporated firm holding 
assets in Countries B and A. This secondary order of “Rough Wash” 
makes states in a universalist bankruptcy willing to subordinate the 
application of their bankruptcy laws in favor of the primary 
jurisdiction’s on the theory that they, in turn, will another day be the 
primary jurisdiction entitled to deference from other states.64 
 
instead they should seek substantive harmonization of domestic laws (in a cooperative spirit of 
comity) for instances such as bankruptcy that ideally require enterprise-wide adjudication under 
one substantive law. See Avi-Yonah, supra note 48, at 7–13, 20–23 & 31. Avi-Yonah aligns with 
the universalists in deciding that bankruptcy requires an enterprise approach. He contends that 
territorialists accept implicitly that resolution by one law is desirable but advocate territorialism 
because the pragmatic forces of the substantive and normative differences among bankruptcy 
laws make states unlikely to accept universalism. See id. at 20–23. In a sense he is correct, but I 
think it is not so much that the universalists ignore or downplay the normative differences 
between bankruptcy laws, rather that they are more optimistic for the capacity of states that hold 
these different laws to appreciate the offsetting benefits of Transactional Gain inherent in 
enterprise-wide resolution. Moreover, “modified” universalism, discussed below, recognizes the 
need for an element of harmonization, which bleeds into another cell of Avi-Yonah’s theoretical 
matrix. I am not sure the international consensus is as yet so strong toward universalism as Avi-
Yonah’s analysis might suggest, because I think different countries ascribe differing levels of 
disutility to the acceptance of outcome differences, although this is a dynamic situation in flux to 
be sure. 
63. See, e.g., MODEL LAW, supra note 5, arts. 2, 16(3). A “contacts” rule is not the only tool 
universalism could use. For example, a first-to-file rule would accord equal if not greater 
predictability at determining the primary jurisdiction to govern the global insolvency. Some 
criticize a “home country” rule on the basis that countries anticipating they are likely to be homes 
to multinationals (such as the United States) will disproportionately export their bankruptcy laws 
to countries (such as Eritrea) that are less likely to be homes and hence likely to be net importers 
of bankruptcy policy under universalism. Engagement of this point is beyond the scope of this 
Article, but I note that Eritrea has adopted the Model Law. See Ian Fletcher, Update on INSOL 
Model Law, International Association of Restructuring, Insolvency & Bankruptcy Professionals, 
available at http://www.insol.org/newinsolworld/jul99/jul99uml.html. 
64. See, e.g., Colloquy, supra note 2, at 2274 (“In a universalist regime, one country’s law 
will govern, but the other countries have no basis for complaining—their law will govern in other 
situations….”). Universalists have not always made this implicit assumption clear, although it 
seems lurking in their writings. For example, the premise seems inherent in Westbrook’s notion 
of “critical-mass reciprocity.” See Westbrook, supra note 1, at 467. Absent an assumption of even 
distribution of jurisdictional primacy, it would be less likely for rational states to participate, let 
15
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Almost as strong as the academic support for universalism as the 
ideal and most efficient method of dealing with a transnational financial 
default is the consensus that it is largely impractical at present.65 No 
treaty exists or has even been seriously proposed to support such a 
system, which would, among other things, rest strongly upon a 
realistically enforceable choice-of-law provision. Indeed, at least one 
scholar has argued (using game theory modeling and international 
relations ideas) that universalism is likely impossible given rationally 
acting states interacting with counterparts over repeated bankruptcy 
“events.”66 Despite this gloominess,67 however, many theorists agree 
 
alone reciprocate, in a universalist system, assuming they have an interest in seeing their own 
laws govern disputes within their jurisdictions. Cf. id. at 425 n.26 (recognizing creditors in states 
who predict that they would routinely end up with a higher territorial assets to territorial claims 
ratio than the worldwide average would likely chafe against universalism). The premise might 
also be part of Westbrook’s overarching theme of “rough justice.” See id. at 458. 
Professor Tung chastises universalists for not making the assumption of even distribution of 
jurisdictional primacy (and hence equal ex ante disposition by states toward universalist 
cooperation) more transparent. FREDERICK TUNG, SKEPTICISM ABOUT UNIVERSALISM: 
INTERNATIONAL BANKRUPTCY AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 29 n.93 (Berkeley L. & Econ. 
Working Papers: Vol. 2001: No. 1, art. 7), available at http://www.bepress.com/blewp/default/ 
vol2001/iss1/art7. He also challenges the assumption itself as “counterfactual for many states.” 
Id. at 24. For example, referring to a “home country” choice-of-law rule, Tung notes that under 
universalism, less developed countries would routinely find themselves deferring to the industrial 
country housing a multinational debtor’s headquarters. See id. at 29 n.93. For the purposes of this 
Article, Tung adopts a “responding” assumption of universalism to this argument: that the model 
of transnational insolvency only works for “countries with significant commercial relations and 
for whom mutual advantage from universalist cooperation would seem to exist.” Id. at 30 n.93; cf. 
Westbrook, supra note 13, at 2298–99 (suggesting that universalism might apply only to 
companies of a certain size or certain economic activity, which might eschew the need for even 
distribution of jurisdictional primacy by convincing deficit states that they are not forfeiting 
significant sovereignty by routinely deferring). This is an ongoing question beyond the scope of 
this Article, but the reader, again, is encouraged to reflect upon Eritrea’s enactment of the Model 
Law. 
65. See Westbrook, supra note 13, at 2283–94. 
66. See Tung, supra note 64, at 24–31. Professor Tung notes that even states committed to 
universalism would have a hard time confronting the inherent prisoner’s dilemma for the ancillary 
domestic jurisdiction, which must trust in the cooperative future cession of sovereignty by the 
foreign jurisdiction when the dominant position reverses. He argues that the fuzzy nature of 
cooperation in universalism (specifically in modified universalism, discussed infra) and difficulty 
in transparently communicating cooperation messages in the international arena set the stage for a 
highly noisy and error-prone game play environment. See id. Additionally, judges have their own 
agenda of interest to public choice scholars that might well undermine international cooperation 
even when their respective countries are so inclined. See Erin A. O’Hara and Larry E. Ribstein, 
From Politics to Efficiency in Choice of Law, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 1151, 1158–60 (2000). 
67. See Douglass G. Boshkoff, The Washington University Interdisciplinary Conference on 
Bankruptcy and Insolvency Theory: Some Gloomy Thoughts on Cross-Border Insolvencies, 72 
WASH. U. L.Q. 931, 936 (1994) (likening substantial international cooperation to the probability 
that pigs could learn to fly). 
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that universalism is a desirable ultimate goal toward which international 
commercial law reform should strive. Indeed, it seems safe to say that 
the majority view, at least among academic circles, is that universalism 
is normatively superior as an efficient and fair model to resolve cross-
border defaults, notwithstanding the ongoing preference for 
territorialism among many country’s policymakers.68 Practice does not 
appear yet to follow theory. 
A critical problem that universalism faces (assuming a workable 
choice-of-law rule can be designed)69 stems from the ongoing allure of 
territorialism to sovereignty-conscious states. Many states will be happy 
to apply their own bankruptcy laws broadly to the resolution of an 
international dispute, but few want to cede their sovereignty over the 
same dispute when they are deemed to be in the ancillary position. This 
returns to the distinguishing characteristics of a bankruptcy regime 
described above. When one state cedes jurisdiction to another to 
facilitate a market-wide resolution of the default, it must fully subjugate 
its broad-reaching, deep-cutting, and policy-rich bankruptcy laws to 
those of the controlling state.70 This is a hard pill to swallow. It is very 
difficult for a court in Country B to tell a group of Country B employees 
who have worked in a branch office in Country B for years that they 
will not enjoy the special priority distribution rule accorded to workers 
under Country B’s bankruptcy laws, even though there are plentiful 
assets in Country B to cover such a payout, because their employer’s 
bankruptcy will be governed under the laws of Country A, which grants 
no such priority.71 As Professor LoPucki muses: 
Could the [foreign bankruptcy] court void an otherwise valid 
collective bargaining agreement? Relieve the debtor of the 
burdensome effects of environmental laws? Suspend the payment 
 
68. See Tung, supra note 27, at 32–23. 
69. That in itself is no mean feat. Choice of law rules are “notoriously imprecise and 
indeterminate.” Tung, supra note 27, at 65 (citing Michael Whincorp, The Recognition Scene: 
Game Theoretic Issues in the Recognition of Foreign Judgments, 23 MELB. U. L. REV. 416, 427–
28 (1999) (contending that the reason international recognition of judgments is not predicated 
upon choice of law rules is because of these rules’ inherent indeterminacy)). 
70. See id. at 45–48 (suggesting that attempts to harmonize insolvency law must overcome 
cultural differences and divergent legal codes). 
71. See LoPucki, supra note 3, at 711 (“Yet in a universalist system, the priority of Mexican 
workers’ employment claims against a U.S. firm operating in Mexico would be determined by 
U.S. rules of priority—much to the disappointment of the affected Mexican workers.”). Professor 
Westbrook also has concerns for such local creditors. See Westbrook, supra note 1, at 489 
(suggesting exemptions from universalism for tort victims and consumers). 
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of pensions to retired workers? Risk the pension fund in a 
reorganization attempt? Delete from a shopping center lease 
provisions restricting the purposes for which the debtor-lessee 
can use the premises?72 
Thus the theoretical core of universalism, in its pluralist mode, must 
confront two fundamental challenges. The first is the design of a viable 
choice-of-law rule that subscribing nations will agree to and honor. The 
second is what Professor Westbrook calls the “acceptance of outcome 
differences,”73 that is, the commitment of rationally selfish states—
which generally prefer to see their own substantive bankruptcy laws 
govern—to cede sovereignty when another state has been chosen to 
control an international bankruptcy dispute, even though such a 
concession may produce a different substantive outcome to the 
bankruptcy for the deferring state’s participants. These are the two 
anchors of universalism’s theory that must hold for the model to work. 
E. Modifications  
Because the universalists recognize the quixotism of their model and 
the territorialists the grottiness of theirs, each camp proposes a 
“modified” version to bolster appeal.74 Mindful of the substantial 
concession that the acceptance of outcome differences requires of the 
states on the deferring end of a transnational insolvency, so-called 
“modified universalism” replaces the “must” of the application of one 
state’s bankruptcy law with a “may.”75 It gives a deferring court a 
choice, saying that the court may—perhaps should—capitulate to the 
controlling jurisdiction’s bankruptcy proceeding, but the decision is 
subject to the discretion of the deferring court. If, for example, it would 
be contrary to Country B’s policies to implement Country A’s 
bankruptcy laws, the Country B court may refuse to defer to Country A 
as the controlling jurisdiction and thus block Country A’s bankruptcy 
laws from governing the Country B assets.76 
 
72. LoPucki, supra note 48, at 2237. 
73. Westbrook, supra note 1, at 458. 
74. For simplicity, I have characterized Professors Westbrook and LoPucki as exemplars of 
universalism and territorialism respectively. In fact, each supports the modified analogues of 
those respective theories. See Colloquy, supra note 2. 
75. See ALI TIP, supra note 8, at 11. 
76. Professor Westbrook uses the examples of the United States’ likely consternation at a 
country that distributed bankruptcy assets on a first-come, first-served basis, Westbrook, supra 
note 1, at 475, and a country that distributed according to birth, id. at 485. Note that this 
“modification” of universalism to accommodate such concerns is actually nothing more than the 
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Although some nations accept this compromise and try to be 
“modified universalists” (either because they settle for this as a second 
best to universalism or because they retain residual risk aversion over 
the potentially unforeseen consequences of a fully universalist regime), 
their implementing laws and judicial interpretations contain great 
slippage. Moreover, the subset of these states that have statutorily dealt 
with how and when to defer to foreign proceedings have usually 
considered the dissimilarity between the foreign and domestic 
bankruptcy laws as a proxy for violations of public policy.77 An 
example of such a statute is 11 U.S.C. § 304, which creates a 
mechanism for American courts to defer to a foreign bankruptcy 
proceeding and which provides a list of statutory factors to guide a court 
in deciding when it may defer.78 This list includes a provision permitting 
 
standard so-called “escape clause” found in most choice of law regimes. See, e.g., Symeon C. 
Symeonides, The Need for a Third Conflicts Restatement (and a Proposal for Tort Conflicts), 75 
IND. L.J. 437, 452 (2000) (“Indeed the need for an escape is too obvious to need any defense 
here.”) (citing Symeon C. Symeonides, Exception Clauses in American Conflicts Law, 42 AM. J. 
COMP. L. 813, 815–18, 864–65 (Supp. 1994) [hereinafter Symeonides, Exception Clauses]); see 
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 90. 
77. Even this may be a charitable characterization, by assuming the laws are at least trying to 
balance policy explicitly. See Buxbaum, supra note 37 (criticizing 11 U.S.C. § 304 as allowing 
for unprincipled, or at best unsystematic, applications). 
78. Section 304 of the U.S. Code permits an ancillary case to be brought in the United States 
to assist a foreign proceeding, and § 304(b)(2) permits the turnover of American assets to the 
foreign proceeding (for distribution under foreign substantive bankruptcy laws), but only if the 
factors of § 304(c) militate in favor of deference. 11 U.S.C. § 304 (2000). Section 304(c) 
provides: 
In determining whether to grant relief under subsection (b) of this section, the court shall 
be guided by what will best assure an economical and expeditious administration of 
such estate, consistent with— 
(1) just treatment of all holders of claims against or interests in such estate; 
(2) protection of claim holders in the United States against prejudice and 
inconvenience in the processing of claims in such foreign proceeding; 
(3) prevention of preferential or fraudulent dispositions of property of such estate; 
(4) distribution of proceeds of such estate substantially in accordance with the order 
prescribed by this title; 
(5) comity; and 
(6) if appropriate, the provision of an opportunity for a fresh start for the individual 
that such foreign proceeding concerns. 
Id. at § 304(c). For a helpful discussion of § 304(c), including its legislative history, see Stuart A. 
Krause, Peter Janovsky & Marc A. Lebowitz, Relief Under Section 304 of the Bankruptcy Code: 
Clarifying the Principal Role of Comity in Transnational Insolvencies, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 
2591 (1996). For caselaw, see, for example, In re Culmer, 25 B.R. 621, 629 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
1982) (noting that consideration of the § 304(c) factors constitutes a comity inquiry, and 
interpreting comity to require deference to the foreign proceeding absent evidence that the 
application of foreign law “would be wicked, immoral, or violate public policy”), and 
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assessment of whether the other country’s bankruptcy laws are similar 
to U.S. law. Taken to its extreme, then, the discretionary safety valve of 
modified universalism has the potential simply to “modify” 
universalism back into territorialism, because a state may refuse to defer 
to the controlling state when its laws are different, i.e., when there is a 
true conflict of laws.79 
Accordingly, at least as currently implemented, modified 
universalism inescapably confronts the issue of substantive 
harmonization. This sits in tension with universalism’s theoretical 
premise of pluralism.80 But such tension is nevertheless inherent when 
universalism is instrumentally “modified” to rely upon discretionary 
compliance and when that discretion in turn varies as a function of the 
substantive similarity of bankruptcy laws. 
Territorialists also refine their theory to a modified form. First, they 
espouse departure from the strict baseline of territorial sovereignty by 
encouraging “cooperation” by nations on an ad hoc basis if and when a 
cross-border dispute arises.81 Thus, rather than requiring ex ante 
commitment to universalism, which is likely to scare off sovereignty-
sensitive states, this “cooperative” territorialist approach accords case-
by-case consideration of the cession of jurisdictional control ex post. If 
a state determines that its best interests are enhanced by allowing the 
foreign state’s laws to control a domestic bankruptcy proceeding, it may 
 
Philadelphia Gear Corp. v. Philadelphia Gear de Mexico, S.A., 44 F.3d 187, 192 (3d Cir. 1994) 
(“Comity should be withheld [in transnational bankruptcies] only when its acceptance would be 
prejudicial to the interest of the nation called upon to give it effect.”). An excellent discussion of 
cases struggling with § 304(c) is presented in Buxbaum, supra note 37, at 42–43, an article 
advocating the explicit adoption of conflicts doctrine and theory in American bankruptcy 
jurisprudence under § 304(c). The new bankruptcy law has technically repealed § 304 and 
adopted the Model Law’s framework, but the old § 304(c) factors have survived in new § 1507, 
which provides bankruptcy courts with the factors to consider in determining whether to offer 
“additional assistance” (i.e., discretionary relief) to international proceedings under the Model 
Law. As part of the revision, former § 304(c) was also amended to elevate comity to the preamble 
(from its former position as subsection (c)(5)). It is likely commentators will continue for some 
time to refer to new § 1507 as embodying the § 304(c) factors. 
79. See LoPucki, supra note 48, at 2221. 
80. What little comparative work has been done suggests that different doctrinal constructs 
perhaps mask overarching similarities of function. See Lynn M. LoPucki & George G. Triantis, A 
Systems Approach to Comparing U.S. and Canadian Reorganization of Financially Distressed 
Companies, 35 HARV. INT’L L.J. 267 (1994) (conducting comprehensive “systems” comparison 
of American and Canadian bankruptcy laws and practices); see also ALI TIP, supra note 8, at 17–
21 (discussing commonalities of three NAFTA members’ bankruptcy laws). But cf. LoPucki, 
supra note 48, at 2251 (discussing “sharp differences that exist among the bankruptcy systems of 
the various countries”). 
81. See LoPucki, supra note 3, at 750; LoPucki, supra note 48, at 2219–20.  
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elect to defer and let those laws apply. The second modification 
territorialists offer intends to combat the potential for mischief inherent 
in the bright-line situs rule (eve-of-bankruptcy manipulation through 
relocation of assets to havens).82 To combat this weakness, “cooperative 
territorialists” recommend international conventions to govern the 
return of assets to their proper jurisdictions in the event of improper last 
minute relocations.83 
In summary, both universalists and territorialists propose 
modifications to their theories to tone down their potentially unpalatable 
elements. But the modifications reveal important concessions of theory. 
First, cooperative territorialists agree that universalism is an 
economically superior way to regulate cross-border insolvencies; they 
quarrel about whether modified universalism or modified territorialism 
represents a more practical, pragmatic model for the interim.84 Thus the 
theoretical debate now involves an element of pragmatics as well as 
principles. Second, it appears that more discussion is taking place at the 
academic level than treaty negotiation or other forms of more official 
international dialogue. Accordingly, “modified” versions appear to be 
more creations of academic theory than positive descriptions of extant 
law. To be sure, the U.S. Bankruptcy Code endorses modified 
universalism (the deference is discretionary rather than mandatory), but 
there do not yet seem to be corresponding “cooperative territorialist” 
countries.85 By contrast, “territorialism” remains vibrant as a matter of 
 
82. See Fletcher, supra note 2, at 123. “Havenism” is of course also a risk under universalism 
if the choice of law rule is sufficiently bright. See Bob Wessels, International Jurisdiction to Open 
Insolvency Proceedings in Europe, in Particular Against (Groups of) Companies 11–12 (Inst. for 
Law and Finance, Johann Wolfgang Goethe-Universität, Working Paper No. 17, 2003), at 
http://www.ilf-frankfurt.de/publications/ILF_WP_017.pdf (last visited Nov. 6, 2005) (supporting 
EU Insolvency Regulation’s rejection of place of incorporation as overly strict jurisdiction-
selecting rule). 
83. LoPucki, supra note 3, at 749 (“Implementing this rule would necessitate treaties that 
require the return of fleeing assets, but negotiating these treaties should not be difficult.”). 
Professor LoPucki also adds that large (presumably “adjusting”) creditors can protect themselves 
with loan covenants even in the absence of such cooperative territorialism treaties, id. at 758, but 
Professor Guzman cautions that such restrictions on capital mobility would come at great social 
and private cost. Guzman, supra note 25, at 2209. I have my doubts whether such conventions 
will be forthcoming, let alone adhered to, by countries otherwise likely to style themselves as 
asset havens. For an excellent debate to be published contemporaneously with this Article (that I 
have only seen preliminary drafts of), see Samuel L. Bufford, Global Venue Controls Are 
Coming: A Reply to Professor LoPucki, 79 AM. BANK. L.J 105. 
84. See LoPucki, supra note 48, at 2217 (“The issue is what to do while we are waiting for 
the ‘new world’ society—essentially, a world government—to arrive.”). 
85. That is, states that start from a territorialist base but nevertheless subscribe to international 
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domestic policy in many countries.86 Thus, whatever convergence may 
be emerging in the academic community, no sort of international 
consensus has been reached at the legal policymaking level. 
In order to analyze the influence of either paradigm on legal reforms, 
both of their two fundamental theoretical differences must be 
considered. First, because it is a pluralist rather than a fully harmonized 
system, universalism requires a content-neutral choice-of-law rule to 
designate which country’s substantive bankruptcy law will (or should, 
under modified universalism) govern a cross-border financial default. 
Territorialism already has such a content-neutral rule, the situs rule, 
which is well ingrained in the conflicts of law. Second, because the 
purported efficiency (and plausibly fairness) gains from universalism 
flow from one law applying to an entire global dispute, the enforcing 
courts of ancillary jurisdictions must accept outcome differences in the 
distribution of bankruptcy assets brought about by the application of 
foreign (norm-laden) law. This is so even if vivid local claimants might 
be treated better under the application of domestic law. Territorialists 
contend this “acceptance of outcome differences” is also unattainable, 
absent a radical harmonization of substantive bankruptcy laws.87 
Yet these two conceptual foundations of universalism theory rebuffed 
by the territorialists—a viable choice-of-law rule and the acceptance of 
outcome differences—are the very elements that are advanced by the 
UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvencies, which is the 
focus of Section III of this Article. Given the ongoing lack of consensus 
between countries, with some favoring universalism and others 
territorialism, the fact that the Model Law was able to secure 
advancements on both of these elements of universalism, and yet still 
 
conventions of asset return. Although the EU Regulation’s secondary proceeding approach might 
seem quasi-territorialist, European scholars resist the territorialist label. See Wessels, supra note 
6, at 494 (preferring “coordinated universalism”). 
86. See, e.g., Antwerp Bulkcarriers, N.V. v. Holt Cargo Systems Inc., [2001] 3 S.C.R. 951 
(purporting to eschew strict territorialism but in fact insisting upon the application of Canadian 
law due to outcome differences); see also Batra, supra note 43 (India). 
87. Professor Westbrook’s third, pragmatic point of “rough similarity” is subordinated to 
these two primary theoretical matters because it is a tactical advantage, not a structural necessity, 
to the adoption of modified universalism. See Westbrook, supra note 1, at 468–69 (arguing that 
such similarity is not necessary in principle but “in practice…very important” to establishing an 
international regime of modified universalism). Moreover, harmonization (or unification) of 
discrete areas of commercial laws occur within a broader framework of legal unification, as Mr. 
Eric Bergsten, retired Secretary of UNCITRAL, reminded me by email in response to a draft of 
this Article. See E-mail from Eric Bergsten to author (April 6, 2005) (on file with author). 
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receives widespread acceptance by universalist and territorialist states 
alike, is both remarkable and puzzling. 
III. UNCITRAL MODEL LAW: WHAT IT PURPORTS TO DO 
A. Previous International Attempts at Reform  
It is commonly noted that it took the United States a century to 
formulate its first permanent federal bankruptcy legislation, so it 
perhaps should not be surprising that there have been some false starts 
in the international realm.88 Indeed, even Canada and the United States 
were unable to agree upon a bilateral treaty for cross-border 
insolvency.89 The Europeans likewise were unable to harmonize their 
myriad disparate laws. The Brussels Convention of September 27, 1968, 
on enforcement and recognition of judgments specifically excluded 
insolvency proceedings from its scope.90 Follow-up attempts to propose 
a draft convention on insolvency in 1982 collapsed because the draft’s 
adoption of universalism could not garner support from territorialist 
states.91 The Council of Europe’s Istanbul Convention of June 5, 1990, 
also failed, ratified only by Cyprus.92 Even the European Union 
Convention of Insolvency Proceedings was unable to be fully ratified by 
its 1996 expiration date (although it has now found an outlet as a 
Regulation).93 
 
88. See, e.g., Colloquy, supra note 2. 
89. This failure is discussed in Harold S. Burman, Harmonization of International Bankruptcy 
Law: A United States Perspective, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 2543, 2556 (1996). The only meaningful 
multistate treaty of even moderate success appears to be the Convention Regarding Bankruptcy, 
Nov. 7, 1933, Den.-Fin.-Ice.-Nor.-Swed., 155 L.N.T.S. 115 (revised 1977 and 1982), and even 
that is riddled with exceptions. See Tung, supra note 15, at 565 n.42; see also Michael Bogdan, 
International Bankruptcy Law in Scandinavia, 34 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 49 (1985). An excellent 
survey, which covers recent African and Asian efforts, is in Bob Wessels, Comparative and 
International Insolvency Law: Current Positions and Future Trends from a Continental European 
Perspective, at 5–8 (INSOL Conference Paper, Sydney 2005) (on file with author). 
90. See Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial 
Matters, done Sep. 27, 1968, art. 1(2), 29 I.L.M. 1417–18. 
91. See Berends, supra note 12, at 316–17. 
92. See European Convention on Certain International Aspects of Insolvency, opened for 
signature May 6, 1990, art. 14, Europ. T.S. No. 136, 30 I.L.M. 165 [hereinafter Istanbul 
Convention]. 
93. See European Union: Convention on Insolvency Proceedings, Nov. 23, 1995, 35 I.L.M. 
1223, adopted in relevant part by Council Regulation 1346/2000 of 29 May 2000 on Insolvency 
Proceedings, O.J. (L 160), available at http://Europa.eu.int/eur-lex/. This Regulation became 
effective in May 2002 for all members except Denmark. See Westbrook, supra note 13, at 2280. 
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Moreover, the failures at international reform were not limited to 
conventions. The International Bar Association promulgated the Model 
International Insolvency Cooperation Act (MIICA) in 1989, an 
ambitious attempt to establish a universalist regime by enacting states.94 
Its staunch universalism likely alienated territorialists, and it never 
received widespread acceptance.95 On the other hand, the less 
threatening Cross-Border Insolvency Concordat, formally adopted by 
the International Bar Association on June 1, 1996, offers only “general 
principles” to assist participants of transnational insolvencies,96 and 
appears to have been embraced somewhat more favorably.97 
Analyzing the Model Law’s less successful predecessors, it becomes 
apparent that the universalism-territorialism debate of how to design an 
international bankruptcy regime remained too volatile to permit 
meaningful convergence on one approach. The more affiliated a 
proposal was with one extreme, such as the European attempt and the 
MIICA model law of the 1980s—both of which pushed universalism 
aggressively—the more likely it was doomed to failure.98 By contrast, 
the ten non-binding principles of general applicability from the 
 
The implementation of this agreement as a regulation instead of a convention has to do with the 
United Kingdom’s touchiness over mad cow disease, a matter well beyond the scope of this 
Article. See E. Bruce Leonard, The International Scene, The International Year in Review, 2001 
AM. BANKR. INST. J. 34, 34 (2001). 
94. MIICA’s text can be found in 12 CROSS-BORDER INSOLVENCY: COMPARATIVE 
DIMENSIONS (THE ABERYSTWYTH INSOLVENCY PAPERS) 287–96 (Ian Fletcher ed., United 
Kingdom National Committee of Comparative Law 1990) [hereinafter MIICA]. 
95. MIICA’s future is discussed in IAN F. FLETCHER, INSOLVENCY IN PRIVATE 
INTERNATIONAL LAW: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES 325–26 (1999). Although 
MIICA was strongly universalist in its deference to a primary jurisdiction’s substantive 
bankruptcy laws, it curiously provided no choice of law rule for determining the primary 
jurisdiction. It did, however, confront the issue of deference to non-enacting jurisdictions by 
mandating “unilateral” deference to non-enacting states if to do so would be to the general benefit 
of all creditors. See MIICA, supra note 94, § 1(a). 
96. The Concordat does, however, make clear its universalist proclivity. See International Bar 
Association Cross-Border Insolvency Concordat, Principle 1 (1995), at http://www.ibanet.org/ 
images/downloads/Cross-Border%20Insolvency%20Concordat%201995.pdf (last visited Nov. 6, 
2005). 
97. In re Everfresh, 238 B.R. 558 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995), involved a Canadian-U.S. cross-
border insolvency. The Concordat was relied upon heavily by both courts and found its way into 
the joint protocol. See Anne Nielsen et al., The Cross-Border Insolvency Concordat: Principles to 
Facilitate the Resolution of International Insolvencies, 70 AM. BANKR. L.J. 533, 557–61 (1996). 
98. The comparison of the European proposal and MIICA is noteworthy, because there is a 
natural experiment of “public” vs. “private” legislatures trying to reform international bankruptcy 
law. Both failed. No state has tried to codify the status quo of territorialism into a treaty, which is 
indirect evidence that the unresolved nature of the debate would preclude such a codification; 
universalists would balk. 
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Concordat achieved at least marginal success, doubtless due to their 
vagueness. Therefore the explicit decision of the Model Law’s drafters 
to avoid taking a firm stance on the unsettled universalism-territorialism 
debate is one of the Law’s central and distinguishing characteristics. 
B. UNCITRAL Model Law 
1. Introduction 
The Model Law is a suggested template for domestic legislative 
reform, for states to adopt either wholesale or with minor 
modifications.99 It was completed with the input of thirty-six member 
and forty observer states of UNCITRAL, as well as thirteen 
international organizations.100 Most participants were esteemed 
bankruptcy practitioners, judges, and academics.101 A final version was 
adopted in 1997, and a Guide to Enactment (Enactment Guide) was 
published in 1998.102 The Model Law has been proposed for adoption in 
numerous jurisdictions, including the United States, where it has just 
become (in April 2005) Title 15 of the Bankruptcy Code. The national 
delegations have roundly advocated the law’s adoption in their 
 
99. Cf. Matthew T. Cronin, UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency: Procedural 
Approach to a Substantive Problem, 24 J. CORP. L. 709, 711 (1999) (noting that an amendment to 
Canada’s Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act is “comparable” to the Model Law “in many important 
respects” but that its difference still creates “quite dissimilar ‘uniform’ law” from the Model 
Law). 
100. See Guide to Enactment of the UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency, ¶ 8, 
reprinted in 6 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 415 (1998) [hereinafter Enactment Guide]. 
101. Id. ¶ 5. Professor Stephan worries that “the use of [these] technical experts at the center 
of an international process result[s] in [the] kind of legislation that we might expect from the most 
venal of domestic political bodies.” Stephan, supra note 11, at 768. Stephan’s concern employs 
Bob Scott and Alan Schwartz’s political economy analysis of private legislative bodies (such as 
NCCUSL and the ALI) to predict that such technocratic, private lawmaking efforts either produce 
vague, standard-like provisions offensive to no constituency of meaningful lobbying power or 
bright, specific rules that inure to the benefit of such meaningfully powerful constituencies. See 
Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of Private Legislatures, 143 U. PA. L. 
REV. 595, 630–37 (1995). Professor Stephan and Professors Schwartz and Scott seem to disagree 
mildly over the comparative expertise of these technocratic institutions, with Stephan 
acknowledging their faculties and Schwartz questioning their ability to engage in better fact-
finding than a public legislature. Compare Stephan, supra note 11, at 755–56, with Schwartz & 
Scott, supra, at 651. Although Stephan worries that countries “rarely…impose…political 
constraints” on their international delegates, supra note 11, at 756, at least one national delegate 
was conscious of his status as a mere agent representing the views of his country. See Berends, 
supra note 12, at 321 (noting that he “d[id] not agree with everything that is in the Model Law”). 
102. See generally Enactment Guide, supra note 100 (providing a description of the process 
of adopting the UNCITRAL Model Law). 
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respective jurisdictions.103 Thus the Model Law’s reception can be 
characterized as a success in several ways. First, the Model Law 
succeeded at garnering the approval of an important international quasi-
legislative body, UNCITRAL, where its adoption was strongly 
supported by delegates from territorialist and universalist states alike. 
Promulgation of anything, even if only a “model” rather than binding 
law, is a tremendous advancement in its own right given international 
bankruptcy’s disappointing track record. 
Second, the Model Law is not just a model but is actually becoming 
adopted as real, domestic “hard” law in countries around the world as 
they engage in piecemeal reform efforts of their own bankruptcy 
legislations: Japan, Mexico, South Africa, the United Kingdom, the 
United States, and New Zealand, among others, have led the way.104 
While the Model Law has not been enacted verbatim in these countries, 
and while there has been some foot-dragging, the trajectory appears 
positive. This promising trend of domestic enactment is another way of 
characterizing the Model Law as a success. 
We might still further call the Model Law a success on a normative 
level because it appears to promote universalism as the prescriptive 
model for resolving international bankruptcy disputes (and 
universalism, for the reasons a majority of scholars acknowledge, is the 
better road). My focus on the Model Law moves beyond the normative 
discussion, however, which I take as a given, into an analysis of what 
about the Model Law led to its success after so many false starts. It is 
this final level of success—unexpected success in the face of repeated 
failure—that is most worthy of exploration. 
The Model Law’s most important feature is that its scope is self-
consciously constrained.105 It does not settle the universalism-
territorialism question. On the contrary, the drafters seemed to sidestep 
this core issue altogether. They did this in two ways: by cutting a 
“middle ground” between universalism and territorialism on those 
 
103. See Westbrook, supra note 13; see also, Cronin, supra note 99, at 712 (discussing 
National Bankruptcy Review Commission). For a comprehensive summary of the enactment 
process in the first countries to consider the Model Law, see Westbrook, supra note 8, at 24–30. 
104. See generally Westbrook, supra note 8 (describing domestic reform efforts in various 
nations). 
105. See Enactment Guide, supra note 100, ¶ 3 (describing the Model Law as “modest”); Jay 
L. Westbrook, Creating International Insolvency Law, 70 AM. BANKR. L.J. 563, 571 (1996) 
(“Given the difficulty of the subject and the primitive state of international bankruptcy law as it 
is, the aim of the UNCITRAL initiative is to establish just a small number of key improvements, 
with the hope of building further on that achievement in the future.”). 
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matters where it had to engage the debate,106 and by focusing the bulk of 
the provisions on matters of procedure where the debate could be 
seemingly avoided altogether.107 In the words of its Enactment Guide, 
the Model Law’s “scope [is] limited to some procedural aspects of 
cross-border insolvency cases.”108 The Model Law “does not…set forth 
a complete framework for the resolution of cross-border bankruptcies; 
instead, it creates [merely] a set of procedural rules to be integrated into 
the substantive bankruptcy law of each state that adopts the Model 
Law.”109 
The Model Law’s limited provisions can be clustered into two broad 
areas, “administrative” and “substantial.” The first cluster, 
administrative provisions, might be divided further into two subsidiary 
categories: first, provisions related to international cooperation and 
communication, and second, antidiscrimination rules. The first category 
includes, for example, Articles 25 through 27 and Article 30, in which 
the Model Law codifies a series of rules built from the fledgling 
precedents of ad hoc sovereign cooperation and international 
protocols.110 Article 25 (“Cooperation and direct communication 
 
106. The Enactment Guide and Model Law do not even use the words “territorialism” or 
“universalism,” although traditional commentators recognize the compromise. See, e.g., Claudia 
Tobler, Note, Managing Failure in the New Global Economy: The UNCITRAL Model Law on 
Cross-Border Insolvency, 22 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 383, 410 (1999) (“The Model Law 
balances universality goals against the needs of territoriality based regimes.”). 
107. See Cronin, supra note 99, at 709–10. These two elements of the Model Law—neutrality 
and procedural focus—are conceptually related if one characterizes the theoretical debate 
between territorialism and universalism as “substantive.” See, e.g., Buxbaum, supra note 37, at 33 
n.66 (characterizing a move from territorialism to universalism as “substantive”). Accordingly, 
the Model Law’s neutrality (its attempt to avoid picking sides in the universalism-territorialism 
debate) is seemingly complemented by its focus on procedural matters (avoiding the subject 
matter of topics likely to implicate the debate altogether). 
108. Enactment Guide, supra note 100, ¶ 20. The Model Law might fit within the 
philosophical paradigm of functionalism, which advocates technocratic minimalism as the path 
toward substantive unification. See ERNST B. HAAS, THE UNITING OF EUROPE (1958), discussed 
in Westbrook, supra note 13, at 2288 n.58. 
109. Buxbaum, supra note 37, at 34. Indeed, the very title of one commentator’s piece, “A 
Procedural Approach to a Substantive Problem,” underscores the entrenched premise of the 
Model Law’s modest, procedural focus in the literature. See Cronin, supra note 99, at 711 (“The 
Model Law does not seek to unify or change the substantive insolvency laws of the enacting 
State. Rather, the Model Law seeks to change only the procedural law of the enacting State by 
encouraging and facilitating cooperation between States.”); see also Tobler, supra note 106, at 
408, 410 (noting law’s focus on “procedural means” and judging it to “balance” between 
universalism and territorialism as a “political necessity”). 
110. The use of ad hoc protocols, which are addressed in the Model Law, is prevalent in 
international bankruptcies. See, e.g., In re Maruko, 200 B.R. 876 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1996) (Japan); 
In re Nakash, 190 B.R. 763 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1996) (Israel); In re Everfresh 238 B.R. 558 
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between a court of this State and foreign courts or foreign 
representatives”) is illustrative. It mandates court cooperation “to the 
maximum extent possible,”111 and makes explicit a domestic court’s 
entitlement to “communicate directly with, or to request information or 
assistance directly from, foreign courts.”112 These changes are especially 
important in civil law jurisdictions where such power may not be 
inferred as easily from inherent judicial authority as at common law,113 
but unremarkable beyond their confirmation of the general aspiration 
for international cooperation. They do not speak to the ongoing issues of 
contention in the universalist-territorialist debate. If anything, they 
simply reinforce the characterization of the Model Law as a “feel good” 
document concerned mostly with procedural matters. 
Similarly, the second category of administrative changes also pertains 
to issues regarding which there is developing universal consensus. 
Provisions under this category would include Article 9 (“Right of direct 
access”); Article 12 (“Participation of a foreign representative in a 
[domestic insolvency]”); Article 13 (“Access of foreign creditors to a 
[domestic insolvency proceeding]”); and Article 24 (“Intervention by a 
foreign representative in proceedings in this State”). These provisions 
may be seen as antidiscrimination rules that generally require a state to 
accord full access and treatment to foreign bankruptcy representatives 
and creditors.114 Again, these provisions, while important, likely 
 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1995) (Canada). See generally Evan D. Flaschen & Ronald J. Silverman, 
Cross-Border Insolvency Cooperation Protocols, 33 TEX. INT’L L.J. 587 (1998) (discussing and 
reproducing protocols). Economically inclined scholars delight in the efficiency gains of private 
ordering from these protocols. See, e.g., Rasmussen, supra note 35, at 31 (“In effect, the two 
parties [in Maxwell Communication] negotiated a treaty for this case.”). Others note that it is 
more precisely the courts that are negotiating their jurisdiction “through the medium of the 
parties.” Jay L. Westbrook, International Judicial Negotiation, 38 TEX. INT’L L.J. 567, 573 
(2003). For historical treatment, see Thomas M. Gaa, Harmonization of International Bankruptcy 
Law and Practice: Is it Necessary? Is it Possible?, 27 INT’L LAW. 881, 899–900 (1993) (noting 
that ad hoc cooperation in financial default could be traced back to Pope Boniface VIII in 1302). 
111. MODEL LAW, supra note 5, art. 25(1). 
112. Id. art. 25(2). 
113. See, e.g., ALI TIP, supra note 8, at 5 n.6 (noting that Mexico’s civil law tradition 
requires greater reliance on statutory enactments). 
114. Article 13(2), while addressed to antidiscrimination, does not require full “national 
treatment” of foreign creditors. See Jay L. Westbrook, Universal Priorities, 33 TEX. INT’L L.J. 
27, 29 (1998). Instead, it ensures only the (arguably dubious) protection that foreign creditors 
may not be relegated below domestic general unsecured creditors. See MODEL LAW, supra note 
5, art. 13(2) (permitting substantive bankruptcy laws of priority to discriminate against foreign 
creditors “except that the claims of foreign creditors shall not be ranked lower than [general non-
preference creditors]”). This preserves protectionist quirks such as 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(5)(B) 
(giving priority preference to claims of “United States fisherm[e]n”). Note that even the Model 
Law, however, countenances the intractability of discrimination against certain mainstays, such as 
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memorialize emerging practice.115 They only tangentially involve the 
deep, broad, and prickly elements that constitute domestic bankruptcy 
laws. 
Having thus flagged the administrative cluster of provisions that 
codify current trends of ad hoc cooperation and antidiscrimination, I 
wish to focus on the second, more “substantial” cluster. These are the 
parts that engage (but then seek neutrality on) the ongoing theoretical 
debate about universalism. These are found principally in Chapter III of 
the Model Law, which is entitled “Recognition of a Foreign Proceeding 
and Relief.” This focus of inquiry is supported by the conclusion of one 
drafter that “Chapter III contains the most important provisions of the 
Model Law.”116 
2. Core Provisions of the Model Law 
a. One Part Universalism 
The core provisions of the Model Law address a request made to a 
domestic court by a foreign representative (such as a bankruptcy trustee) 
to “recognize” domestically a bankruptcy proceeding already afoot in a 
foreign state. For example, the representative may seek an enforcement 
order by the recognizing court to carry out the effects of an order 
entered by the foreign court that regards assets or parties within the 
recognizing jurisdiction. Most significantly, from the universalist 
perspective, the foreign representative—if coming from the jurisdiction 
that a neutral choice-of-law rule would determine to be the controlling 
jurisdiction—would likely request the domestic court to “turn over” 
local assets to the representative’s control for administration in the 
foreign proceeding according to the priority and distribution rules of the 
foreign bankruptcy laws. Before even getting to a request for turnover, 
however, the foreign representative will first and foremost seek a stay of 
 
foreign tax claims, although it disfavors such discrimination. See MODEL LAW, supra note 5, art. 
9 & cmt. 105 (alternative version of art. 9 allowing for discrimination against foreign tax claims). 
In terms of the substance-procedure distinction discussed later in this paper, see infra Section 
V.C, it is unsurprising that the Model Law stops short of a full antidiscrimination injunction on 
priority rules (the substantive heart of a domestic insolvency law) and instead reserves its clearest 
antidiscrimination mandate for more traditionally procedural matters, such as access to courts 
(art. 12) and standing to intervene (art. 24). 
115. See ALI TIP, supra note 8, at 34 n.46 (“[F]ew countries practice active discrimination on 
the basis of citizenship or residence….”). 
116. Berends, supra note 12, at 349. 
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all activities in the domestic country or, if a worldwide stay has been 
ordered in the foreign proceeding already, a domestic order enforcing 
the foreign-issued stay.117 
Anticipating this prototypical international scenario of stay and 
turnover, the Model Law prescribes a set of rules for domestic courts 
when they are presented with a request to “recognize” a foreign 
bankruptcy. The Model Law—in probably its most legally significant 
provision—directs a domestic court to determine first whether the 
request emanates from a “main” or “non-main” foreign bankruptcy 
proceeding.118 The foreign representative’s request emanates from a 
“foreign main proceeding” if the foreign bankruptcy is in the country 
where “the debtor has the centre of its main interests.”119 If it does not 
come from such a focal point, the request is categorized as coming from 
a “foreign non-main proceeding.”120 The distinction, based on where the 
debtor has the center of its main interests, is fundamental to the 
structure of the Model Law. 
From the foreign representative’s perspective, the most crucial 
distinction is the imposition of a stay. If the bankruptcy is recognized as 
a “foreign main proceeding,” a domestic stay enters (in accordance with 
domestic bankruptcy law) automatically under Article 20 of the Model 
Law, as if the debtor had filed for bankruptcy domestically.121 (While a 
foreign non-main proceeding may also earn a stay under Article 21, 
 
117. The protective force of the stay is recognized as central to most insolvency proceedings. 
See ALI TIP, supra note 8, General Principle III & Cmt. (recognizing that a moratorium helps 
prevent fraud, achieve court control, enhance the value of the debtor’s assets, and even promote 
“social order”). 
118. See MODEL LAW, supra note 5, art. 2 (defining “foreign main proceeding” and “foreign 
non-main proceeding”). 
119. Id. art. 2(b). This test is used in other international documents, such as the EU 
Regulation. 
120. Id. art. 2(c). Indeed, to be more precise, the request may come from neither a foreign 
main proceeding nor a foreign non-main proceeding, because even a “foreign non-main 
proceeding” has requirements. To be a foreign non-main proceeding, the proceeding must be in a 
country where the debtor has an “establishment” (i.e., “any place of operations where the debtor 
carries out a non-transitory economic activity with human means and goods or services,” Id. art. 
2(f)). See id. art. 2(c). For analysis of “establishment,” see Wessels, supra note 82, at 11–12. 
121. See MODEL LAW, supra note 5, art. 20(1) (“Upon recognition of a foreign proceeding 
that is a foreign main proceeding, (a) Commencement or continuation of individual actions or 
individual proceedings concerning the debtor’s assets, rights, obligations or liabilities is stayed; 
(b) Execution against the debtor’s assets is stayed; and (c) The right to transfer, encumber or 
otherwise dispose of any assets of the debtor is suspended.”). Section 20(2) clarifies that the 
scope of such stay is congruent with the bankruptcy stay under the domestic law of the 
recognizing state. Id. art. 20(2). 
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such a stay is purely discretionary.)122 The automatic stay enjoyed by a 
foreign main bankruptcy is then followed by a request for more 
permanent relief, under Article 21.123 Assuming the prototypical request 
in a liquidation is for turnover, Article 21(1)(e) permits turnover of 
domestic assets to the foreign proceeding for distribution, subject to 
certain constraints to be discussed below.124 But, again, the distinction 
between the foreign proceeding as “main” or “non-main” affects the 
result. While assets may presumptively be turned over to a foreign main 
proceeding (provided certain statutory safeguards are met), only limited 
assets may be sent to a foreign non-main proceeding: those assets that 
the domestic court’s choice-of-law rules determine should be 
administered in the foreign proceeding under foreign law.125 Thus, even 
if uncontested by any opposing creditors, a request for turnover to a 
non-main proceeding is statutorily prohibited if the non-main 
proceeding should not be governing the assets under domestic choice-
of-law rules. Therefore, the Model Law can be said to discriminate, 
overtly, in favor of foreign main proceedings over foreign non-main 
proceedings. 
Taking these two key provisions—automatic stay and turnover—
together, the designation of a foreign proceeding as a “main 
proceeding” captures the first theoretical pillar of universalism. It is a 
content-neutral rule (the “centre of the debtor’s main interests”) that 
chooses the jurisdiction (the state of a “foreign main proceeding”) of 
presumptive entitlement to control the distribution of a debtor’s 
assets.126 This presumptive entitlement is demonstrated by the 
 
122. See id. art. 21(1)(a), (b), and (c). 
123. See id. art. 21 (“Relief that may be granted upon recognition of a foreign proceeding.”). 
124. Id. art. 21(1)(e) provides that a domestic court, upon recognizing a foreign proceeding, 
may order any appropriate relief, including “[e]ntrusting the administration or realization of all or 
part of the debtor’s assets located in this State to the foreign representative or another person 
designated by the court.” 
125. See id. art. 21(3) (“In granting relief under this article to a representative of a foreign 
non-main proceeding, the court must be satisfied that the relief relates to assets that, under the law 
of this State, should be administered in the foreign non-main proceeding or concerns information 
required in that proceeding.”). 
126. “Centre of main interests” is a rule. Whether it is a good rule depends upon its 
comparison to the status quo situs rule that anchors territorialism. Whether either such rule affects 
forum shopping depends upon, among other factors, the remoteness of the bankruptcy payoff on 
ex ante credit pricing, a topic upon which there are volumes of academic literature already. For a 
recent offering, see Alan Schwartz, A Normative Theory of Business Bankruptcy, 91 VA. L. REV. 
1199 (2005). Bankruptcy’s compulsory jurisdiction over multiple stakeholders makes “racing” 
analysis more complicated than the general corporate law context because there is greater 
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imposition of the automatic stay under Article 20 against all domestic 
actions, coupled with the turnover relief a domestic court may—and 
presumably should—order under Article 21(1)(e).127 Without more, the 
Model Law would clearly be a pluralist universalist vehicle: a regime 
for promoting the worldwide distribution of international assets under 
one state’s substantive bankruptcy law pursuant to a jurisdiction-
selecting choice-of-law rule. 
b. One Part Territorialism 
It is of course not that simple. Were it so, the Model Law would have 
been denounced by territorialists and declared a victory by universalists. 
Therefore, the Model Law offsets this potential adoption of 
universalism with three powerfully territorialist caveats. First, the 
Model Law contains an escape clause in Article 6 permitting general 
non-compliance;128 second, it contains a safeguard clause constraining 
Article 21(1)(e)’s universalist turnover power;129 and third, it contains a 
mechanism to preserve the “pre-eminence” of local proceedings over 
any foreign proceeding (including a foreign main proceeding) under 
Articles 28 and 29.130 
Article 6 of the Model Law is a general escape clause that permits 
refusal of cooperation when to do so would be “manifestly contrary” to 
the domestic state’s “public policy.”131 This on its own is unexceptional. 
 
mischief, at least theoretically, for third-party rent extraction from non-adjusting creditors if 
debtors and their lenders can shop for bankruptcy forums. 
127. The text of Article 21 simply says “may,” which is neutral. MODEL LAW, supra note 5, 
art. 21(1). The “should” is implied by the Model Law’s overall structure and purpose. 
128. See id. art. 6 (“Nothing in this Law prevents the court from refusing to take an action 
governed by this Law if the action would be manifestly contrary to the public policy of this 
State.”). 
129. See id. art. 21(2) (restricting the domestic court’s power to order turnover of domestic 
assets to administration in a foreign proceeding to situations when “the court is satisfied that the 
interests of creditors in this State are adequately protected”). 
130. See id. art. 28 (“After recognition of a foreign main proceeding, a proceeding under 
[domestic insolvency laws] may be commenced….”); id. art. 29 (“Where a foreign proceeding 
and a [domestic proceeding] are taking place concurrently regarding the same debtor…(a)(i) Any 
relief granted under article 19 or 21 [to the foreign representative] must be consistent with the 
[domestic proceeding]; and (ii) If the foreign proceeding is recognized in this State as a foreign 
main proceeding, [the automatic stay of] article 20 does not apply….”); see also id. art. 20(4) 
(“[The automatic stay of] Paragraph 1 of this article does not affect the right to request the 
commencement of a proceeding under [domestic insolvency law]….”). The Enactment Guide 
accordingly concludes that Article 29 “maintains a pre-eminence of the local proceeding over the 
foreign proceeding” in numerous ways. Enactment Guide, supra note 100, ¶ 190. 
131. MODEL LAW, supra note 5, art. 6. The Enactment Guide makes clear that Article 6 is 
intended to be used sparingly. See Enactment Guide, supra note 100, ¶¶ 88–89 (emphasizing that 
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In fact, it simply codifies pre-existing conflicts law.132 Seen another 
way, Article 6 does no more than embrace modified universalism. 
The greater problem with calling the Model Law universalist comes 
from the safeguard clause of Article 21(2). While turnover of all 
domestic property is in theory permitted to a foreign main proceeding 
under Article 21(1)(e), Article 21(2) explicitly incorporates a 
retrenchment. Specifically, Article 21(2) provides:  
[T]he court may, at the request of the foreign representative, 
entrust the distribution of all or part of the debtor’s assets located 
in this State to the foreign representative or another person 
designated by the court, provided that the court is satisfied that 
the interests of creditors in this State are adequately protected.133  
By expressly constraining the turnover power to instances where “the 
interests” of domestic creditors are “adequately protected,” Article 
21(2) invites, at least on one plausible reading, the domestic court to 
conduct a substantive review of the foreign bankruptcy law, just as 
some courts did under Section 304(c) of the U.S. Code.134 A domestic 
creditor can always argue its “interests” are not “adequately protected” 
if its priority status is lowered by being subjected to less-favorable 
foreign substantive bankruptcy law.135 Thus far from fostering the 
 
clause should be “interpreted restrictively” and used only in “exceptional circumstances” of 
“fundamental importance”). 
132. See generally Symeonides, Exception Clauses, supra note 76. Berends, supra note 12, at 
336, explains that Dutch law distinguishes between garden-variety “domestic” public policy, and 
less restrictive “international” public policy. Thus Dutch courts will not demand the same level of 
public policy comportment of a foreign proceeding as they would with a domestic proceeding. 
This suggests, for example, that a foreign contract that would be void under Dutch law might well 
be enforced in a Dutch court out of international comity; see also Enactment Guide, supra note 
100, ¶ 88 (recognizing this trend of distinguishing “domestic” and “international” standards of 
public policy in a “growing number of jurisdictions”). 
133. MODEL LAW, supra note 5, art. 21(2) (emphasis added). 
134. See, e.g., In re Toga Mfg. Ltd., 28 BR 165, 167–69 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1983). 
135. A strain of this argument was tried in In re Treco, 240 F.3d 148, 159 (2d Cir. 2001), 
where the court reversed the lower court’s deference to a Bahamian main proceeding under § 
304(c)(4), on the appeal of a secured creditor who, under American law, would receive full 
recovery, but under Bahamian law, would recover only after the administrative expenses were 
paid. In holding that the secured creditor’s complaint was well grounded, the court seemed to be 
guided not so much by the dissimilarity of payout per se (secured creditors coming after 
administrative expenses under Bahamian law) but by the startling fact that the Bahamian 
administrators had devoured $8 million (USD) in fees on an estate of $10 million, with more 
expenses still to come. See id. at 161. Thus a procedural impropriety argument was likely lurking 
within the court’s acceptance of the secured creditor’s protest of differential payout. My 
interpretation of Treco appears to be supported by at least subsequent decision. See In re Petition 
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acceptance of substantive outcome differences, a first principle of 
universalism, Article 21(2) of the Model Law seems at best to 
discourage it and at worst to forbid it. 
The final nail in the coffin for a universalist interpretation of the 
Model Law—and an explicit assertion of the Law’s territorialism—is 
found in Articles 28 and 29, which confirm the “pre-eminence” of local 
proceedings. According to these provisions, the recognition of a foreign 
main proceeding does not impede the filing of a full-blown “plenary” 
insolvency action in a domestic bankruptcy tribunal. This is potentially 
fatal to universalism. Consider an American-based debtor that holds 
minimal assets in a Canadian warehouse and that has filed a liquidation 
proceeding in a United States bankruptcy court. The American trustee 
would file an application under the Model Law in a Canadian court for 
recognition of the American proceeding under Article 15(1) 
(“Application for recognition of a foreign proceeding”) as a “foreign 
main proceeding” and for consequent invocation of a stay under Article 
20(1) in accordance with Canadian law.136 She would then seek turnover 
of the Canadian assets under Article 21(1)(e) for distribution in the 
American main proceeding under American bankruptcy law.137 
Articles 28 and 29, nevertheless, permit a Canadian insolvency 
proceeding to be opened in a Canadian court (for example, by a 
sophisticated American creditor who realizes it would enjoy higher 
priority payout under Canadian bankruptcy law, even if its priority is 
applied only to the smaller pool of Canadian assets). The stay accorded 
the American proceeding in Canada under Article 20(1) is dissolved 
under Article 29(b)(ii), as if the Model Law had never imposed a stay at 
all.138 The result reverts the insolvency to the status quo: a territorialist 
system where the freshly opened Canadian proceeding has control over 
the Canadian assets under Canadian law and the American proceeding 
over the American assets under American law, with cooperation and 
deference depending on the pre-existing comity practices of each 
jurisdiction.139 
 
of Bd. of Directors of Compania General de Combustibles S.A., 269 B.R. 104, 114 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. 2001). 
136. MODEL LAW, supra note 5, arts. 15(1), 20(1). 
137. Id. art. 21(1)(e). 
138. Id. art. 29(b)(ii). 
139. Full plenary proceedings are available under the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. See 11 U.S.C. § 
304 (2005). This may be subsumed by Model Law Articles 28 and 29 (as enacted at 11 U.S.C. §§ 
1528–29). The EU Regulation is closer to the Articles 28–29 “local proceeding” approach. 
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In sum, it is understandable why the Model Law is characterized as 
modest and as not settling the universalist-territorialist debate. True, it 
embraces one of the two theoretical cores of universalism: a 
jurisdiction-selecting choice-of-law rule (“centre of main interests”). It 
even backs up that rule with an automatic stay and potential turnover 
power. Despite the universalist features, it makes that rule effectively 
voluntary by allowing the adversely affected parties the opportunity to 
undermine the stay by filing a domestic (territorialist) proceeding.140 
This clashes with the second theoretical foundation of universalism: 
forcing unhappy states and creditors to accept the difference of 
outcomes inevitably flowing from the application of the selected 
jurisdiction’s laws. Therefore the Model Law, on the surface, appears to 
be a hybrid of sorts: partially universalist in outreach, but partially 
territorialist in retrenchment. It is this compromise approach, which 
some might say is anchored more in pragmatics than principle,141 that 
should make both territorialists and universalists equally happy (or 
sad).142 Likely due to the feel-good administrative provisions about 
facilitating international communication and cooperation, the overall 
consensus has trended toward happiness.143 The Model Law, like 
anything else that tries to compromise and seems to do nothing,144 earns 
self-congratulation from drafters and internationally minded 
policymakers, but exasperation from scrutinizing commentators.145 
 
140. See, e.g., Tobler, supra note 106, at 409–10. 
141. Writing about the EU Convention that ultimately spawned the EU Regulation, Professor 
Fletcher observed, with equal applicability to the Model Law,  
Although the resulting mix of principles may draw the wrathful ire of purists who 
happen to adhere to one or other of the dogmatic theories [of universalism or 
territorialism], the Convention represents a triumph of the “art of the possible” in the 
delicate field of international treaty negotiation…whereby the best can become the 
enemy of the good.  
Fletcher, supra note 2, at 124. 
142. See Berends, supra note 12, at 320–21 (underscoring compromises required to complete 
the Model Law and noting that, as a key drafter, he did “not agree with everything that is in the 
Model Law”). 
143. See generally Westbrook, supra note 13. 
144. Perhaps the Model Law could be seen as an illustration of the hypothesized proclivities 
of “private legislatures” to prefer in most circumstances vague standards to clear rules in 
reformist projects. See Robert E. Scott, The Rise and Fall of Article 2, 62 LA. L. REV. 1009, 1042 
(2002) (“These [vague] rules will result, not from their intrinsic merits, but from the compromises 
that reformer-dominated [bodies] will accept in order to secure enactment.”). 
145. See Buxbaum, supra note 37, at 35–36 (“Thus, in explicitly recognizing and deferring to 
a court’s ability to implement a territorial approach, the [Model Law] not only falls short of its 
promise of universality but also gives new vitality to territoriality.”); Liza Perkins, Note, A 
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IV. UNCITRAL MODEL LAW: WHAT IT REALLY DOES 
Of the scholarly analyses of the Model Law to date, most have 
discussed the Model Law’s modesty and “middle ground” between the 
theories of territorialism and universalism.146 These conventional 
assessments do not reflect sufficiently the true nature of the Model Law, 
which is to advance the agenda of universalism. Universalism is 
advanced not by express adoption of a full-fledged universalism regime, 
where countries defer to one controlling jurisdiction on all elements of 
the bankruptcy pursuant to a choice-of-law rule. Rather, universalism is 
advanced incrementally, by building upon its first principles. That is, 
the Model Law embraces universalism’s two foundations: it proffers a 
viable and neutral jurisdiction-selecting choice-of-law rule, and it 
fosters the introduction, albeit on a fledgling scale, of the acceptance of 
outcome differences in transnational insolvencies. 
A. Jurisdiction-Selecting Choice-of-Law Rule 
The Model Law develops a workable choice-of-law rule, embodied in 
Articles 2, 20, and 21. As explained above, Article 2 defines “foreign 
main proceeding” as a “proceeding taking place in the State where the 
debtor has the centre of its main interests.”147 Article 20(1) puts this into 
force by imposing an automatic stay in the recognizing jurisdiction that 
operates instantaneously upon determination that the request for 
deference emanates from a foreign main proceeding.148 Article 21(1)(e) 
builds upon this choice of law by enabling domestic asset turnover to 
the main proceeding for distribution under foreign bankruptcy law.149 
 
Defense of Pure Universalism in Cross-Border Corporate Insolvencies, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & 
POL. 787, 828 (2000) (“[The Model Law] do[es] not go far enough. In fact, the UNCITRAL 
Model Law, even if widely enacted, may do little to change the dreadful state of affairs in 
international bankruptcy law.”); see also Fletcher, supra note 2, at 124 (acknowledging 
compromise approaches “draw the wrathful ire of purists”). 
146. See Section III.B.2, supra. The Model Law’s attempt to cut a neutral path between 
universalism and territorialism has unsurprisingly led to some confusion with a few authors. 
Compare Cronin, supra note 99, at 711 (“The Model Law adopts what one could call a 
cooperative territorial approach.”) with Perkins, supra note 145, at 803 (“[T]he Model 
Law…would essentially codify a U.S.-style regime of ‘modified universalism’ for the enacting 
nation(s)….”). Most, however, simply recognize the middle-roading for what it is. See Tobler, 
supra note 106, at 410 (“The Model Law balances universality goals against the needs of 
territoriality based regimes.”). 
147. MODEL LAW, supra note 5, art. 2(b); see also id. art. 17(2)(a) (dictating that a foreign 
main proceeding is recognized if it takes place in the state where the debtor has its center of main 
interests). 
148. See id. art. 20(1). 
149. See id. art. 21(1)(e). 
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The Model Law therefore picks the “centre of main interests” to 
decide which foreign bankruptcy proceedings should enjoy greater legal 
force (automatic vs. discretionary stays) in the recognizing 
jurisdiction.150 This ascribes fundamental significance and superior 
regulatory entitlement to one and only one jurisdiction: that of the 
center of the debtor’s main interests.151 That the Model Law does so 
regarding the imposition of an automatic stay is important, because the 
stay of proceedings triggered by the initiation of an insolvency action is 
a core element of many insolvency regimes.152 Thus even though Article 
21(2) waters down the turnover power of the domestic court and stops 
short of complete universalism, Article 20(1) on its own suffices to 
implement the theoretical concession of sovereigns that one jurisdiction 
is “more important” than others: universalism’s theoretical focus on one 
law.153 (Furthermore, as discussed below, it is far from clear that the 
exceptions of Article 21(2) are quite so lethal to the Model Law’s 
nascent universalism as conventional analysis suggests.) 
In conflicts parlance, the Model Law’s adoption of a center of main 
interests test is a multilateralist choice-of-law rule, because it recognizes 
the possibility of several interested states and attempts to find the nexus 
of greatest connection between one jurisdiction and the worldwide 
insolvency.154 While the Model Law only implements the choice-of-law 
 
150. The pros and cons of the “centre of main interests” test have been analyzed elsewhere. 
For a critical discussion, see LoPucki, supra note 48, at 2226–29. For a legislative history of other 
contenders, see Berends, supra note 12, at 330. 
151. See Buxbaum, supra note 37, at 45 (noting that the Model Law’s “deference to foreign 
main proceedings sketches the outlines of a true jurisdiction-selecting rule based on a notion of 
the ‘proper seat’ of the insolvency proceeding”). 
152. See ALI TIP, supra note 8, at 36–37, 56–67. Note that even in jurisdictions that do not 
embrace as broad-sweeping an automatic stay as the United States, a moratorium plays an 
important role. For example, in Canada, where secured creditors are nominally immune from the 
automatic stay, there is at least some interim breathing relief of ten days’ notice before 
foreclosure and a routine practice of court-ordered discretionary relief. See LoPucki & Triantis, 
supra note 80, at 279 n.32. Countries that do not stay some liquidations automatically will 
routinely grant asset-specific or proceeding-specific protection measures. See Anderson, supra 
note 31, at 705 (discussing Japanese order of hozen shobun). 
153. Professor Buxbaum agrees. See Buxbaum, supra note 37, at 45 n.123 (“While this 
arrangement does operate as a concession to territoriality, it does not undermine the impact of the 
initial recognition [of the foreign bankruptcy].”). 
154. See id. at 38–41, 47–48 (canvassing conflicts literature and contrasting paradigms of 
unilateralism and multilateralism). The Model Law’s rule also seems to be an interest-based 
analysis, because it tries to apply the substantive law of the state with the greatest interest in 
regulating the conduct at issue. See generally Brainerd Currie, Married Women’s Contracts: A 
Study in Conflict-of-Laws Method, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 227 (1958). While some modern conflicts 
scholars build upon interest analysis, see Kramer, supra note 37, at 279 (suggesting that Currie’s 
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rule for individualized, discrete issues (such as the automatic application 
of the stay), it lays the groundwork that is conceivably extendable to the 
selection of the substantive rules of priority and distribution, i.e., to the 
adoption of universalism. The Model Law thus drops the first shoe of 
universalism’s theory, by providing the choice-of-law rule. That the 
Model Law does not go all the way, by requiring the recognizing court 
to let the main jurisdiction’s substantive bankruptcy laws govern, 
diminishes neither the conceptual significance of the Law’s 
multilateralism, nor the advancement of hammering out a specific 
choice-of-law rule. Indeed, as discussed below, that may be its 
brilliance. 
Furthermore, it is not clear that the purportedly stay-unraveling 
provisions of Article 21(2)’s safeguard clause and Articles 28 and 29’s 
local proceedings provisions are anywhere near so fatal to the impact of 
the choice-of-law rule as initially implied. First, while Article 21(2)’s 
insistence on “adequate protection” of domestic creditors as a condition 
of turnover appears to import territorialist considerations, it is by no 
means a compelled conclusion of statutory interpretation. As discussed 
above, certainly one possible way to interpret “adequate protection” is 
to require substantive judicial scrutiny of the foreign bankruptcy law 
and construe any deviation from domestic priorities to render a domestic 
creditor “inadequately protected.” An equally plausible interpretation, 
however, would be to construe the phrase procedurally, and permit 
turnover as a remedy only if a domestic creditor is accorded sufficient 
notice and time to file a claim in the foreign main proceeding.155 Indeed, 
substantive comparison of domestic bankruptcy laws seems an unlikely 
intent of the drafters, who were clearly familiar with the U.S. Code’s 
Section 304(c)(4) and declined that route.156 If anything, the Model 
 
basic insights are still relevant to the choice of law process), others reject it, see O’Hara & 
Ribstein, supra note 66 (arguing that interest analysis improperly focuses on state interests rather 
than private actor interests). 
155. Cf. Interpool, Ltd. v. Certain Freights, 102 B.R. 373 (D.N.J. 1988) (refusing to defer to 
an Australian proceeding because of, among other reasons, the entry of an ex parte order 
approving a settlement). For a critique of this case, and of this argument in particular as a 
makeweight, see Westbrook, supra note 1, at 475–76. See also Canadian S. Ry. Co. v. Gebhard, 
109 U.S. 527 (1883) (according comity to foreign judgment where party to be bound had notice 
and opportunity to intervene). For a focus on procedural protections in comity analysis and their 
role in rendering potential substantive differences in litigation outcomes acceptable, see In re 
Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at Bhopal, India in Dec. 1984, 634 F. Supp. 842 
(S.D.N.Y. 1986). As discussed above, this procedural protection interpretation is also a plausible 
reading of the Treco case. See supra note 135. 
156. This conclusion is strengthened by the inclusion of an adequate protection clause in § 
304(c) already, under § 304(c)(2) (providing “protection of claim holders in the United States 
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Law’s repeated insistence that it focuses on procedural matters perhaps 
suggests a procedural lens through which to interpret Article 21(2).157 
Thus it is far from a foregone conclusion that this provision fully 
revives territorialism in its reference to “adequate protection” of 
domestic creditors. 
Articles 28 and 29 present more of a real challenge to the nascent 
choice-of-law rule regarding the automatic stay. Nevertheless, there are 
still several reasons to suspect the effects of these provisions have also 
been overstated. Article 28 provides that after a foreign main 
proceeding has been recognized, a domestic bankruptcy proceeding may 
nevertheless be opened with regard to the domestic assets. Furthermore, 
Article 29 says that in such a situation, “the automatic stay and 
suspension referred to in [Article 20(1)] shall be modified or 
terminated…if inconsistent with the [domestic] proceeding.”158 The 
Model Law thus allows a domestic creditor rights to file a full domestic 
insolvency proceeding, even in the face of a proceeding underway in the 
state of the center of the debtor’s main interests. It further allows that 
local proceeding to vitiate the principal recognition effect of the foreign 
main proceeding (the automatic application of a stay). 
Articles 28 and 29 are not so dire to the universalist potential of the 
Model Law’s automatic stay as this summary suggests for at least three 
reasons. First, Articles 28 and 29 only apply when the domestic 
proceeding is recognized on record as being a non-main proceeding. 
That is, to invoke Articles 28 and 29 to “undo” the effects of the 
automatic stay of Article 20, the domestic court must have already 
decided under Article 15 that the center of the debtor’s main interests 
falls outside its jurisdiction. Indeed, structurally, Article 28 states that 
its operation occurs “[a]fter recognition of a foreign main 
 
against prejudice and inconvenience in the processing of claims in [a] foreign proceeding”) 11 
U.S.C. § 304(c)(2) (2005). An expressio unis argument can be made that the Model Law’s 
safeguard of “adequate protection” would more likely map to § 304(c)(2)’s prejudice and 
inconvenience concerns than to § 304(c)(4)’s similarity of laws concerns. 
157. See Berends, supra note 12, at 373–74 (suggesting “corruption” concerns prompted 
safeguard clause). Consider also the theoretical goals of a bankruptcy regime discussed earlier in 
this Article—specifically, the broad jurisdictional reach of bankruptcy laws to bind all 
stakeholders to a compulsory resolution procedure. Presumably, a creditor required to relinquish 
assets to a proceeding that does not guarantee collective debt resolution—the core of 
bankruptcy—would be inadequately protected. 
158. MODEL LAW, supra note 5, art. 29(b)(ii). If an application for recognition of a foreign 
main proceeding has been filed but not yet granted, Article 29 blocks such a stay preemptively. 
See id. art. 29(a)(ii) (instructing that in such a situation Article 20 “does not apply”). 
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proceeding.”159 This puts a domestic court more clearly on record in 
deciding whether to frustrate a foreign proceeding that it concedes is 
taking place in the center of the debtor’s main interests. While it is 
arguably easy for courts to give comity short shrift in fuzzy situations,160 
it is surely a different matter where the necessarily subordinate nexus to 
the worldwide bankruptcy must be openly acknowledged.161 
Accordingly, even if Articles 28 and 29 permit the “pre-eminence” of a 
local proceeding, that local proceeding may well—in the interests of 
comity that pre-exist and survive the Model Law—ultimately defer to 
the foreign proceeding, perhaps self-conscious of an inferior regulatory 
entitlement.162 
Second, while the point may seem straightforward, Articles 28 and 29 
only apply if and when a local proceeding is actually filed. Thus the 
default scenario is for the automatic stay to enjoy full effect unless and 
until a local proceeding is opened. This may be cold comfort if in 
practice local proceedings are always filed by opportunistic creditors—
and there is some support for this likelihood.163 Nonetheless, the point 
 
159. Id. art. 28. 
160. See Tung, supra note 27, at 72, 100; cf. In re Starcom Servs. Corp. (Bankr. W.D. Wa. 
1998) (converting a U.S. plenary proceeding into § 304 ancillary proceeding and entering 
injunction requiring all creditors to pursue claims in Canadian plenary proceeding of Washington 
state subsidiary of North American telecom company).  
161. Professor Tung’s game theory approach suggests that ambiguity and its concomitant 
“fuzzy commitments” create a heightened risk of defection and even enhance the “error noise.” 
See id. at 80–82. Exposing “defection,” by removing ambiguity regarding which home state is 
entitled to deference, reduces this noise. 
162. Article 29 requires “cooperation and coordination” with the foreign court, and the 
Enactment Guide makes clear that the initiation “of a local proceeding does not prevent or 
terminate the recognition of a foreign proceeding. This principle is essential for achieving the 
objectives of the Model Law in that it allows the court in the enacting State in all circumstances 
to provide relief in favour of the foreign proceeding.” Enactment Guide, supra note 100, ¶ 189. 
There is thus no reason why universalist states cannot fully defer to foreign main proceedings 
under Article 29. Indeed, it is not even clear that the stay would dissolve automatically if the 
foreign proceeding had been already recognized. Article 29(b)(ii) only provides that “the 
stay…shall be modified or terminated…if inconsistent with the [local] proceeding.” MODEL 
LAW, supra note 5, art. 29(b)(ii). A universalist state may well find an automatic stay, when it is 
an ancillary jurisdiction, purely “consistent” with its local proceeding. Universalist states 
consequently may remain universalist under Articles 28 and 29, just as territorialists may dig in. 
The interesting case is the countries at the margin that could go either way. Such a country may 
feel more pressure to defer if it must first recognize the foreign proceeding as being in the center 
of the debtor’s main interests. 
163. For example, most of the seminal cases involved filings in the relevant jurisdictions. See, 
e.g., In re Toga Mfg. Ltd., 28 B.R. 165 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1983); Interpool, Ltd. v. Certain 
Freights, 102 B.R. 373 (D.N.J. 1988); In re Maxwell Communication Corp., 170 B.R. 800 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994), aff’d, 186 B.R. 807 (S.D.N.Y. 1995), aff’d, 93 F.3d 1036 (2d Cir. 1996); 
Re BCCI, Banque Arabe Internationale d’Investissement SA v. Morris [2001] 1 BCLC 263. We 
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remains that, absent local interjection, a domestic automatic stay arises 
by operation of a foreign bankruptcy, a novel concept to traditionally 
territorialist jurisdictions. Furthermore, even if a local proceeding is 
filed, the effects of recognizing the foreign main proceeding and any 
orders (e.g., for turnover of assets) are not necessarily undone. They are 
simply reassessed to check for “consistency” with the local proceeding. 
As discussed above regarding adequate protection, the term 
“consistency” is undefined and might be subject to varying 
interpretations, including ones fostering international cooperation and 
deference. 
Finally, even if the automatic stay is modified or terminated by 
initiation of a local proceeding under Articles 28 and 29, the effect of 
recognizing the foreign proceeding as a main proceeding remains part of 
the landscape of the ongoing transnational dispute. This has both a 
direct and indirect consequence. Directly, it means that other provisions 
of the Model Law that turn on the “main proceeding” designation still 
remain in effect. For example, the presumption of insolvency created by 
Article 31, (discussed in Section IV.B.1, infra), remains in force. 
Indirectly, the ongoing effect of recognition reinforces the awkwardness 
issue just discussed: it casts a pall over any subsequent judicial order of 
the domestic court, which now emanates from a tribunal that has 
acknowledged its inferior sovereign claim to control the global 
insolvency dispute.164 
The third reason the scope of Articles 28 and 29 might be overstated 
is that the preserved “pre-eminence” of local proceedings is qualified, 
not absolute. Specifically, while Article 28 accords the territorialist 
creditor the right to initiate a plenary domestic insolvency proceeding in 
the face of a foreign main proceeding, that right is constrained. Article 
28 by its own terms limits the domestic proceeding in such a case to 
covering only “the assets of the debtor that are located in [the local 
state].”165 Thus, an Article 28 proceeding may only be territorialist in its 
 
do not know, however, how many unremarkable cases with lower stakes there are. 
164. In an earlier draft of the EU Regulation, which adopts a secondary proceeding approach 
reminiscent of Articles 28 and 29, there was a proposed requirement that the foreign 
representative from the foreign main proceeding authorize any filing of a secondary, local 
proceeding. See Wessels, supra note 6, at 497. 
165. MODEL LAW, supra note 5, art. 28. To be precise, Article 28 permits the local 
proceeding to reach beyond domestic assets, but only to aid foreign proceedings. Id. 
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reach, even in a domestic jurisdiction with universalist bankruptcy 
laws.166 
On the one hand, this result might seem expected. After all, Article 
28 is invoked only when a (presumably local) creditor resists the 
universalist reach of a foreign main proceeding and seeks to shield 
domestic assets from the ambit of the foreign proceeding’s (presumably 
unfavorable, at least for that creditor) substantive bankruptcy laws. On 
the other hand, if such a creditor is sufficiently advantaged by the 
substantive priority rules of local law to bring a local proceeding under 
Articles 28 and 29, then there is no reason why that creditor would not 
want the reach of those favorable rules to be as expansive as possible 
and thus encompass the debtor’s worldwide assets.167 
In sum, a closer analysis of the Model Law reveals that the 
supposedly unraveling effects of Articles 28 and 29 may be somewhat 
overstated in their purported negation of the universalist choice-of-law 
potential of Articles 2 and 20. Accordingly, the Model Law’s choice-of-
law rule—“centre of main interests,” which is presumed to be at the 
debtor’s “registered office”—is a content-neutral rule that accords 
important regulatory entitlements to the selected jurisdiction.168 While it 
does not implement full-fledged universalism by compelling 
distribution of global assets in accordance with the selected 
jurisdiction’s substantive bankruptcy provisions under a “one law” 
approach, the Model Law nevertheless provides a functioning choice-
of-law rule for transnational insolvency disputes, the starting theoretical 
foundation of a universalist regime. 
B. Acceptance of Outcome Differences 
The second way in which the Model Law foments universalism is by 
embracing the paradigm’s other theoretical anchor, namely, pushing 
enacting states into accepting some cession of regulatory sovereignty in 
 
166. Bob Wessels makes this observation regarding the EU Regulation’s analogues to 
Articles 28 and 29. Wessels, supra note 6, at 499. 
167. This happened in Stonington Partners, Inc. v. Lernout & Hauspie Speech Prods. N.V., 
310 F.3d 118, 126 (3d Cir. 2002), where a U.S. creditor argued, to an American court, that its 
claim should be subjected to (favorable) Belgian bankruptcy law when there were two parallel 
bankruptcy proceedings opened in the United States and Belgium. See id. (reversing injunction 
that barred U.S. creditor from pursuing this claim in Belgium). Compare this case with In re 
Maxwell Communication Corp., 170 B.R. 800 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1994), aff’d 186 B.R. 807 
(S.D.N.Y. 1995), aff’d 93 F.3d 1036 (2d Cir. 1996) where British administrators sought the 
application of American avoidance law in an American proceeding to transfers otherwise valid 
under British law. 
168. MODEL LAW, supra note 5, art. 16(3). 
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the transnational insolvency realm. I offer two examples of this from the 
Model Law: Articles 31 and 14. What is significant about these articles 
is that they are not part of the core provisions of the Model Law 
discussed above that pertain to the stay upon recognition of a foreign 
proceeding. Rather, they are more to the periphery of the Law. 
1. Article 31 
Article 16 of the Model Law adopts certain presumptions. Some of 
these presumptions affect purely procedural matters. For example, 
Article 16(2) empowers recognizing courts to presume that documents 
submitted in support of an application for recognition are authentic 
without resort to cumbersome methods of legalization.169 Other 
presumptions are more substantive. Significant for the choice-of-law 
rule is Article 16(3), which provides that the debtor’s registered office is 
presumed to be its center of main interests.170 
The Model Law also contains another, arguably hidden presumption 
that curiously is not located with the other presumptions in Article 16. It 
is in Article 31.171 This presumption does not apply universally, but only 
to foreign main proceedings. It provides: “In the absence of evidence to 
the contrary, recognition of a foreign main proceeding is, for the 
purpose of commencing a [domestic insolvency proceeding], proof that 
the debtor is insolvent.”172 This presumption is significant because in 
many jurisdictions some threshold degree of financial distress must be 
shown before a debtor may enjoy the benefits of insolvency 
protection.173 These range from the “cessation of payments” test in the 
Netherlands,174 to the more traditional “balance sheet insolvency” test in 
Canada.175 By contrast, the American system allows for debtor self-
 
169. Id. art. 16(2) (“The court is entitled to presume that documents submitted in support of 
the application for recognition are authentic, whether or not they have been legalized.”). 
170. Id. art. 16(3) (“In the absence of proof to the contrary, the debtor’s registered office, or 
habitual residence in the case of an individual, is presumed to be the centre of the debtor’s main 
interests.”). 
171. Berends suggests that this is because the presumption only takes effect after recognition. 
See Berends, supra note 12, at 392–95. 
172. MODEL LAW, supra note 5, art. 31. 
173. See Enactment Guide, supra note 100, ¶ 194 (canvassing different tests). 
174. See Berends, supra note 12, at 393 (discussing the Dutch Insolvency Act’s two unpaid 
debts test). 
175. See ALI TIP, supra note 8, at n.71 (discussing § 2(1) of the Canadian Bankruptcy & 
Insolvency Act’s definition of a “bankrupt”). 
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filing, policed indirectly by a good-faith requirement.176 Article 31’s 
presumption of insolvency thus speaks to the eligibility of a debtor to 
enter the insolvency system.177 
By creating this eligibility-related presumption, Article 31 mandates 
a domestic state—at least to the extent of a rebuttable presumption—to 
accept a foreign state’s decision that the requirements of “protection-
worthiness” have been met.178 Indeed, the compelled decision reinforces 
the choice-of-law rule central to the Model Law, because the 
sovereignty-suppressing presumption is only enjoyed by foreign states 
where the pending bankruptcy is a foreign main proceeding under 
Article 2’s center of main interests test. 
What makes the presumption still more remarkable is that it is 
enjoyed by any primary jurisdiction under the center of main interests 
test, even those jurisdictions that have no threshold insolvency 
requirement for filing under domestic law. It is one thing for a Canadian 
court to suppress its balance sheet insolvency test for the Dutch 
cessation of payments test: they are arguably two roads to the same goal 
of ensuring a state of financial distress has been demonstrated. It is quite 
another thing for a Canadian court to suppress its entire eligibility 
requirement—by “presuming” that the debtor is insolvent and hence 
eligible for Canadian bankruptcy protection—by virtue of an American 
proceeding that requires no such showing. To be sure, an easy answer is 
that the presumption is only an inference that can be deflated with 
“evidence to the contrary” by a skeptical Canadian suitor.179 But the 
 
176. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(3) requires that a reorganization plan be proposed “in good faith” as 
a precondition to confirmation. See, e.g., In re Manville Forest Prods. Corp., 31 B.R. 991 
(S.D.N.Y. 1983); Lawrence Ponoroff & F. Stephen Knippenberg, Legal Theory: The Implied 
Good Faith Filing Requirement: Sentinel of an Evolving Bankruptcy Policy, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 
919 (1991). 
177. See UNCITRAL Draft Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law, Part II, 24th Sess., U.N. 
Doc. A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.54/ADD.1 (2001), paras. 103–11 (discussing various eligibility screens 
used in bankruptcy systems) [hereinafter Draft Legislative Guide, Part II]. 
178. MODEL LAW, supra note 5, art. 31. To be precise, it foists this acceptance upon states 
that have “insolvency” as an eligibility threshold to bankruptcy protection. States such as the 
United States sacrifice little with such a concession. See Enactment Guide, supra note 100, ¶ 196 
(“For the national laws where proof that the debtor is insolvent is not required for the 
commencement of insolvency proceedings, the presumption established in article 31 may be of 
little practical significance.”). 
179. MODEL LAW, supra note 5, art. 31. The comment on the rebuttable nature of this 
presumption in the Enactment Guide, supra note 100, ¶ 197, seems almost defensive about 
Article 31’s incursion onto sovereignty and reminds that “the court of the enacting state is not 
bound by the decision of the foreign court, and local criteria for demonstrating insolvency remain 
operative, as is clarified by the words ‘in the absence of evidence to the contrary.’” That local 
criteria remain active does not mean that they survive intact. An interesting corpus of European 
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easy answer ignores the effects of presumptions in creating evidentiary 
hurdles to bias preferred outcomes.180 There is also arguably an 
expressive function to delineating the status quo.181 
The theoretical import of Article 31 is difficult to overstate. Its 
message is unabashedly universalist: one state should accept another 
state’s assessment that eligibility for bankruptcy filing has been met, 
even from those jurisdictions that do not invest great stock in a financial 
distress requirement.182 Moreover, Article 31’s scope is broad. Even a 
“pre-eminent” local proceeding under Articles 28 and 29 does not 
escape its reach. Although Articles 28 and 29 permit the filing of a local 
proceeding in the face of a concession that another jurisdiction houses 
the center of the debtor’s main interests, that otherwise plenary local 
proceeding is partially constrained by being required to accept the main 
jurisdiction’s assessment that eligibility for filing has been met under 
Article 31. 
 
 
 
litigation is unfolding on when and how “evidence to the contrary” can rebut the presumption, 
which is also contained in the EU Regulation. See, e.g., Enron Directo SL ((High Ct. Ch. Div., 
July 4, 2002) (oral decision of Lightman, J.) (holding Spanish-incorporated subsidiary of the 
Enron Group that had all its activities conducted and headquarters situated at Enron House in 
London had its center of main interests in the United Kingdom rather than Spain), discussed in 
Ian F. Fletcher, The Challenge of Change: First Experiences of Life Under the EC Regulation on 
Insolvency Proceedings in the U.K. (INSOL Working Paper (2003) (on file with author). 
180. See Note, Shifting Burdens of Persuasion in Employment Discrimination Litigation. 109 
HARV. L. REV. 1579 (1996). This observation can be cast as a corollary of the Coase Theorem. 
Note that the burden of this specific issue is important. The assignment of risk in demonstrating 
insolvency implicates complex valuation and accounting issues in many bankruptcy cases. 
181. See Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract Law, 
113 YALE L.J. 541, 608 n.144 (2003) (“[C]ourts tend to regard state-created defaults as 
presumptively fair or efficient.”). 
182. By framing Article 31 as an insolvency presumption, as opposed to a more explicit 
“eligibility” presumption, the Model Law might be making a further, even stronger normative 
statement on the triviality of the insolvency requirement as an eligibility screen. This is because 
Article 31 does not foist a presumption upon recognizing states with regard to all eligibility 
screens. For example, the recognition of a foreign main proceeding does not generate a 
presumption that the debtor has filed in good faith. The Model Law has thus arguably created a 
hierarchy of bankruptcy eligibility screens, necessarily classifying the insolvency requirement as 
“more suppressible” than other eligibility screens. This possibility is reinforced by the disdain of 
the NAFTA reformers toward the insolvency screen. See ALI TIP, supra note 8, at 17 
(“Technical details of insolvency and ‘entrance requirements’ aside, the law in each country is 
concerned with situations in which the debtor is (or threatens shortly to be) not paying its debts as 
they become due.”). On the other hand, UNCITRAL’s Draft Legislative Guide endorses 
eligibility screens in insolvency laws. See Draft Legislative Guide, Part II, supra note 177. 
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2. Article 14 
While Article 31 provides a direct example of universalism in the 
Model Law by suppressing one state’s laws in deference to the main 
state’s, Article 14 goes even further. It compels an actual harmonization 
of important notice provisions of domestic bankruptcy laws. If 
universalism requires temporary cession of sovereignty by ancillary 
jurisdictions, harmonization arguably requires absolute relinquishment. 
This is because universalism rotates which jurisdiction’s substantive 
bankruptcy laws will govern. Compelled harmonization, by contrast, 
requires all jurisdictions to follow one invariable rule. The jurisdictions 
that do not subscribe to the eventual victor rule must forever give up 
their own policy views on the matter.183 
Article 14 of the Model Law covers the notice to foreign creditors 
that must be given when an insolvency proceeding is commenced in an 
enacting jurisdiction. The provision begins innocuously enough as an 
antidiscrimination injunction requiring states to give notice to foreign 
creditors when notice is given to domestic creditors.184 The article 
continues, however, to impose the requirement that notice be given 
individually to the foreign creditors: “Such notification shall be made to 
the foreign creditors individually, unless the court considers that, under 
the circumstances, some other form of notification would be more 
appropriate.”185 
This is significant. Some domestic regimes require individual notice 
to creditors, but others permit common publication.186 By mandating 
individual notice, the Model Law takes a stance in the debate over 
offsetting costs and benefits of differing forms of notice. Again, in 
keeping with the expected and repeated agnosticism of the Model Law 
towards harmonization, one would have expected Article 14 simply to 
 
183. Strictly speaking, harmonization does not require suppression of sovereignty if the 
subscribing states agree spontaneously to a new, harmonized standard. But the Model Law’s 
“adjunct” status—that it can be enacted alongside a country’s preexisting domestic insolvency 
code—anticipates that enacting states may not want to change their preexisting laws. 
184. MODEL LAW, supra note 5, art. 14(1):  
Whenever under [domestic insolvency law] notification is to be given to creditors in this 
State, such notification shall also be given to the known creditors that do not have 
addresses in this State. The court may order that appropriate steps be taken with a view 
to notifying any creditors whose address is not yet known. 
185. Id. art. 14(2). The “discretion [reserved] to allow other forms of notification” permits 
flexibility for situations where, for example, “another way of notifying foreign creditors…is 
equally effective but less cumbersome.” Berends, supra note 12, at 347. 
186. See Enactment Guide, supra note 100, ¶ 107 (noting domestic notice laws ranging from 
individual notice to local publication to affixing notices on courthouse doors). 
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have required the same degree of notice that all other creditors enjoy 
under domestic bankruptcy law, respecting the sovereign rights of each 
state to select its notice system of preference. Article 14(2)’s decision to 
mandate individual notice is striking, almost pushy.187 
Furthermore, Article 14(3) goes a step further and actually spells out 
specific items for inclusion in that individual notice.  
[The] notification shall: (a) [i]ndicate a reasonable time period 
for filing claims and specify the place for their filing; (b) 
[i]ndicate whether secured creditors need to file their secured 
claims; and (c) [c]ontain any other information required to be 
included in such a notification to creditors pursuant to the law[s] 
of [the enacting] State.188 
The structure of Article 14(3) clarifies that subsections (a) and (b) are 
additive, harmonized notice requirements to domestic notice law 
already incorporated under subsection (c). Article 14(3) foists these 
notice requirements onto all enacting states, regardless of their pre-
existing laws, thus forcing further harmonization. Remarkably, Article 
14 applies to any domestic proceeding involving foreign creditors, even 
the insolvency of a domestic debtor with all its assets located within the 
domestic state’s jurisdiction.189 This expands the Model Law’s reach 
beyond the paradigmatic conception of a “transnational” insolvency.190 
If the purpose of the Model Law is to facilitate resolution of potential 
conflicts of laws among nations with competing claims to regulate an 
insolvency, then Article 14 has no place in applying to a “purely 
domestic” insolvency, i.e., one in which only one sovereign’s laws 
 
187. The Enactment Guide invokes fairness and pragmatism to justify the forced 
harmonization, noting that the more inexpensive and parochial forms of notice, such as posting on 
the courthouse door, prejudice distant creditors (as international creditors are wont to be). See id. 
¶ 107. The aggressiveness of Article 14 is striking in light of approaches taken by other 
procedural international instruments, such as the Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement 
of Foreign Arbitral Awards. 
188. MODEL LAW, supra note 5, art. 14(3). 
189. See id. arts. 1(d), 14(1). 
190. Cf. CAPE TOWN CONVENTION, CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL INTERESTS IN 
MOBILE EQUIPMENT, INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTE FOR THE UNIFICATION OF PRIVATE LAW 
(UNIDROIT), U.N. Doc. A/AC.105/C.2/2002/CRP.3 (2001). art. 50(1) [hereinafter CAPE TOWN 
CONVENTION] (permitting states not to apply the Convention to “internal transactions”). 
Professor Mooney thinks international reforms should not shy away from revising purely 
domestic law. See Mooney, supra note 48, at 32–33 & n.51. 
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could possibly govern.191 Article 14 does precisely that by covering 
notice to foreign creditors in such purely domestic proceedings. 
This seemingly unprincipled extension of the Model Law’s scope is 
actually fully consonant with the first principles of universalism theory: 
it fosters the increased acceptance of outcome differences by requiring 
the suppression of regulatory sovereignty over bankruptcy notice laws 
(at least within those jurisdictions whose pre-existing laws do not match 
Article 14’s prescriptions). Moreover, the effects of Article 14’s 
harmonization may be dynamic. If certain notice rules are mandated for 
foreign creditors in all proceedings, there may well be a spillover effect 
into domestic creditor notice provisions.192 Some domestic provisions 
may well be upgraded to comport with the higher standard of notice 
enjoyed by the foreign creditors in domestic proceedings compelled by 
the Model Law.193 Thus, Article 14 constitutes a brazen example of the 
Model Law creeping well beyond its purportedly sovereignty-respecting 
effects into the realm of harmonization. 
Articles 14 and 31 are just two examples of the Model Law’s 
universalist leanings, and they are not unique. The Model Law contains 
myriad other instances of latent harmonization. The Preamble, for 
example, includes a pronouncement of normative policy.194 It states that 
 
191. Article 1(d) of the Model Law expressly extends its scope to otherwise domestic 
proceedings where “creditors or other interested persons in a foreign state have an interest,” 
which provides the doctrinal foundation for Article 14(3). The Enactment Guide sheds little light 
on this jurisdictional stretch, which sits in tension with the theoretical justification of resolving 
competing claims to regulatory jurisdiction by co-equal sovereigns. 
192. Indeed, UNCITRAL’s Draft Legislative Guide, Part II endorses such a heightened notice 
standard. See Draft Legislative Guide, Part II, supra note 177, rec. 18. 
193. See Colloquy, supra note 2, at 2274 (“[C]ountries could learn from the experiences of 
other nations and update their law accordingly.”); cf. Charles W. Mooney, Jr., Extraterritorial 
Impact of Choice-of-Law Rules for Non-United States Debtors Under Revised U.C.C. Article 9 
and a New Proposal for International Harmonization, in CROSS-BORDER SECURITY AND 
INSOLVENCY (eds. Michael Bridge and Robert Stevens) 195 (2001) (supporting such a 
harmonizing potential in secured transactions reform that will encourage minority view states to 
“wake up, smell the coffee, and reach some of the [superior] conclusions that lawmakers reached 
in [majority view states] many years ago”). Professor Tung discusses a related idea of “passport” 
extraterritorial transnational regimes, where a form of pluralist universalism is followed (which 
he and others call a “passport” system) in which a multinational commercial actor carries the 
substantive regulatory laws of its “home” jurisdiction when it “travels” abroad (like carrying a 
passport), but insists that there be some degree of baseline harmonization among the participating 
states. See Tung, supra note 25, at 379. This is another expression of the “rough similarity” that 
Professor Westbrook says is likely required for there to be meaningful cession of sovereignty by 
deferring jurisdictions under modified universalism. See Westbrook, supra note 13, at 2291. 
194. Inherent in this assessment is the contention that by including matters of normative 
policy, enacting states that disagree with those policies (unless they delete them from the version 
of the text they enact) have modified their own policies, yielding once again a degree of 
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the goals of the Model Law include promoting the objectives of: 
cooperation between domestic and foreign courts in cross-border 
insolvencies; greater legal certainty for trade and investment; fair and 
efficient administration; protection and maximization of the value of the 
debtor’s assets; and facilitation of the rescue of financially troubled 
businesses.195 These goals could safely be characterized as 
uncontroversial, even accurate summaries reflecting general principles 
of many of the world’s insolvency laws.196 The Preamble’s further 
insistence that the objective of the last goal (rescue) is to “preserv[e] 
employment” strays into the normative.197 It touches on a hotly 
contested debate of substantive bankruptcy policy: whether insolvency 
laws should seek to save otherwise economically inefficient firms from 
failure for salutary collateral purposes such as promoting full 
employment.198 Needless to say, there is no international consensus 
here. 
In summary, while not overtly trumpeting its universalist 
proclivities—and wisely so, given the consensus-dooming touchiness of 
the ongoing debate—the Model Law actually contains several 
provisions, albeit at the margin, which begin to “nudge” states along the 
way to ceding some sovereignty. On these limited matters, they accept 
the outcome differences that accompany forced deference to the home 
 
regulatory sovereignty. Although of course a Preamble is usually not law itself, states may accord 
it some force. For example, in the enactment of the Model Law in the United States, Congress 
incorporated the Preamble as a legislative declaration. 11 U.S.C.S. § 1501 (2005).  
195. Preamble to MODEL LAW, supra note 5. 
196. See generally UNCITRAL Draft Legislative Guide, supra note 7. 
197. Preamble to MODEL LAW, supra note 5, subs. (e). 
198. See Baird, supra note 22, at 580–88. Professor Baird charts a fundamental divide 
between economically focused bankruptcy scholars (whom he calls proceduralists) and more 
traditional bankruptcy scholars. The latter embrace the distributional potential for bankruptcy 
laws, while the former do not. Illustrating this divide, Baird distinguishes between “economic” 
distress, which indicates a firm’s inefficient deployment of assets, and “financial distress,” which 
implicates an otherwise healthy firm’s temporary dislocation due to an inopportune capital 
structure. The former group of scholars, Baird contends, see bankruptcy law’s proper goals as 
limited to financial distress, whereas the latter group accepts both financial and economic distress 
as within the legitimate purview of bankruptcy. 
One of the Model Law’s drafters has recognized this potential for dispute with subsection (e) 
of the Preamble. See Berends, supra note 12, at 323–24 (noting that Dutch law, according to 
recent precedent, would likely accord higher protection to preserving employment than 
maximizing value of the debtor’s assets, by realizing a lower value for a business in a manner that 
preserves full employment, a notion that translates roughly as a protection of “social interests”). 
Baird would see this as clearly embracing a traditionalist approach to bankruptcy policy and thus 
on one side of a possibly unbridgeable chasm. The Enactment Guide, supra note 100, makes no 
specific comment on this normative component of the Preamble. 
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jurisdiction’s laws, and in some instances harmonize their discrepant 
laws outright. Moreover, the trigger for at least one of these areas of 
nudging is the choice-of-law rule (the center of the debtor’s main 
interests). The interactive combination of these two constructs—choice 
of law and acceptance of outcome differences—reveals the Model 
Law’s embrace, despite its purported neutrality, of both of 
universalism’s conceptual foundations. Therefore at a theoretical level 
of inquiry, although it requires some probing below the surface, we can 
see the Model Law as universalist. 
V. MODELING TRANSNATIONAL REFORM: PROCEDURAL 
INCREMENTALISM 
The previous Section demonstrated that the Model Law fosters a 
nascent form of universalism. This “proto-universalism” exhibits two 
important characteristics. First, it is not a direct adoption of the 
universalist model but rather an indirect embrace of universalism’s 
theoretical underpinnings. Second, the universalism of the Model Law 
is not overt. Indeed, it has eluded most academic commentary to date. 
Accordingly, the Model Law’s proto-universalism can be described as 
operating below the radar. This Section builds upon this characterization 
and constructs a model to explain the Model Law’s success at garnering 
international consensus. As mentioned above, the Model Law’s success 
can be found both in the creation of a coherent model law for cross-
border insolvencies, an accomplishment in its own right, and in the 
actual passage of domestic legislation in several countries. Both of these 
demonstrate reform qua reform (something where before there was 
nothing). But the Model Law also advances universalism when, 
paradoxically, there remains ongoing vitality to the universalism-
territorialism debate and continuing skepticism over universalism. We 
might call this “unlikely” or “surprising” reform: consensus in a state of 
flux. It is both these levels of success of the Model Law that I seek to 
explain.199 
A. The Appeal of the Model Laws  
The Model Law appears to be enjoying a warm reception from 
enacting states, a marked departure from the coolness offered most of its 
 
199. Again, I defer participation in the normative debate for another day, but I will note the 
majority position of scholars in favor of universalism and thus add the further label of “happy” to 
the reform. See supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
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predecessors. One explanation of the Model Law’s comparative success 
might be the use of the mechanism of a model law itself. A model law 
permits provision-by-provision treatment. This in turn escapes the all-
or-nothing rigidity of treaty adoption. While of course the terms of a 
treaty are negotiated and tailored by the international parties involved, 
the difficulty of drafting a comprehensive treaty is multiplied when one 
moves from the bilateral to the multilateral context.200 By contrast, a 
model law permits the myriad differences of opinion that might 
otherwise render the negotiation of a multinational treaty impossible to 
be deferred to the enactment stage.201 Moreover, the opus of the model 
law exists on its own as a discrete document of potential law,202 even if 
each state ends up rejecting a provision or two. As Professor Mooney 
has observed: 
In many respects the process of harmonization through an 
international convention is much more cumbersome and 
unwieldy than the model law paradigm. An international 
convention normally would be sponsored by an inter-
governmental organization, with all the usual formality and 
delay. The road from an idea, to a study, to successful meetings 
of governmental experts, and eventually to a diplomatic 
conference may be long, winding, and rocky. A model law, on 
the other hand, need not have explicit or unqualified approval of 
any governmental or intergovernmental organization, inasmuch 
as it is itself not a law at all but only a “model.”203 
 
200. See, e.g., Andrew T. Guzman, The Cost of Credibility: Explaining Resistance to Inter-
state Dispute Resolution Mechanisms, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 303 (2002). 
201. See Westbrook, supra note 105, at 570–71 (noting that UNCITRAL decided to opt for a 
model law because “[t]he achievement of a treaty would be a greater accomplishment, but much 
more difficult”). I leave aside, as do the other bankruptcy commentators, the issue of reservations 
in the treaty ratification process. 
202. “A model law is better than an unratified convention.” Berends, supra note 12, at 319 
(noting the hesitance of the Model Law’s drafters to push for an international treaty in light the of 
failure of the Istanbul Convention). 
203. Mooney, supra note 193, at 202. Curiously, Professor Mooney then backs away from his 
endorsements of model laws, over fear that they can be altered excessively (perhaps distorted) at 
the domestic enactment stage. He thus prefers the “take it or leave it” approach of an international 
convention. Id. He raises a good point, but even if I shared this preference for tough love, I am 
not sure the traditional alternatives will solve his concerns. For example, an international 
convention on secured transactions “will find it necessary to provide alternatives to accommodate 
local, domestic interests that may vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction,” as he himself concedes. 
Id. Thus I am not sure conventions, at least as he envisions, will have any more agenda-setting 
power than model laws. His other concern of model laws goes more generally to the interests of 
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One might argue that the Model Law’s reliance on follow-up 
enactment largely undermines its binding potential.204 But this analysis 
is too quick, for several reasons. First, one can empirically look to 
jurisdictions that have begun the enactment process to see how much of 
the Model Law becomes adopted. These initial results look promising. 
For example, in the United States, freshly enacted Title 15 of the U.S. 
Bankruptcy Code codifies the scheme of the Model Law virtually 
verbatim.205 And other countries that have completed domestic 
enactment have, with some inevitable exceptions, left the core terms of 
the Model Law for the most part undisturbed.206 
Second, one can repeat the observation that the enactment of 
something is better than the enactment of nothing.207 The all-or-nothing 
 
the “private legislatures” that design them. See id. at 12 (distrusting the use of model laws to 
harmonize secured transactions legislation over fear that local bankruptcy professors and 
practitioners will “have little interest in reforms that would render obsolete their lifelong efforts to 
master the esoteric”). 
204. See generally Scott, supra note 144, at 1031 (“The ALI and NCCUSL believed that this 
consolidation of commercial law into a single statutory scheme would enable them to sell the 
entire project to the states on a ‘take it or leave it’ basis thus avoiding the selective enactment that 
had occurred with earlier uniform acts.”) (citation omitted). 
205. Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, S.256, 109th 
Cong. Tit. 14 (2005). 
206. See generally Westbrook, supra note 13 (discussing the approach most countries have 
taken to adopt the Model Law provisions). For example, Eritrea has adopted the Model Law 
virtually wholesale. United Nations Commission on International Trade Law, Status: 1997—
Model Law on Cross-border Insolvency, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitral/en/uncitral_texts/ 
insolvency/1997Model_status.html (last visited Nov. 6, 2005). New Zealand is poised to do the 
same (the Model Law’s adoption having been recommended by the Law Commission of New 
Zealand to the Ministry of Justice). See Westbrook, supra note 8, at 30. The United Kingdom also 
appears ready to follow suit. Id. South Africa’s adoption had a qualifier injected about reciprocity. 
Id. at 29. Most interesting has been the “sticking points” in Japan and Mexico. In Japan, a 
traditionally territorialist jurisdiction, a reciprocity requirement was not added, but two 
noteworthy changes were included. First, the Japanese blanch at the messy idea of parallel 
proceedings and so in the event of an Article 28 parallel proceeding arising after a recognition of 
a foreign main proceeding, the Japanese version of the Model Law requires dismissal of either the 
foreign recognition or the main petition. Id. at 24–25. Second, the stay under article 20 is not 
automatic (a potential blow for universalists), but the stay affecting secured creditors under article 
27 is to be in accordance with the main jurisdiction’s laws (a boon for universalists—exportation 
of the center of main interest’s stay laws). Id. at 25–26. As for Mexico, the alterations are less 
marked than Japan, except, for purposes of this analysis, the retention of the insolvency 
“verification visit” that is triggered in all Mexican bankruptcies. “Decreto por el que se aprueba la 
Ley de Concursos Mercantiles reforma el articulo ochenta y ocho de la Ley Organica del Poder 
Judicial de la Federacion,’’ D.O., 12 May 2000, art. 293 [hereinafter Mexican Insolvency Law]. 
Yet Mexico adopted article 31 of the Model Law, so its interaction with the verification visit 
practice under preexisting Mexican law is, in the understatement of Professor Westbrook, “not 
clear.” Westbrook, supra note 8, at 28. Perhaps the verifier must presume insolvency in her visit 
if an ancillary proceeding is opened in Mexico and a foreign main proceeding is recognized. 
207. Berends, supra note 12, at 319. 
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nature of treaty ratification poses considerable risk of nothing (or 
ominous signals through reservations). A model law’s reliance on 
provision-by-provision scrutiny may allow for substantial deviation, but 
at least reduces the risk of outright rejection.208 Finally, one can point to 
the agenda-setting effect of the Model Law’s structured template. By 
emphasizing a strong desire for complete enactment,209 and by singling 
out specific prescriptions where alternative rules are proposed,210 the 
Model Law both signals an intention for minimal deviation and cabins 
the areas on which objectively reasonable disagreement might be 
anticipated.211 A state may wish to deviate from the proposed majority 
text and adopt one of the alternative provisions for those areas where the 
Model Law’s drafters provide variations. That state might be respected 
as exercising its rights to take the minority view. A state seeking to 
deviate from one of the provisions for which the Model Law proposes 
one and only one text faces a more internationally face-threatening act. 
It must go on record as finding infirmity in one of the Model Law’s 
provisions that was not deemed worthy of preparing alternatives. Such a 
dissenting state must accordingly fight an implicit assumption that 
reasonable states could not (or should not) have disagreed.212 This peer 
pressure casts considerable doubt on the first-blush concern that a model 
law leaves states truly “free” to incorporate or reject each provision at 
will. Therefore it is certainly possible that the Model Law’s status, qua 
model law, may well in significant part account for its success at 
 
208. Id. (“A convention is an ‘all-or-nothing’ instrument, a ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ text. The risk 
that too many countries would not ‘take it’ was too great [for the drafters of the Model Law].”). 
209. See Enactment Guide, supra note 100, ¶ 12 (“Therefore, in order to achieve a 
satisfactory degree of harmonization and certainty, it is recommended that the States make as few 
changes as possible in incorporating the model law into their legal systems.”). 
210. See, e.g., id. at 449–50 (proposing an alternative version of Article 13(2)—the 
substantive antidiscrimination clause against foreign creditors—permitting discrimination against 
foreign tax and social security claims, as do several domestic insolvency laws). 
211. In fairness, this approach is not exclusive to model laws. The Aircraft Equipment 
Protocol, discussed infra, has an Alternative A and Alternative B regarding article XI, which its 
commentary describes as the “hard” and “soft” alternatives. See Mooney, supra note 48, at 37–
38. These alternatives are helpful where, for example, there are structural differences between 
legal systems, such as a common law versus civil law approach. 
212. UNCITRAL’s Draft Legislative Guide does not propound a full model law, but does 
offer more abstracted provision-by-provision legislative proposals, and occasionally resorts to 
“minority” recommendations in areas where there is a strong tradition of legal difference. See 
generally UNCITRAL Draft Legislative Guide, supra note 7. 
53
Pottow:
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2005
 988 VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 45:4 
 
 
 
garnering international support. But there may be something more at 
work.213 
B. Acclimation 
The Model Law’s status qua model law cannot be the sole reason for 
its success, because the model law format had been tried in the past and 
failed. Accordingly, there must be something about the specific scope 
and nature of the Model Law that facilitated its success in an 
environment where the universalism–territorialism disagreement 
survives.214 What distinguishes the Model Law is that it chose an 
incrementalist approach, whereas other, less successful predecessors 
pursued a more ambitious agenda.215 Under the modest approach of the 
Model Law’s proto-universalism, skeptical territorialist states might not 
have been overwhelmed by the complete subjugation of regulatory 
sovereignty and acceptance of outcome differences demanded by 
universalism. Instead, the Model Law accords states the chance to 
desensitize gradually to other states’ bankruptcy systems; acclimation is 
permitted.216 
My chief claim is therefore that the Model Law takes the soft sell of 
incrementalism over the harder core, one-step plunge into universalism 
that was tried, and failed, with previous international efforts such as 
MIICA. Recall that the universalism model rests upon a tolerance for 
the acceptance of outcome differences by reluctant sovereign states. If 
that is so, then there are at least two possible routes a universalist reform 
 
213. Model laws and treaties need not necessarily be exclusive in format. For example, the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) proposes “model bilateral 
treaties” in the tax context and has had some success with this approach. OECD, Article 26 of the 
OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital, at http://www.oecd.org/document/53/ 
0,2340,en_2649_33747_33614197_1_1_1_1,00.html (2004) (last visited Nov. 6, 2005) (“Article 
26 of the OECD Model Tax Convention provides the most widely accepted legal basis for 
bilateral exchange of information for tax purposes. More than 2,000 bilateral treaties are based on 
the Model Convention.”). 
214. As one court’s testy comments reminded in rejecting a universalist request for turnover 
(preceding the Model Law), “[a Canadian court’s] function is not simply to rubber stamp 
commands issuing from the foreign court of the primary bankruptcy.” Holt Cargo Sys. v. ABC 
Containerline N.V. (Trustees of), [2001] 3 S.C.R. 907, ¶ 33. 
215. See, e.g., MIICA, supra note 94 (proposing a full-fledged universalist regime). 
216. Writing about what became the EU Regulation (a cousin of the Model Law), Professor 
Fletcher underscores the sensitivity over sovereignty that inclines many states against 
universalism. The Regulation’s approach was thus “pragmatic—in that it recognizes the limits 
beyond which sovereign states are unlikely to be prepared to go at the present stage of European 
integration, even for the sake of procuring a more structured approach to handling cross-border 
insolvencies in an EU context….” Fletcher, supra note 2, at 124. 
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effort might have taken. The first is a flooding approach, where the state 
that is anxious about giving up regulatory sovereignty over a bankruptcy 
is inundated with foreign policies and required to capitulate on all 
matters at once when a foreign jurisdiction is chosen to govern. In 
bankruptcy, this would mean ceding controlling law to the “prickly” 
avoidance, distribution, and priority rules of the foreign jurisdiction. 
Reformers would thus hope for the best, gambling that the flooded state 
would emerge from this cathartic relinquishment of sovereignty and see 
the light of Transactional Gain and other such theorized benefits of 
universalism.217 The enlightened state should swim toward the 
universalist shore as a new convert. The downside, of course, of such an 
approach is that the inundated state may simply be overwhelmed by 
yielding complete control to the potentially strange bankruptcy laws of a 
foreign country with highly different normative content. Following the 
analogy, this would mean that the state drowns and withdraws from the 
universalist project altogether, seeking refuge in the familiar comfort of 
territorialism, and the reform effort collapses.218 
The second, less risky but more protracted path is one of systematic 
desensitization, where the cold water of universalism is adjusted to 
gradually with baby steps. Under this approach, universalism is 
presented with regard to discrete matters, with a choice-of-law rule 
requiring relinquishment of control over some, but not all, elements of a 
transnational dispute. This is the route taken by the Model Law. To be 
sure, it is a less direct approach to reform, because it requires time, 
patience, and quite probably multiple stages of increasing exposure to 
its paradigm, as opposed to the potentially more satisfying but more 
volatile all-or-nothing approach.219 
 
217. See Mooney, supra note 48, at 30 (admonishing reform-sensitive states to wake up, 
smell the coffee); see also Fletcher, supra note 2, at 124 (acknowledging that compromise 
approaches may “draw the wrathful ire of purists”). 
218. Consider the skittishness of states over discussing avoidance rules in bankruptcy. 
Deliberately omitting them from the Cape Town Convention on Immovable Equipment, Professor 
Mooney explains: 
As an active participant in the drafting and negotiation process for the Convention over 
several years, I clearly recall that the decision not to attempt to define [preferences and 
fraudulent transfers] was a deliberate one. The consensus view was that insolvency 
systems so differed from one another that it would not be feasible to fashion definitions 
that would adequately mesh with all systems. 
Mooney, supra note 48, at 36 n.85. Consider also that the UNCITRAL Model Law on 
International Credit Transfers followed the U.S. approach of Article 4A of the Uniform 
Commercial Code so closely that it alienated non-American participants. No state has enacted it.  
219. Even those who prefer to jump into the lake and get it over with, and who denigrate their 
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This gradual route also learns from the unique theoretical 
characteristics of bankruptcy law discussed earlier that make it 
especially contentious at the international level. The deeply invasive, 
broadly reaching, and thornily normative nature of a bankruptcy regime 
is divided and conquered by this incrementalism. While the Model Law 
goes for the first two dimensions (by displacing pre-existing bankruptcy 
laws and binding all creditors and property) it deliberately falls short on 
the third axis (by avoiding the normative priority rules and pushing only 
on matters at the periphery of bankruptcy). Thus it permits some 
acclimation as an interim measure before pursuing subsequent reforms, 
and it does so by picking the easier battles first.220 
Furthermore, the oblique nature of this incrementalist approach 
allows the potential to capture some skeptical territorialist states at the 
margin. These marginal territorialists fall into two camps. The first 
camp holds the putative reformer territorialists—the territorialists who 
are dubious at giving up their sovereignty and who worry that 
universalism’s theorized benefits may be overstated, but who 
nevertheless might be willing to give it a try, if it were possible to do so 
without going all in. These states can subscribe to the Model Law’s 
limited universalism, confident in the knowledge that if the water gets 
too cold they can always stop where they are and go back. If they go 
back, the universalists are arguably no worse off, and if they go on—
because upon exposure they find the water not so bad—then the 
universalists have gained another convert, a convert who may well have 
never considered conversion had it required an all-or-nothing leap.221 
The second camp that might be swept in by the Model Law’s 
indirectness are the diehard territorialists who refuse to even try 
universalism, convinced of its undesirability. Here, then, the Model 
Law’s design of fostering universalism in tangential sections somewhat 
removed from its core provisions may well be deliberately conceived to 
 
slowpoke colleagues who prefer to wade in, must concede that a latent danger with their more 
dramatic approach is the occasional heart attack. 
220. This is especially why the Model Law might be considered “functionalist.” Its gradual 
advancement is on arguably more technical matters.  
221. Indeed, there may even be a subset of these universalism experimenters who wish their 
experimentation to remain secret, perhaps because of being locked into previously stated 
positions defending territorialism. This group would enjoy the convoluted and ambiguous 
interaction between Article 20 and Articles 28 and 29. Because of the “one hand-other hand” 
granting and taking away of universalism by the interaction of these articles, the outwardly 
territorialist state could always point to Articles 28 and 29 to assert the supremacy of sovereignty 
and preeminence of local proceedings while at the same time experimenting with the Model 
Law’s universalism. MODEL LAW, supra note 5, arts. 20, 28–29. 
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have an obfuscating or distracting effect. Such states may not appreciate 
the latent universalism embedded within the Model Law until after they 
have been subjected to it at a mild level (and then may find that it is not 
that bad after all, or, to remain within the ongoing analogy, that after 
allowing themselves to be lightly splashed through lack of attention, the 
water is not nearly so cold as had at first been feared). Had the Model 
Law’s foray into universalism been on a more central matter—say, the 
bankruptcy priority rules—then this distracted camp of states might 
have sat up, paid more attention, and dug into their territorialist roots.222 
The success of the Model Law in the second, “surprising” sense—at 
advancing universalism in the face of continuing support for 
territorialism by some states—might be explained in part by looking at 
these marginal states. Their approval of the Model Law through their 
respective UNCITRAL delegates and presumable follow-up enactment 
as domestic legislation evinces a willingness to accept a limited 
exposure to universalism as a good-faith experiment (or a mild 
deception) for their own benefit. This perhaps is how the Model Law 
was able to advance the agenda of universalism in the face of unsettled 
consensus. To be clear, I am not suggesting that territorialists were 
hoodwinked into enacting the Model Law. Whatever one’s views of 
legislators, I am skeptical that a law premised upon widespread 
international deception is likely to prove stable. As Llewellyn observed, 
covert tools are never reliable ones.223 (In any event, I have now just 
“outed” the Model Law by publishing this Article.) Rather, my 
proposition is that there may be some states that let their guards down 
because of the non-threatening nature of the universalist provisions in 
the Law—states that may well be surprised to find themselves moved 
slightly more along the universalism continuum and, upon realizing 
where they are, unlikely to move back.224 
To summarize the initial theoretical model, my primary claim is that 
the Model Law’s success at receiving warm international reception 
 
222. See supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
223. KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION 363 (1960). 
224. Cf. Tung, supra note 27, at 60–65 (arguing that rational states will become stuck in a 
prisoner’s dilemma and never embrace universalism even if they want to). Indeed, were the 
Model Law more brazenly universalist, it is unlikely the states’ guards would have been lowered 
sufficiently. Belaboring the analogy, one might be able to distract someone afraid of cold water 
long enough to splash them lightly; it is unlikely one could distract them sufficiently to have them 
accidentally walk into a lake. Their guards will lower in non-threatening or confusing 
environments—but only so far. The benefits of obfuscation are extant but marginal. 
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stems not exclusively from its status as a model law qua model law, but 
rather from the incrementalism inherent in its overall design and scope. 
Rather than seeking complete universalism, the Model Law retained 
some territorialist components, but ultimately inserted some baby 
steps—in discrete, unassuming areas—towards universalism. This 
seemingly convoluted design and unambitious scope was actually the 
key to breaking the reform loggerhead in international bankruptcy. The 
back-and-forth interaction between Article 20 and Articles 28 and 29 
signaled a sensitivity to the concerns of both universalists and 
territorialists alike, implicitly legitimizing each. This cued enacting 
states that the Model Law was thus a middle ground that all should be 
able to agree upon. This non-threatening presentation permitted the tag-
along injection of some proto-universalist provisions to be accepted by 
territorialists, who doubtless would have balked at a more aggressive 
presence of universalism. Accordingly, the gentle incrementalism 
regarding indirect, non-core areas of the law likely assuaged some 
hesitant, territorialism-inclined states skeptical about universalism’s 
benefits, and perhaps even tricked (to their paternalistic betterment) 
some troglodyte states prejudiced against universalism altogether.225 
C. The “Procedural” Character of the Model Law 
Building upon the contentions of the previous subsection, I want to 
refine the account of the Model Law’s success. My further claim is that 
the Model Law’s incrementalist nudge toward universalism was not just 
randomly situated in tangential areas of the Law unrelated to its core 
provisions, but rather that it was deliberately directed at targeted 
matters. The selection of those issues was influenced by the hoary legal 
distinction between substance and procedure and its role in conflicts of 
law theory.226 
 
225. Professor Westbrook, a universalist instrumental in the drafting of the Model Law, 
candidly acknowledged that the concession to territorialists embedded in Articles 28 and 29 was 
the “sine qua non of achieving the Model Law.” Westbrook, supra note 8, at 17. 
226. See, e.g., Russell J. Weintraub, “At Least, to Do No Harm”: Does the Second 
Restatement of Conflicts Meet the Hippocratic Standard?, 56 MD. L. REV. 1284, 1300 (1997) 
(discussing the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS chapter on “procedural” rules 
and the general rule of conflicts jurisprudence to apply forum procedural law). Professor 
Weintraub also discusses an outcome-determinative approach to defining procedure, whereby a 
rule is truly procedural if does not rise to the level of affecting the choice of forum, and then 
rescrutinizes the Restatement (Second) under this approach. Id. (citing Walter Wheeler Cook, 
Substance and Procedure in the Conflict of Laws, 42 YALE L.J. 333, 344 (1932)). See also Hanna 
v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468–74 (1965) (applying federal procedural rules in federal diversity 
actions but applying state substantive laws). The precise definitions of and the distinctions 
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When a true conflict of laws exists, co-equal sovereigns have 
presumptively equal entitlement to exert their regulatory might.227 The 
traditional approach is to resolve these conflicts with reference to a 
content-neutral, jurisdiction-selecting rule, such as the Model Law’s 
Article 2.228 More recent scholarship explores the idea of content-
focused inquiries based not on the jurisdictional clash, but on the policy 
clash.229 In addition to weeding out false conflicts, such an approach 
might generate a hierarchical ranking of policy interests. Needless to 
say, these instances of consensus are not clearly delineated; Dean 
Kramer of Stanford Law School proposes that they can at best be 
shaped into canons rather than rules.230 One such canon, he submits, 
rests upon the time-honored distinction between substance and 
procedure.231 Kramer contends that if a conflict involves one state’s 
procedural interests clashing with another’s substantive laws, the 
community of sovereigns will generally agree that the substantive rule 
should govern.232 Viewed another way, under this theory states should 
 
between “substance” and “procedure” are not critical to this Article. For the reader insistent upon 
an example, Dean Kramer defines procedural laws as ones chiefly aimed at regulating the conduct 
of litigation, which explains the deference to a forum’s procedural laws in conflicts situations. 
Dean Kramer’s definition implicitly (and likely correctly) assumes that procedure is more discrete 
and identifiable, and leaves substance to be the definitional residuum. Larry Kramer, Rethinking 
Choice of Law, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 324–26 (1990). While the precise definition may be 
elusive, its entrenchment in conflicts jurisprudence cannot be seriously questioned. See, e.g., 
RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 585 (1934) (applying forum’s procedural laws 
in conflicts situation); see also FLEMING JAMES, JR. & GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., CIVIL 
PROCEDURE 1 (3d ed. 1985) (“Courts have many occasions to distinguish between substantive 
law and procedure…. [O]ver-all definitions of the distinction would be both futile and 
misleading.”). For a recent attempt that does not heed this advice, see Lawrence B. Solum, 
Procedural Justice, Univ. of San Diego Sch. of L., Pub. L. & Legal Theory Research Paper 
Series, No. 04-02, at pt. II., at http://ssrn.com/abstract=508282 (Feb. 23, 2004). 
227. See Kramer, supra note 34, at 1019 (“The whole problem in a true conflict is that 
different states have made different judgments about what is just, and it is axiomatic that…states 
are coequal sovereigns entitled to make their own value judgments.”). 
228. See, e.g., Weintraub, supra note 226 (discussing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT 
OF LAWS §§ 142–43 (1971)). 
229. See, e.g., Kramer, supra note 34, at 1015–21 (arguing for “policy-selecting” rules); see 
also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 403(3) 
(1987) (comparing and ranking the interests of states with overlapping claims to prescriptive 
jurisdiction). 
230. Kramer, supra note 37, at 318–22 (explaining that such “canons” represent rules that 
hypothetically negotiating sovereigns would agree to by compact, which at the very least must 
leave them better off ex ante than application of forum law to a conflict). 
231. Id. at 324. 
232. Id. at 324–29. The application of this principle is somewhat confusing as notions of 
“procedure” have evolved over time. Dean Kramer proposes following the “Erie” approach, 
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be routinely more willing to cede regulatory authority on matters of 
procedure than on matters of substance.233 Dean Kramer’s theory finds 
some doctrinal support, for example in the U.S. federal court system’s 
jurisdictional rules.234 
Accordingly, the Model Law’s success may have stemmed from 
exploiting the procedure–substance continuum on two different levels. 
At a general, overarching level, the Model Law marketed itself, and was 
in fact widely perceived, as a vehicle addressing chiefly “procedural” 
matters. This likely assuaged hesitant states to let their guards down, or 
at least err on the side of giving the law a chance.235 Any state diffusely 
committed to showing some good faith at international cooperation in 
insolvency law—but deeply hesitant to relinquish completely its more 
substantive commitment to either universalism or territorialism—might 
readily sign onto an international agreement like the Model Law 
purporting to govern “mere procedure.” Additionally, at a secondary 
level, the Model Law also employed the procedure–substance 
 
which has federal procedural law govern in federal forum diversity cases when state substantive 
law applies, unless the conflicting state “procedural” rule can be said to contain a substantive 
purpose, in which case it will trump the federal rule. Id. at 327 & n.173 (collecting cases). Kramer 
prefers this interpretation to the approach of some contemporary conflicts scholars that would 
permit the forum law to govern in the event of hybrid substantive-procedural laws. Id. at 327–28. 
The nuances are less relevant than the broader recognition of a procedure-substance distinction in 
which states are more concerned with having their substantive policies enforced in a conflicts 
situation than their procedural policies. Id. at 328. Other commentators agree. See Bergsten email, 
supra note 87 (“You have emphasized the distinction between procedure and substance. I would 
have to agree with you that countries are very tolerant of differences in procedure when it comes 
to actions taken in another country.”). 
233. It is important to be clear on the scope of this claim. States’ perceptions of procedure as 
comparatively low-stakes matters should not be confused with the core notions of due process in 
constitutional systems and natural justice in common law systems that are routinely concerned 
with “procedural” protections. Issues such as notice, opportunity to be heard, and having an 
impartial decision-maker are matters of critical importance to most legal systems and central in 
deciding whether to defer to foreign judgments. See Interpool, Ltd. v. Certain Freights, 102 B.R. 
373 (D.N.J. 1988) (declining deference due to purported concerns with an ex parte order). These 
procedural concerns are better characterized as “constitutional” matters, even though they pertain 
to procedural issues. Few states readily defer on constitutional matters in conflicts. On the 
contrary, they will likely hold constitutional issues to be of the highest legal order as matters of 
“fundamental” policy. Cf. MODEL LAW, supra note 5, art. 6 (allowing refusal of recognition of 
foreign proceedings to protect violations of fundamental public policy). 
234. Under American law, the Supreme Court of the United States may accord lesser 
deference to the jurisdictional supremacy of a state court of final appeal’s pronouncement on state 
law in the event that the state law at issue is one of procedure. This is the so-called “procedural 
default” doctrine. See Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 486–87 (1953). 
235. Cf. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 101, at 636 (“[Private legal reform bodies] react more 
conservatively to proposals that would work significant reform than to proposals that alter the 
status quo only slightly.”). 
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distinction in selecting the specific areas in which to nudge its proto-
universalism. That is, the provisions where the Law pushes its foray into 
universalism, namely, Articles 14 and 31, are arguably both matters of 
procedure, or at the very least, toward the procedural end of a 
procedure-substance continuum. 236 It is on both this general and more 
specific level that the Model Law sought to focus on matters of 
procedure and thereby, following Dean Kramer’s theory, minimized the 
likelihood it would be perceived as a substantial threat to sovereignty. 
Yet again, this focus harkens back to the unique theoretical attributes of 
bankruptcy laws that make them internationally challenging. The 
procedural aspects (breadth and depth of reach) were pushed more 
aggressively in the Model Law than the substantive aspects (differing 
normative priorities of distributive justice). Moreover, those limited 
areas where differing norms were confronted squarely, such as the 
notice provisions of Article 14, were themselves procedural. This is why 
I refer to the Model Law as a reform mechanism premised upon not just 
“incrementalism” but “procedural incrementalism.” 
The greater willingness of states to defer on matters of procedure did 
not limit the Model Law’s import to fostering the acceptance of 
outcome differences as such. To be sure, by signing onto the Model 
Law, states took the first step toward subordinating their policies and 
accepting outcome differences, albeit on comparatively minor matters in 
the grand scheme of conflicts of law (procedure). But states’ comfort in 
so doing also led them to accept the creation of a comparatively clear 
choice-of-law rule, the second consequence of the Model Law’s focus 
on procedure. Some scholars have suggested that the clarity of a choice-
of-law rule to which sovereigns will submit correlates with the level of 
commitment they are willing to make to the resulting decision.237 The 
clearer the rule, the harder plausible deniability becomes for a state 
seeking ex post defection.238 Because the perceived stakes of the Model 
 
236. To return once again to the aquatic analogy of the previous subsection, the fact that the 
matters were low stakes on which the hesitant territorialist states were acquiescing to testing the 
waters of universalism makes it only a toe they were placing in the water; experimentation with a 
higher stakes, more substantive bankruptcy provision, such as, for example, the avoidance rules 
of a bankruptcy code, would be like testing the waters by dipping in one’s face. 
237. See Guzman, supra note 200, at 309 (observing that in “high stakes” international issues 
states are less likely to sign onto binding dispute resolution provisions). 
238. Id. at 304 (predicting that a state’s willingness to sign on to a binding dispute resolution 
clause in an international agreement will vary directly as a function of its inclination to honor the 
implicated international commitment). Thus when states are inclined to comply, they are inclined 
to box themselves into more on-record positions, such as a binding dispute resolution clause. 
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Law were low, that is, because the areas on which the Model Law 
would require some cession of sovereignty pertained to such procedural 
matters as a presumption of insolvency, participating states became 
willing to expose themselves to an unusually clear (at least by conflicts 
standards)239 choice-of-law rule.240 
 
When they want to be able to renege, they eschew such clauses and rely upon the vaguer forum of 
the international community and reputational enforcement mechanisms. The extrapolation of this 
principle to a choice of law rule would be that if states anticipate wanting to renege on the 
outcome of a choice of law decision and not be bound by it, they would logically press for a 
minimally clear rule that accords maximal possible evasion. 
239. I say a “clear” choice of law rule to describe the “centre of main interests” test as aided 
by the presumption of registered office in the Model Law, see MODEL LAW, supra note 5, arts. 
2(b), 16(3), because choice of law rules are traditionally amorphous. The reader need go no 
further than the Restatement (Second) for an illustration. See also Tung, supra note 64, at 32–33 
(characterizing choice of law rules as “notoriously imprecise and indeterminate”). O’Hara & 
Ribstein, supra note 66, attribute this phenomenon to the desire of courts to leave themselves 
escape room for the application of domestic law when they find foreign law substantively 
objectionable, which accounts for the rejection of the rule-based approach of the Restatement 
(First) of Conflict of Laws in the Restatement (Second), where “choice-of-law ‘rules’ are only 
baseline presumptions that courts can ignore if a multifactored, contact-based analysis indicates 
that another state’s law most appropriately applies.” Id. at 1183; see also id. at 1182 (“Although 
judges began with a rule-based approach that might have deterred them from indulging in their 
own preferences by making departures more obvious, the courts have developed more open-
ended, standard-based approaches that facilitate more discretionary judicial decisionmaking.”). 
240. For a healthy disagreement on this conclusion, see Tung, supra note 27, at 70–82. Tung 
denigrates what he contends is the fuzzy, standard-oriented nature of the “centre of main 
interests” rule and decries its ex post reliance upon judicial interpretation. He marshals support 
from Professor Fletcher’s comments that the EU Regulation’s center of main interests test, even 
with its rebuttable presumption of registered office, did not delineate the manner of rebutting this 
presumption or the degree of proof needed. See id. at 77 (quoting IAN F. FLETCHER, INSOLVENCY 
IN PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL APPROACHES 253 n.21, 260 
(1999)). Professor Fletcher has subsequently written on how European courts have quickly 
decided litigation involving this standard since the Regulation’s coming into force and generated 
holdings for other states to follow, focusing upon the principle of reasonable expectations in 
commercial settings and objective identifiability to third parties (including, interestingly, 
instances where the presumption of registered office has been rebutted, such as in BRAC and 
Enron). See Re BRAC Rent-A-Car Inc., [2003] 2 All E.R. 201, 207–08 (Ch. App.); Enron Directo 
SL ((High Ct. Ch. Div., July 4, 2002) (oral decision of Lightman, J.) (holding that the Spain-
incorporated subsidiary of the Enron Group that had all its activities conducted and headquarters 
situated at Enron House in London had its center of main interests in the United Kingdom rather 
than Spain), discussed in Fletcher, supra note 179, at 11. While I agree in principle with Tung’s 
concerns with fuzziness, I think he may be setting the bar too high; in my opinion, “centre of 
main interests” seems no less manipulable than “principal place of business,” and that standard, 
while to be sure triggering litigation at the margins, has enjoyed robust efficacy in American civil 
procedure. See John B. Oakley, Prospectus for the American Law Institute’s Federal Judicial 
Code Revision Project, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 855, 882–84 (1998). See also Miguel Virgós & 
Ettienne Schmit, Report on the Convention on Insolvency Proceedings, EU Council Doc. 6500/96 
DRS 8 (CFC) (May 3, 1996) [hereinafter Virgós-Schmit Report]. 
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As discussed above, one of the key developments of the Model Law 
was the implementation of a choice-of-law rule. This was important for 
settling on a unified international standard and reinforcing that one 
country’s law should presumptively govern a cross-border bankruptcy. 
What was equally if not more important was the Model Law’s setting in 
which that rule was designed, because it contributed to the rule’s 
content. By offering its choice-of-law rule in a seemingly low-stakes, 
non-threatening vehicle, the Model Law was able not simply to 
propound a rule qua rule, but also to make that rule comparatively 
crisp.241 The choice-of-law rule in the Model Law is “centre of main 
interests.” That rule was crafted to dictate the country that would enjoy, 
among other legal consequences, the application of an automatic stay to 
its debtors’ assets located in a recognizing jurisdiction, as well as a 
presumption of the debtor’s insolvency. Had the Model Law, by 
contrast, sought to entitle the selected jurisdiction to enjoy all 
substantive control of the global bankruptcy, the choice-of-law rule 
would almost certainly have slipped into a more malleable standard, 
such as, for example, “the state with most appropriate contacts with the 
dispute.”242 Indeed, the MIICA, which sought to effect complete 
universalism, did not even contain a choice-of-law provision, consistent 
with the proportionate relationship between substantive reach of an 
instrument (stakes) and ambiguity of its choice-of-law rule (deniability). 
 
241. More skeptical commentators disparage the choice of law rules suggested by 
universalists in the literature. See Tung, supra note 64, at 31–33. The critiques of others are more 
nuanced. For example, Wessels concedes the potential for mischief within a standard like center 
of main interests but “nevertheless” contents himself that the courts seem to be working it out by 
providing predictable guidance in their judicial interpretations. Wessels, supra note 82, at 25. 
242. As an example of such indeterminacy in an international document, consider the 
Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods. See United Nations Convention on 
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (1980), reprinted in U.S. Ratification of 1980 
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods: Official English 
Text, 52 Fed. Reg. 6262, 6264–80 (Mar. 2, 1987) (based in part upon UNIDROIT’s Uniform Law 
on the International Sale of Goods) [hereinafter CISG]. An ambitious agreement seeking to spell 
out substantive rules for contracts borrowed from Article 2 of the American Uniform Commercial 
Code and the domestic sales laws of other countries (and one that has received impressive 
international adoption, see Stephan, supra note 11, at 774), the convention applies only to “parties 
[of signatory states] whose places of business are in different states.” Id., art. 1(1). But “place of 
business” for a multinational that conducts “business” in multiple jurisdictions turns on the 
business “which has the closest relationship to the contract and its performance”—scarcely a 
model of clarity. Id., art. 10. This is consistent with my thesis: the scope of the convention 
pertains to a rich panoply of substantive rights and obligations that flow from an international 
sales contract, which is a “higher stakes” matter than certain procedures used in bankruptcy—
hence the offsetting reduction in clarity of its choice of law rule. 
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Moreover, if the choice-of-law rule proves not only clear but durable, 
i.e., it blazes a path upon which future universalist reform efforts will 
build, then the final, universalist result will end up having a much 
clearer anchoring rule than would have otherwise resulted by using a 
one-step reform mechanism.243 
Therefore, some insights from modern conflicts literature suggest that 
in an area where international disagreement abounds and where states 
hold high normative stakes, such as international bankruptcy, sovereign 
actors will more readily coalesce around areas such as procedure, where 
they will more willingly cede their sovereignty. This conclusion builds 
upon the argument that when a conflict exists between substance and 
procedure, states would prefer to yield on procedure from an ex ante 
perspective than yield on substance. Injecting this sovereign disposition 
into the international insolvency realm, where states have been trying 
for years to reach some form of agreement, then the success of the 
Model Law at garnering support might be thus explained. By effectively 
channeling a cooperative international impulse into the (universalist) 
acceptance of cession of sovereignty on matters of procedure, the Model 
Law produced an end product of seemingly modest scope but 
profoundly important effect. In following an approach of procedural 
incrementalism, the Model Law not only succeeded in winning 
international support where other proposals failed, but also locked in a 
relatively clear choice-of-law rule in the process.244 
Some qualification is necessary. Strictly speaking, my overall 
argument does not rest upon the categorization of Articles 14 and 31 (or 
the Model Law for that matter) as “procedural.” That is, the primary 
proposition borrowed in part from Dean Kramer’s conflicts theory—that 
states will cede sovereignty more willingly on “lower stakes” matters—
simply requires branding Articles 14 and 31 as “low stakes.” Such a 
 
243. Professor Stephan disagrees with my positive assessment of the Model Law’s potential 
for clarity in a passing analysis, see Stephan, supra note 11, at 784–87, and instead suggests that 
the Model Law counterproductively “decrease[s] the predictability of outcomes in international 
bankruptcies,” id. at 785. His conclusion appears to rest upon a belief, asserted in greater depth by 
territorialists such as LoPucki, see LoPucki, supra note 48, at 2225–39, that the bright line of the 
situs rule (in the presence of lending covenants) offers greater clarity than universalism, at least as 
implemented by the Model Law—a contention which universalists like Professor Westbrook have 
already engaged. See, e.g., Westbrook, supra note 13, at 2309. 
244. The first step, moreover, is the hardest. Subsequent efforts that build upon the Model 
Law, such as UNCITRAL’s Draft Legislative Guide, should have an easier time following an 
already-blazed path. Cf. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 101, at 636 n.82 (“Revisions of existing 
statutes are seen as ‘technical’ exercises—correcting minor flaws or updating a statute” and are 
thus more likely to advance passage of clear status-quo altering rules). 
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case can be made. Although at one level, the gatekeeping nature of 
insolvency status might seem to invoke high stakes (whether or not you 
get into the bankruptcy system), it seems reasonable when comparing it 
to, for example, the distribution and priority rules (who gets what of the 
limited money in the bankruptcy pot once you are in), to call it a low, or 
at least lower, stakes matter. Similarly, the notice provisions for 
commencement of a case are surely not core provisions of a bankruptcy 
code. Thus I could rest my argument on showing that these low stakes 
matters allowed states to let their guards down and sign onto a 
comparatively non-renegable choice-of-law rule without trying to 
shoehorn them into a substance-procedure taxonomy. 
Nevertheless, I do want to contend that these provisions, if stratified 
along a substance-procedure continuum (assuming away the difficulty 
of articulating the principles for distinguishing substance from 
procedure), fall more to the procedural end of the spectrum. The reason 
I take this further step is not because I find Dean Kramer’s theory 
irrefutable, although I do find it accords with my own intuition, but 
because, at least in bankruptcy, there is a preoccupation with procedure. 
For example, there is a whole school of bankruptcy scholars who 
believe that bankruptcy law is nothing more than a procedural device 
for facilitating a collective action discussion.245 Indeed, one of the focal 
points of many bankruptcy regimes—a moratorium on the individual 
collection of payments—is fairly characterized as a matter of procedure: 
the right to seek collection of a debt is not cancelled; the remedy of 
vindicating that right is merely channeled into a group resolution.246 
Moreover, the distinguishing components of a bankruptcy regime 
outlined at the beginning of this Article in part revolve around the 
jurisdictional reach of the bankruptcy laws and their preclusive and 
invasive effects (breadth and depth of scope), which also can be called 
matters of procedure.247 Therefore it is not surprising that a transnational 
bankruptcy law, drafted by blue ribbon international bankruptcy 
practitioners and scholars, might be anchored, if even at a subconscious 
 
245. See JACKSON, supra note 19, at 7–19. 
246. See Adler, supra note 20, at 234 (breaking the concept of a bankruptcy claim into its two 
component parts: a debt (substantive) and the right to collect on that debt (procedural, enjoined by 
the moratorium)). 
247. The third component, normative content of distributive provisions such as the priority 
rules, is the area where the Model Law makes its most ginger inroads, consistent with the theory 
that yielding on procedures is more palatable than yielding on substance for sovereigns. 
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level, in a procedural-substantive mindset.248 Indeed, the Model Law has 
repeatedly been described as a “procedural” reform project, and many 
of its provisions, while not the focal point of this Article, pertain to 
facilitating the procedures by which courts and parties can communicate 
across different jurisdictions. Thus I am inclined to suggest, at least as a 
first level of description, that the areas such as Articles 14 and 31 where 
the Model Law pushes its tentative universalism are matters of 
procedure, or, more precisely, toward the procedural end of a 
procedure-substance continuum. 
In summarizing the previous two subsections of this Article, I claim 
that the Model Law employed a model of gentle incrementalism to 
nudge some initial foray into universalism and allow acclimation by 
otherwise territorially inclined states that would balk were universalism 
proposed more aggressively. This was successful at garnering 
international support, even among these territorialist jurisdictions, 
because of the seemingly tangential nature of the areas on which 
universalism was sought and the indirect and possibly “subsurface” way 
in which that universalism was sought. This approach contrasted with 
the all-or-nothing approach of a comprehensive regime of full-fledged 
universalism that doomed previous international reform efforts. 
Furthermore, the specific areas at which this incrementalism was 
directed were situated toward the procedural end of a procedure-
substance continuum. By taking this approach of procedural 
incrementalism, the drafters of the Model Law sought to capitalize upon 
the theorized willingness of states to be more likely to accept outcome 
differences on matters of procedure than on matters of substantive law. 
This explains not only the specific areas where the Model Law pushes 
universalism, but also the broader characterization of the Model Law as 
a “modest” document that is concerned, on the whole, with “procedural 
matters.” This heightened willingness to accept outcome differences on 
matters of procedure likely explains the Model Law’s ability to 
introduce some limited universalism notwithstanding ongoing 
international disagreement. It also explains the Model Law’s 
surprisingly clear choice-of-law rule, which was enacted with regard to 
seemingly low stakes matters. Thus the Model Law, as a successful 
mechanism of international bankruptcy reform, relies upon much more 
 
248. UNCITRAL’s Draft Legislative Guide lends further support for this point. See 
UNCITRAL Draft Legislative Guide, supra note 7, ¶ 30 (“Notwithstanding the variety of 
substantive issues that must be resolved, insolvency laws are highly procedural in nature.”). 
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than its status as a model law. It builds on a procedurally focused mode 
of graduated acclimation. 
VI. DEPLOYING THE MODEL: ANALYZING SUBSEQUENT INSOLVENCY 
REFORM 
The above argument that the Model Law fosters pluralist 
universalism by embracing its two conceptual cores (by adopting a 
choice-of-law rule and by promoting the acceptance of at least some 
outcome differences) and the model I offer to explain its success at 
doing so (by pursuing incremental reform, along a discernable 
procedural-substantive continuum) can each be tested by analyzing the 
subsequent direction of transnational insolvency reform. First, if the 
Model Law advances universalism by deploying a robust jurisdiction-
selecting choice-of-law rule, then we should expect to see the roll out of 
that rule in subsequent reforms. Second, if the Model Law advances 
universalism by fostering some cession of regulatory sovereignty and 
concomitant acceptance of outcome differences, and if (as I assume and 
discuss below) the acceptance of some outcome differences begets the 
more ready acceptance of further outcome differences in a 
“snowballing” effect, then we should expect an accelerating trend 
toward the acceptance of outcome differences, and perhaps even a move 
toward substantive harmonization. Finally, if the model propounded 
above accurately describes the Model Law’s success, we might predict 
the path of both these developments (the areas in which the center of 
main interests test is being used and the areas in which there will be 
increasing acceptance of outcome differences) to be matters sliding up 
the procedural-substantive scale. Each of these hypotheses is supported 
by at least some evidence. 
A. Center of Main Interests Test  
Recent reform experiences around the world support the notion that 
“centre of main interests” is catching on in the insolvency realm. The 
EU Regulation on Insolvency (EU Regulation), which came into force 
in 2002, uses the same test to determine the primary jurisdiction of an 
intra-Union, cross-border insolvency.249 The EU Regulation is a kindred 
 
249. See Wessels, supra note 6, at 494. Although the EU Regulation came into force in 2002 
(after the Model Law), it was actually the resuscitation of an earlier convention that was initiated 
well before the Model Law. So it might be fairer to say that the Model Law drew the center of 
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spirit to the Model Law, although it adopts a secondary proceeding 
approach along the lines of Articles 28 and 29.250 Similarly, the ALI’s 
TIP, a compilation of general principles and of restatement summaries 
of domestic insolvency laws of the three NAFTA countries, also uses 
the center of main interests test.251 The UNIDROIT Cape Town 
Convention Protocol on Matters Specific to Aircraft Equipment uses 
center of main interests to trigger the choice of law regarding the 
possessory rights of lessors or secured parties of collateral in the event 
of bankruptcy.252 Center of main interests thus seems to be moving well 
beyond the Model Law,253 and is finding explication in judicial 
decisions and scholarly analyses.254 
 
main interests tests from (what was to become) the EU Regulation rather than vice-versa. See 
Westbrook, supra note 8, at 2. Accordingly, Professor Westbrook suggests the Regulation 
template “heavily influenced” the Model Law. Id. at 3. Given the typical pace of international 
legal reform, see Wessels, supra note 6, at 505–06 (“Given the complexity of the issues and the 
diversities in countries’ insolvency laws, the development over a period of less than a decade is 
quite remarkable.”), it might be even more accurate to consider these European and UNCITRAL 
reforms as occurring roughly contemporaneously. (Parenthetically, it is quite clear that the ALI 
TIP followed both these projects, and represents, in the words of Professor Westbrook, “the next 
generation of reform,” so at least its sequencing is clear. Westbrook, supra note 8, at 2.) 
250. For a more detailed summary than space permits here, refer to Wessels, supra note 6, at 
491–93. It is beyond the scope of this Article to explain in detail, but the secondary proceeding 
approach of the EU Regulation is conceivably “worse” than the territorialism lurking in Articles 
28 and 29. See Westbrook, supra note 8, at 33–38. Indeed, Professor Tung disparages the EU 
Regulation as “essentially a territorial system with universalist pretensions.” Tung, supra note 27, 
at 77. Some European commentators disagree with this pessimism. See, e.g., Wessels, supra note 
6, at 499 (“‘[M]odified territorialism’…in my opinion does not reflect the Regulation’s model” 
and “[i]t is for this reason I use the description of ‘coordinated universalism.’”). I accord the 
Europeans deference in characterizing their own laws. 
251. The formation of the general principles in the ALI TIP was strongly consensus-driven, 
with no principle included if there was a “significant division of opinion along national lines.” 
Westbrook, supra note 8, at 32. 
252. Protocol to the Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment on Matters 
Specific to Aircraft Equipment, adopted Nov. 11, 2001, § XI, available at 
http://www.unidroit.org/english/conventions/mobile-equipment/aircraftprotocol.pdf (last visited 
Nov. 6, 2005). 
253. It also arises in UNCITRAL’s Draft Legislative Guide, Part II, supra note 177, and in 
the WORLD BANK PRINCIPLES, supra note 26, ¶¶ 180–81. 
254. See, e.g., Fletcher, supra note 179 (summarizing recent case law discussing center of 
main interests); Wessels, supra note 82, at 4–10. Although there are no official travaux 
préparatoires to the EU Regulation, there is a quasi-official report, the Virgós-Schmit Report, 
which was supporting documentation to the failed treaty. See Virgós-Schmit Report, supra note 
240. The report found outlet by being partially codified in a long list of recitals that appears at the 
beginning of the EU Regulation. Regarding center of main interest, Recital 13, originally from the 
Virgós-Schmit report, provides some interpretive guidance: “The ‘centre of main interests’ should 
correspond to the place where the debtor conducts the administration of his interests on a regular 
basis and is therefore ascertainable to third parties.” Id. Courts implementing this new law have 
relied upon this language. E.g., Re BRAC Rent-A-Car Inc., [2003] 2 All E.R. 201, 207–08 (Ch.). 
68
Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009, Art. 36 [2005]
http://repository.law.umich.edu/law_econ_archive/art36
 2005] A MODEL FOR INTERNATIONAL BANKRUPTCY 1003 
 
 
 
 
What is even more interesting is the test’s robustness. There are at 
least two levels on which center of main interests could have been 
modified around the world. First, subsequent reform efforts might have 
tinkered with the test itself. The rule could have elevated “place of 
registered office” to a bright-line rule rather than a mere rebuttable 
presumption. Indeed such a neutral jurisdiction-selecting rule has 
precedent in Article 9 of the U.S. Uniform Commercial Code.255 
Alternatively, subsequent efforts could have softened the rule, along the 
lines of the amorphous standards found in the U.S. Restatement on the 
Conflicts of Laws.256 Neither occurred. Consensus converged on center 
of main interests as an appropriate choice-of-law rule with an 
appropriate degree of specificity.257 
Another way the center of main interests test might have been altered 
would have been to translate it into “local speak.” For example, when 
the United States adopted the Model Law, it could have converted 
center of main interests into a more nationally recognizable standard, 
such as “principal place of business.”258 This would have captured the 
essence of center of main interests, but in a legal parlance more familiar 
to American lawyers. Yet the Americans intentionally used the 
“foreign” language of center of main interests to acclimate local 
bankruptcy professionals to a different, international lexicon.259 Thus 
center of main interests’ robustness seems to be well grounded, both in 
ongoing international reforms and parallel domestic enactments. 
B. Acceptance of Outcome Differences  
1. Acceptance of Outcome Differences Begetting Further 
Acceptance 
A second extrapolation from my model posits that there should be an 
increasing acceptance of outcome differences as the Model Law is 
 
255. U.C.C. §§ 9-301, 9-307 (1998) and commentary. 
256. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS, § 6 (1971) (articulating a “most 
significant contacts” test). 
257. The center of main interests test has now become entrenched enough to lead Bob 
Wessels to call it the “magic words.” Wessels, supra note 82, at 4. The path, thus blazed, perhaps 
proved dependence-inducing. 
258. E.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1) (2000). 
259. Westbrook, supra note 8, at 19 (discussing the Congressional hearings on the proposed 
Chapter 15 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, the recommendation of a minority of commentators that 
the committee use American phraseology, and the ultimate decision of the committee to track the 
Model Law’s language verbatim). 
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rolled out and the first instances of outcome difference are felt. But this 
prediction itself rests upon a proposition that the initial acceptance of 
outcome differences will beget the further acceptance of outcome 
differences along an accelerating path. The support for this embedded 
assumption is the intuition that what lies at the root of territorialist 
states’ aversion to outcome differences is often nothing more than free-
floating concerns of sovereignty and discomfort with foreign laws.260 
If that is so, then the best solution for easing this distrust may be 
simple exposure to foreign laws. The educational benefit of such 
exposure has been well noted: 
Perhaps the most important benefits of comparative law are 
educational. It is true that many of these benefits can be 
generated by looking only at foreign national systems: 
experiencing the variety and contingency of law, learning 
tolerance toward other legal cultures, critically looking back at 
one’s own rules, and so forth. Here, exactly what other legal 
system students are exposed to is actually of secondary 
importance; what is crucial is that they step outside of their own 
legal system at all.261 
If what holds many states back from embracing universalism and its 
acceptance of outcome differences is in part a fear of “different” foreign 
law, then mere exposure to those different systems, and their potentials 
for different outcomes, may desensitize insolvency participants and 
prompt a more critical reexamination of the perceived evils of those 
foreign laws. Recall that the Model Law’s administrative provisions 
remove procedural barriers to communication between insolvency 
tribunals in different countries.262 Consequently, judges (and litigants) in 
 
260. Avi-Yonah, supra note 48, at n.22 (“Countries may object to having the law of another 
country apply within their territory as a matter of sovereignty, even if they agree with the policy 
of the law in question.”). 
261. Mathias Reimann, Beyond National Systems: A Comparative Law for the International 
Age, 75 TUL. L. REV. 1103, 1113 (2001). See also Mooney, supra note 48, at n.106  
(While I cannot prove it, my participation in and observations of the process of 
negotiation and debate convinced me that the only reason for the objections to including 
the substance of Alternative A alone as a choice for a Contracting State is that 
Alternative A follows closely United States law—section 1110 of the Bankruptcy Code. 
Having witnessed the Convention and Protocol being modeled on the substance and 
policies of U.C.C. Article 9 and the Canadian personal property security acts, perhaps 
borrowing from United States bankruptcy law was simply ‘too much’ for the objecting 
states.). 
262. MODEL LAW, supra note 5, art. 25. Indeed, facilitating discussion should in and of itself 
reduce the collective action problem that some contend is the main reason for an insolvency 
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cross-border proceedings will now be able to interact more directly and 
easily than ever before.263 The dynamic reassessment of domestic 
bankruptcy laws by states under such a regime may well make 
territorially disposed states less nervous about foreign bankruptcy law 
and more amenable to the acceptance of outcome differences.264 
Moreover, because the defining theoretical attributes of a bankruptcy 
regime (broad, invasive reach of jurisdiction involving redistributive 
norms) lend themselves to a noisy international environment of 
conflicting and overlapping claims, the Model Law’s facilitation of 
judicial dialogue may well reduce the noise and create situations where 
orderly communication can find more common ground than initially 
anticipated. Accordingly, it seems plausible that the initial acceptance of 
outcome differences will in turn beget the further acceptance of 
outcome differences.265 
 
system in the first place. The EU Regulation actually imposes an affirmative “duty to cooperate,” 
although the duty is directed at bankruptcy representatives rather than courts themselves. See 
Wessels, supra note 6, at 493; see also Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Duty to Seek Cooperation 
in Multinational Insolvency Cases, ANNUAL REV. OF INSOLV. L., 187 (2005) (arguing for an 
affirmative duty on courts to cooperate “actively” in multinational insolvencies with proceedings 
in multiple countries). 
263. See Anne-Marie Slaughter, Judicial Globalization, 40 VA. J. INT’L L. 1103, 1113–14 
(2000) (discussing the increased cross-border “dialogue” of appellate courts with their 
international peers). Professor Westbrook has already noted the significant challenges on matters 
as simple as using a common lexicon. Westbrook, supra note 105, at 567–68 (explaining the need 
for exposure to both foreign terms and foreign constructs of insolvency law, such as the American 
notion of a “debtor-in-possession” who may act within the “ordinary course of business”) (citing 
11 U.S.C. §§ 363(c), 1107). 
264. An illustration of this phenomenon might be in the alteration of domestic notice 
requirements in the wake of the Model Law. See Wessels, supra note 6, at 505 (“This Model Law 
aims to urge and inspire in a way to adapt the national insolvency law.”). Cf. Colloquy, supra note 
2, at 2274 (“Indeed, to the extent that the different laws are just different attempts to reach the 
same goals, countries could learn from the experiences of other nations and update their law 
accordingly.”). 
265. One of the recurring concerns of transnational insolvency is the information costs of 
gaining familiarity with different countries’ laws. The participants in the ongoing debate differ 
sharply in their assessments. Colloquy, supra note 2, at 2261–62 (“The largest potential cost is 
getting a handle on the law of the country selected [under a contractarian approach to 
transnational insolvency].”). Professor Rasmussen might be troubled at the point made in the 
text—that the Model Law would promote and perhaps require exposure to multiple states’ laws—
given his prediction that a menu approach would more efficiently sharpen the international focus 
onto understanding the laws of only a few. Id. But the point I wish to make is that the Model Law 
is helpful as a stepping stone to a future adoption of universalism. It promotes exposure to foreign 
laws even in the non-universalist parallel proceedings, which will make the eventual jump to full-
fledged universalism at a future time less costly, when legal education becomes a sort of sunk 
cost. Put another way, I suppose I anticipate the direct and indirect benefits from a robust 
comparison of laws outweighing the costs of learning those laws. 
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2. Evidence of Increased Acceptance of Outcome Differences and 
Harmonization 
The evidence for an increased acceptance of outcome differences is 
harder to unearth than for the rollout of center of main interests. One 
illustration would be a rise in deference to foreign insolvencies under 
the Model Law than under pre-existing regimes such as Section 304(c) 
of the U.S. Code, but the domestic enactment of the Model Law is not 
yet widespread enough to test this. On the other hand, the EU 
Regulation, which is premised upon the same spirit as the Model Law, 
shows some promising trends in jurisdictional deference. In one early 
case decided under the Regulation (which only came into force in 
2002), Re Daisytek-ISA Ltd.,266 the High Court in the United Kingdom 
opened a main insolvency proceeding, finding that it was the center of 
main interests not only of the English debtor, but also of its French and 
German-incorporated subsidiaries.267 This decision, in effect, rebutted 
the presumption of center of main interests being the country of 
registered office of the subsidiaries. The French trial court, as did the 
German analogue, disavowed this jurisdictional conclusion and opened 
a rival main proceeding for the French subsidiary, chafing at what it felt 
was the British court’s aggrandizement of jurisdiction.268 But the 
Appeals Court in Versailles reversed, clarifying that in international 
bankruptcies under the EU Regulation, cooperation is required and 
courts should not second-guess a prior court’s determination of center of 
main interests.269 To be sure, this evidence is at best correlational rather 
than causal regarding the role of the Model Law, but it is at least 
 
For a debate on the information costs of territorialism for lenders setting the price of credit, 
compare Guzman, supra note 25, at 2200–01 (predicting higher information costs under 
territorialism due to lenders’ needs to understand multiple bankruptcy laws, not just the law of the 
debtor’s home jurisdiction) with LoPucki, supra note 3, at 754 (challenging both the extent to 
which lenders need to incorporate insolvency law into pricing credit and the conclusion that 
territorialism will be more costly). 
266. [Claim Nos. 861–76 of 2003], [2003] B.C.C. 562 (High Court of Justice (Ch. D.), Leeds, 
May 16, 2003). 
267. For a detailed discussion, see Wessels, supra note 82, at 20–22. 
268. See Trib. comm. pont., May 26, 2003, Cass. com. 
269. See CA Versailles, 24eme ch., Sep. 4, 2003, arret no. 12, available at 
http://www.iiiglobal.org/country/european_union/Daisytek_CA_Versailles.pdf (last visited Nov. 
6, 2005). The French public prosecutor has appealed this decision to the French Supreme Court 
(Cour de cassation) on the grounds of public policy. This apparently was a violation of the 
Principle of Mutual Trust, a European cognate of full faith and credit with regard to jurisdictional 
decisions. See Wessels, supra note 6, at 503 n.39. For another European discussion—critical of 
the Daisytek outcome—see Christoph G. Paulus, Zustandigkeitsfragen nach der Europeishcen 
Insolvenzverordnung (working paper and English abstract on file with author). 
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consistent with the theoretical predictions of greater acceptance of 
foreign deference and cooperation in cross-border bankruptcy. Because 
at this nascent stage empirical claims are at best speculative, I present 
anecdotally the observation from conversations with European 
colleagues that a decade ago a French court would likely find it 
“unthinkable” that an English corporate affiliate could lead to the 
application of British insolvency law of an otherwise “French” debtor. 
What might demonstrate further acceptance of outcome differences 
more strikingly would be if international harmonization were shown to 
be on the rise after the Model Law. Again, there is some tentative 
evidence here that is consistent with further movement building upon 
the Model Law’s base. The first development is UNCITRAL’s Draft 
Legislative Guide on Insolvency Law.270 This enormous document, 
building on an earlier effort of the World Bank,271 is an ambitious 
attempt to set out summaries and principles of domestic insolvency 
regimes, and it contains broad, standards-based recommendations for 
best practices for domestic bankruptcy codes. Multiple years in the 
drafting, the final text was adopted by UNCITRAL’s Working Group in 
2004.272 To be sure, many difficult questions are avoided in this 
document, but the distillation of general principles arguably begins the 
road to harmonization.273 
 
270. UNCITRAL Draft Legislative Guide, supra note 7. 
271. See WORLD BANK PRINCIPLES, supra note 26. 
272. U.N. COMM. ON INT’L TRADE LAW, UNCITRAL LEGISLATIVE GUIDE ON INSOLVENCY 
LAW (2004). The document is divided into two parts. Part One is a sort of preamble that 
propounds the “Key Objectives and Structure of an Effective and Efficient Insolvency Law.” Part 
Two breaks out those specific provisions and employs a tripartite structure: a survey of various 
approaches to the insolvency issue discussed; a recommendation based on those experiences; and 
contents of a model legislative provision to implement those recommendations. The 
recommendations are mostly soft. See, e.g., id. at 198 (“The law should protect a general right of 
set-off existing under general law that arose prior to the commencement of insolvency 
proceedings, subject to the application of avoidance provisions.”). On the other hand, and further 
supporting my model, the document gets specific on more technical (and arguably procedural 
matters), such as voting methods in reorganization proceedings. See, e.g., id. at 277:  
To facilitate voting and recognize the increasing use of electronic means of 
communication, it may be desirable to permit voting to take place in person, by proxy 
and by electronic means. The majority should be calculated by reference to those 
actually voting, whether in person, by proxy or by other means.  
Interestingly, the publication of the Draft Legislative Guide in September 2003 had to omit the 
choice of law recommendations, which came in January 2004. These recommended choice of law 
rules are messy, but struggle toward endorsing a form of universalism. See, e.g., id. at 89 
(assuming that the center of main interests test would presumptively determine controlling 
insolvency law under rule of lex fori concursus in crafting regulated financial markets exception). 
273. Building upon the reform of the EU Regulation, an apparently self-appointed “Working 
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A second indication toward harmonization is the focus on 
diminishing the special priority provisions that accord distributional 
preference. With each insolvency regime having its idiosyncratic 
provisions of special creditors who get paid ahead of the rank and file 
(the United States boasts no fewer than seventeen types of them),274 the 
number of friction points between nations is high. Yet a trend is 
emerging toward downplaying these priorities. UNCITRAL’s 
Legislative Guide begrudgingly countenances these domestic priorities, 
mindful of the normative, country-specific policies they embrace, but 
then admonishes countries to reduce reliance on them as much as 
possible.275 And this call for diminution has been heard. In the 2002 
revisions to the United Kingdom’s Enterprise Act, there was an express 
reduction in the number of priority creditors in bankruptcy.276 The 
elimination and reduction of priority provisions for special creditors 
provides fewer points for sovereigns to fight about when comparing the 
varying potential dispositions of a bankruptcy. With fewer areas on 
which the outcomes can differ, the fewer incidences there will be in 
which a state is called upon to cede regulatory sovereignty in an 
outcome-determinative manner. Thus there is preliminary evidence to 
indicate that the Model Law is correlated (and possibly causally 
connected) with an increase in the acceptance of outcome differences in 
bankruptcy.277 
 
Group on European Insolvency Law” presented “Principles of European Insolvency Law,” in 
Brussels in 2003. This document is a collection of fourteen principles purporting to cull general 
trends of European substantive insolvency law. The Working Group has also followed the ALI 
TIP model and prepared summaries of domestic insolvency law of ten of the EU member states. 
See PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN INSOLVENCY LAW (Bob Wessels ed.), available at 
http://www.iiiglobal.org/country/european_union/PEILABIjournal_appended.pdf (last visited 
Nov. 6, 2005). 
274. 11 U.S.C. § 507(a) (2000). 
275. See U.N. Comm. On Int’l Trade Law, Draft Legislative Guide On Insolvency Law ¶ 628, 
U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/WG.V/WP.70 (2004) [hereinafter UNCITRAL Draft Legislative Guide 
(2004)] (“The provision of priority rights has the potential to foster unproductive debate on the 
assessment of which creditors should be afforded priority and the justifications for doing so.”). 
Nevertheless, the Draft Legislative Guide concedes cryptically that there may be a “need to strike 
a balance between private rights and public interests,” in creating priority provisions, id. ¶ 631, 
and ultimately recommends that a bankruptcy law should “minimize priorities” and “set out 
clearly the claims” that will receive that priority, id. at 237. The World Bank is more forgiving 
and recognizes that countries may wish to accord priority status to employees to “ensur[e] 
employee security,” WORLD BANK PRINCIPLES, supra note 26, ¶ 148, perhaps mindful of a 
different audience base. 
276. See E. Bruce Leonard, The International Year in Review, AM. BANKR. INST. J. 22 
(Dec/Jan 2004/2005) (discussing abolition of priority for governmental claims). 
277. What is also interesting is the difficulty at cabining areas of bankruptcy once 
international cooperation has begun. For example, although the EU Regulation thought it “best to 
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C. Vector of Reform 
As modeled above, the incrementalist path to transnational 
insolvency reform suggests that the areas on which sovereigns will be 
asked to yield will proceed from perceived lower-stakes matters to 
higher-stakes matters. This may move along a spectrum from more-
procedural provisions to more-substantive provisions. Some subsequent 
efforts to the Model Law appear to fit this trend.278 
Recall that Article 14 of the Model Law forced some acceptance of 
outcome difference regarding the standard and content of international 
notice.279 In bankruptcy, notice likely falls at the procedural end of a 
spectrum. At the other end of the spectrum are the meatier provisions, 
such as the priority rules. Searching for a middle ground between these 
two elements of a bankruptcy law, one might consider the stay. The stay 
that operates at the outset of a case within many systems provides what 
conceivably is a “middle stakes” provision. On the one hand, a 
bankruptcy stay is simply a procedural order temporarily enjoining 
other actions.280 On the other hand, the halting of individual collections 
is critical;281 it forces joint resolution of the collective action problem 
that many contend is the theoretical anchor of a bankruptcy system.282 
So it might be fair to consider the bankruptcy stay as “procedure plus” 
when placed upon a procedural-substantive continuum. 
Using the model of procedural incrementalism, we would be 
unsurprised if the next domain of sovereignty cession in bankruptcy 
came on matters of the stay. Recall that the Model Law already requires 
a recognizing state to impose a stay upon recognition of a foreign main 
bankruptcy proceeding; this stay operates coextensively with the stay, if 
any, that is imposed under domestic insolvency law.283 The ALI’s TIP, 
 
postpone” the difficult issue of corporate groups, that matter became inevitable as cases had to 
make decisions over center of main interests in corporate bankruptcies. Wessels, supra note 82, at 
18. 
278. Although beyond the scope of this Article, a cursory review of UNCITRAL’s Draft 
Legislative Guide reveals greater specificity on more technical, procedural matters (such as 
majority-vote calculation rules) than on other, more substantive provisions (such as avoidance 
rules), consistent with my model. See generally UNCITRAL Draft Legislative Guide (2004), 
supra note 275. 
279. MODEL LAW, supra note 5, art. 14. 
280. The ALI TIP places matters of stays under the heading “Procedural Principles.” See ALI 
TIP, supra note 8, Procedural Principles 4–6; see also Adler, supra note 20, at 235–36. 
281. See LoPucki & Triantis, supra note 80, at 333. 
282. See JACKSON, supra note 19, at 7–19. 
283. See MODEL LAW, supra note 5, art. 20(1). Strictly speaking, this is perhaps not so much 
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expressly noting its incremental extension of the Model Law,284 and also 
employing the packaging of procedure,285 goes a step further. It suggests 
that the NAFTA countries modify their domestic bankruptcy laws 
beyond the provisions of the Model Law to provide for the imposition 
of the domestic law stay to be automatic upon the filing of a foreign 
proceeding in a NAFTA country, rather than first requiring the 
recognition of that foreign proceeding as a foreign main proceeding by 
a domestic court.286 Thus the ALI TIP pushes universalism even further 
than the Model Law, and does so, incrementally, with the stay. 
A more striking acceptance of outcome differences would be to force 
the domestic state’s courts to accord the automatic stay not simply a co-
extensive scope with domestic law, as it does under the Model Law, but 
the scope a stay would receive under the foreign state’s laws. At the 
extreme, this might force an “anti-stay” jurisdiction,287 to enter a stay 
upon the recognition of a foreign main proceeding from a “pro-stay” 
jurisdiction.288 This appears to be the step taken by the EU Regulation, 
and thus moves universalism a notch even further.289 Accordingly, it 
does seem that other reform efforts are building upon the Model Law’s 
foundation and moving, incrementally, along what could well be a 
procedural continuum.290 
 
an acceptance of outcome differences as it is an acceptance of the de facto foreign exercise of 
domestic legal authority, which is a related if perhaps lesser sovereign concession. 
284. See ALI TIP, supra note 8, Recommendation 2: Automatic Stay & cmt. (“This 
recommendation again follows the Model Law, but goes further.”). 
285. See id. at 35, General Principle II (“This Project is primarily devoted to procedural 
questions.”). 
286. See id., rec. 2 & cmt. (“It would mean that if the center of a debtor’s main interests is in 
a NAFTA country, a bankruptcy filing in that country would produce a moratorium in all three 
countries immediately and automatically without any need for court action in the first instance.”). 
287. See Anderson, supra note 31, at 705; see also Bufford & Yanagida, supra note 42 
(noting that under certain Japanese procedures pre-petition employee claims are not stayed). 
Possibly because of this extreme stance, Japan scaled back Article 20 in enacting the Model Law 
and restricted the scope of the automatic stay to enter upon recognition of a foreign main 
proceeding. See Leonard, supra note 276, at 22 (discussing domestic enactments). On the other 
hand, Japan’s recent revision to its Corporate Reorganization Law institutes some stay-like 
restraints on creditors in a reorganization. See id; see also Bufford & Yanagida, supra note 42. 
288. See 11 U.S.C. § 363. Indeed, this seems not that much more conceptually disharmonious 
than Article 31’s imposition of a presumption of insolvency by recognition of a foreign 
bankruptcy proceeding that has no insolvency screen. 
289. The EU Regulation’s convoluted secondary proceedings approach makes its overall “net 
universalism” vis-à-vis the Model Law’s difficult to measure. Also, as discussed above in note 
251 and accompanying text, the overlap between the EU Regulation and the Model Law is 
somewhat untidy from a chronological perspective. 
290. UNCITRAL’s Draft Legislative Guide gets a bit bolder in pushing for harmonization 
with regard to stays, suggesting that they comport with the key objectives of bankruptcy systems 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
Debate in commercial law has been proceeding as rapidly as 
international economic integration. High-profile collapses from 
Parmalat to Yukos have attracted increased focus to international 
financial default. Yet the field of transnational insolvency has 
remained—at least until the past few years—stubbornly resistant to 
reform.291 
The UNCITRAL Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency shattered 
that stalemate and received widespread enthusiastic reception. Indeed, it 
has just become Chapter 15 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code. In doing so, it 
presented a puzzle: why was this mechanism of reform able to succeed 
in the face of such past failure? What unique theoretical characteristics 
of bankruptcy law did it tap into? This Article proposed a model of how 
the Model Law was able to win international acceptance even in the 
absence of theoretical and political consensus of how best to design a 
transnational insolvency regime. It argued that the Model Law’s success 
lay in the need for incremental reform in bankruptcy, reform that allows 
sovereignty-sensitive states to acclimate to the extraterritorial reach of 
foreign laws. It further proposed that that success may in turn have 
relied upon the ability of the drafters to capitalize on the much-
discussed distinction between substance and procedure in conflicts 
theory—a distinction that some scholars contend is canonical to the 
thorny challenges of international conflicts. Such appreciation and 
exploitation provided the key both to developing a workable choice-of-
law rule and to fostering among sovereigns the acceptance of outcome 
differences in international bankruptcies, the two theoretical foundations 
of the universalist paradigm. 
 
and that they should even apply to secured creditors (which is not true in many jurisdictions), 
although the Guide then adds, with unusual specificity, that secured creditor stays should be short, 
perhaps between 30 to 60 days. See Draft Legislative Guide, Part II, supra note 177, at rec. 37(c) 
& n.52. Another example of moving up the procedural spectrum might be the doctrine of 
substantive consolidation, which is a cousin of piercing the corporate veil and permits the 
collapsing of independent corporate entities of an affiliated conglomerate into one bankruptcy 
proceeding. See, e.g., Alexander v. Compton (In re Bonham), 229 F.3d 750, 762 (9th Cir. 2000) 
(“A substantive consolidation seriously affects the substantive rights of the involved parties. The 
bankruptcy rules recognize as much.”). The various Daisytek decisions under the EU Regulation 
have indirectly begun to articulate a European standard for this doctrine. See Wessels, supra note 
82, at 20. 
291. Academics have been calling for reform for quite some time. See, e.g., John Lowell, 
Conflict of Laws as Applied to Assignments of Creditors, 1 HARV. L. REV. 259, 264 (1888) 
(advocating universalism). 
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There is (at least) one serious concern one could have with my 
model. One could agree with all that I have said regarding the nature of 
incremental mechanisms of legal reform but then quarrel with the 
implicit conclusion that such reform in bankruptcy is part of a multi-
staged journey from “proto” to “full” universalism. That is, one could 
have reservations about the momentum of this trajectory. Reform might 
stall in a position where it cannot proceed further.  
This concern is not without merit. Indeed, if my model is premised 
upon states starting with low stakes matters on which it is comparatively 
easy to garner international support and then moving up a continuum 
toward more substantive matters, it might well be that as the cession of 
sovereignty gets increasingly painful, states will reach a balking point.292 
If this is so, then the full “reform” of a pluralist universalist regime may 
never come to fruition. Indeed, in a worst-case scenario, a Frankenstein 
interim regime might entrench a new status quo that is less efficient and 
desirable than might have otherwise been obtained under naked 
territorialism.293 
I am not as yet so despondent. The principal reason for optimism 
stems from the discussion above pertaining to the increased acceptance 
of outcome differences fostered by the Model Law and its progeny.294 
The danger of reform stalling depends upon how willing states will be 
to countenance the increasing invasion of foreign bankruptcy laws on 
proceedings arguably within their sovereign jurisdiction.295 As discussed 
above, those are unlikely to be static preferences, because the mere 
exposure itself to foreign systems may have a positive influence on 
states’ perceptions of the undesirability of ceding to other states’ 
 
292. Conceivably, this is what happened with Japan’s modification of article 20 to scale back 
the universalist presumption of an automatic stay in accordance with the home state’s laws. Japan 
is an anti-stay jurisdiction and has a long tradition of territorialism. 
293. A bankruptcy regime’s theoretical reliance upon a market-symmetric scope can be 
distorted by unpredictable stays based on differing controlling jurisdictions. 
294. There will also always be academic pressure. See Mooney, supra note 193, at 204 
(“Useful as harmonization efforts concerning procedural aspects of insolvency law for 
multinational debtors may prove, perhaps it is time to step up efforts to modernize and harmonize 
the substantive law….”). Interestingly, the first step Professor Mooney proposes to facilitate this 
harmonization in the secured transactions context is to begin with requiring an international 
public registry of security interests, i.e., a system of publicizing notice of security interests—
arguably a procedural starting point. 
295. Cf. Michael Schroeder, New Role for SEC: Policing Companies Beyond U.S. Borders, 
WALL ST. J., July 30, 2004, at A1 (detailing foreign securities agencies’ enthusiasm over the 
extraterritorial application of U.S. securities laws and deployment of SEC enforcement 
resources). 
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bankruptcy laws.296 Moreover, participants of a transnational bankruptcy 
regime will grow increasingly versed in foreign states’ laws, with 
British lawyers becoming conversant with “section 363 hearings” and 
Americans talking about “administrators” and “floating charges,” 
making those foreign laws ultimately less threatening. More 
importantly, both users will start to talk about the “center of main 
interests” of a corporate bankrupt.297 In short, I suspect nothing will 
succeed like success itself and that the pace of reform will only 
quicken.298 
There are also at least two directions for future research that require 
mention. First, the model presented here for reform is not meant to be 
exclusive. There may be parallel mechanisms of international reform 
operating in concert with procedural incrementalism. One interesting 
possibility is substantively animated incrementalism. Under such an 
approach, commercial reformers might try to carve out a discrete area of 
insolvency regulation and propose a complete, comprehensive set of 
priority rights. Such an approach could still follow an incrementalist 
path, beginning with, say, multi-story commercial office buildings, then 
all commercial real estate, then all real estate, and so forth. And there is 
some evidence of this other road, such as the Cape Town Convention on 
International Interests in Mobile Equipment and the Protocol thereto on 
Matters Specific to Aircraft Equipment.299 In these documents, a highly 
 
296. UNCITRAL’s Draft Legislative Guide seems premised precisely upon this sort of 
dynamic model of exposure and harmonization in advocating the benefits of the Model Law. See 
Draft Legislative Guide, Part II, supra note 177, ¶ 166 (“[A]s the differences between insolvency 
laws increasingly narrow and greater convergence emerges, there are fewer reasons for 
maintaining the territorial approach.”). 
297. See Wessels, supra note 82, at 25 (advocating the creation of a database translating 
European caselaw interpreting the EU Regulation and arguing that such a device will further the 
goal of harmonization). 
298. More generally, as Dean Kramer has discussed, states also derive their own utility from 
“diffuse reciprocity.” See Kramer, supra note 34, at 1026–27 (discussing the term “diffuse 
reciprocity” coined by Robert Keohane in INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND STATE POWER, 
134–48 (1989) (Part II)). Diffuse reciprocity would fall under Kramer’s broader label of 
“multistate policies.” See Kramer, supra note 37, at 313. It refers to situations where a rough 
equivalence of interests will pull states toward cooperation by fostering mutual sacrifice and 
commitment for a greater good. See Kramer, supra note 34, at 1027 (“Note also that diffuse 
reciprocity alone will not generate cooperation. It is, rather, a force that comes into play when 
other factors, like self-interest, create incentives to cooperate but the full benefits and costs of 
doing so are not known with precision.”). Kramer predicts this cooperative impulse will be strong 
in the commercial arena, which seeks to provide “a legal regime whose enforcement is uniform 
and predictable.” Id. at 1016. 
299. The convention and protocol were assembled by UNIDROIT. The convention was 
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discrete area of commercial practice (the financing of aircraft) has been 
carved out for some express harmonization. The draft convention spells 
out the actual priority for secured liens on aircraft and their treatment in 
bankruptcy.300 Rich ground for further analysis exists regarding the 
interaction between such substantive carve-outs and procedural vehicles 
such as the Model Law. 
A second issue has to do with the role of institutions in designing 
international law. The Model Law was the product of UNCITRAL, a 
quasi-legislative international body. Yet other projects of even greater 
ambition, such as the EU Regulation and the ALI TIP, operate at a 
regional level, suggesting that even more fruitful paths for reformers lie 
at the sub-global level. Intuitively, a smaller negotiating table surely 
enables more meaningful consensus. Does this mean that bilateral 
treaties, so popular in the cross-border taxation context, might provide 
an example for future reform? What about the successful “model” 
bilateral tax treaties promulgated by the OECD?301 On the other hand, it 
seems like truly global institutions, such as the World Bank and 
International Monetary Fund, are always important. These international 
institutions play key roles in insolvency law by cross-referencing their 
own reform efforts and building upon the accelerating cooperative 
impetus. Concluding its 1999 Report on “Orderly and Effective 
Insolvency Procedures,” the IMF proposes that in the cross-border 
context its objectives can be best met by “[t]he adoption by countries of 
the Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency prepared by 
UNCITRAL.”302 Thus it seems that both regional and global institutions 
can serve as cheerleaders, taskmasters, and catalysts to encourage and 
 
opened for signature following a three-week diplomatic conference in Cape Town, South Africa 
in October-November 2001 and stemmed from an original proposal to the Governing Council of 
UNIDROIT by the Canadian government in 1988. See generally Charles W. Mooney, Jr., The 
Cape Town Convention on International Interests in Mobile Equipment and the Aircraft 
Equipment Protocol: A New Era for Aircraft Financing, 18 AIR & SPACE L. 4 (2003). 
300. Article 30(1) of the Convention provides that a security interest registered under the 
international registry established under the Convention is to be “effective,” i.e., accorded priority, 
in a subsequent insolvency proceeding. CAPE TOWN CONVENTION, supra note 190, art. 30(1). As 
an interesting twist, certain procedural matters, such as the remedy to enforce a security interest 
created under the Protocol, are left to the domestic laws of the enacting state. See id., art. 14. The 
structure of the Convention seems to anticipate the addition of further protocols beyond aircraft 
equipment. See id., arts. 2(2), 49 & 51. Indeed, UNIDROIT is already in the process of drafting 
protocols for rail equipment and space equipment. 
301. See OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital, supra note 213. 
302. INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, LEGAL DEPARTMENT, ORDERLY & EFFECTIVE 
INSOLVENCY PROCEDURES, KEY ISSUES 15 (1999) at 82, available at http://www.imf.org/ 
external/pubs/ft/orderly/index.htm (last visited Nov. 6, 2005). 
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assist countries in synchronizing their efforts to develop a coherent 
international system. The interaction between these institutions and the 
procedural mechanisms of bankruptcy reform would benefit from 
further exploration. 
Reform in transnational insolvency law—both in explicit cross-
border legal regimes and domestic legal regimes that have international 
reach—is exploding. Further efforts can be random and experimental, 
creating a natural laboratory. Or they can proceed with an eye to critical 
analysis of which mechanisms seem to work at securing positive 
international reception, such as the Model Law, and to try to understand 
why. Practitioners, regulators, and scholars will be well advised to 
follow the latter path. This Article offers the model of procedural 
incrementalism to assist them in their important task.303 
 
 
303. Also beyond the scope of this Article but worthwhile of future inquiry is the potentially 
unique nature of bankruptcy law within commercial law more generally. An initial distinguishing 
characteristic that comes to mind is the compulsory nature of the law that is not currently 
amenable to opt out through contractual arrangement, a point of some academic discussion 
already. See Rasmussen, supra note 35, at 17–19. This may render it inappropriate for the 
voluntary “private choice” of international jurisdictional competition advocated by some scholars. 
See, e.g., Stephan, supra note 11, at 788–96; John O. McGinnis, The Political Economy of 
International Antitrust Harmonization, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV. 549, 577–87 (2003) (preferring 
jurisdictional competition with an antidiscrimination rule to harmonization and the international 
regulatory regime espoused by, e.g., Spencer Weber Waller, The Internationalization of Antitrust 
Enforcement, 77 B.U. L. REV. 343, 400 (1997)). Thus whether bankruptcy law can even enter a 
race, regardless of whether it is to the top or bottom, requires further discussion at another time. 
For the impatient reader, consult LYNN M. LOPUCKI, COURTING FAILURE (2005) (chronicling 
domestic and global trends in forum selection and purported “judicial competition” in 
bankruptcy). 
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